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Abstract 
Literature reviewed so far shows that several scholars dismiss targeted killings as clear violation 
of international law; while others argue that it is the law that should adapt to its contemporary 
context of application. My thesis argues in favour of the latter concept. My aim is to clarify the 
current legal interpretation of targeted killings and then enhance and supplement the 
international legal framework by identifying a range of standards in which states can lawfully 
and effectively defend themselves against terrorists.  Critical analysis of legislations permitting 
the use of lethal force, through the methodological approach of doctrinal analysis, which focuses 
on the meaning of legal categories in the abstract, reveals that targeted killing is an accepted 
form of self-defence, during peace time, only when it is carried out in response to imminent 
threats that are both instant and overwhelming. A would-be victim must have no alternative 
choice of means and no moment of deliberation but to respond to an armed attack in a 
proportionate measure. From the perspective of such doctrinal analysis, only upon satisfaction of 
this condition can Article 51 of the United Nations Charter be invoked. Laws of Armed Conflict 
permit the use of targeted killings against civilians only when they are found to be directly 
participating in hostilities against those targeting them.  By cross referencing these legal 
provisions with the supplementary methodology of socio-legal studies, which in contrast to 
doctrinal approach focuses analysis upon of the law in action, it is possible to secure more 
critical insights. My research has thus identified discrepancies between these regulatory laws and 
their actual application to practical scenarios.  
The thesis addresses the following questions: firstly, because terroristic plots are typically 
planned covertly and executed instantaneously, what comprises the catalyst for victims of 
terrorism - who do not have an overwhelming imminent threat experience - to enable them to 
mount an effective defence?  Secondly, since terrorists covertly plot and execute attacks, how 
can states fulfil the condition under the laws of armed conflict of finding terrorists engaged in the 
act of hostilities in order to fulfil the present criteria for ‘lawful targeting processes’?  Existing 
                                                                                     
international law provisions, appearing to permit killing in self-defence within limited 
parameters, are underdeveloped and the legality of targeted killing is, therefore, debateable. 
Thus, the thesis adopts a mixed method approach that critically evaluates legislative provisions 
permitting killing in self-defence and the viability of their application to practical scenarios. 
They include the following: A qualitative hermeneutical analysis of theoretical perspectives from 
legal realist, liberal cosmopolitan and pragmatic schools of thought and associated 
methodologies. This will highlight challenges with attempts to fully applying existing law to 
contemporary targeted killing; and a semi-quantitative approach using the Peace War Game 
Theory analytical tool. In order to clarify the contribution of targeted killings as a viable 
counterterrorism strategy, the latter methodological approach, which addresses the options facing 
different parties relative to their goals, serves as a new lens for predetermining the outcomes of 
strategic decisions, regarding the long term utilization of targeted killings.  As an original 
contribution to the literature, my research critically tests the viability of this game theory 
methodological approach as a means of adding something new to existing debates over research 
practice. It further suggests guidelines for a new legal model focussed, in particular, upon the use 
of targeted killings as a counterterrorism strategy. As the game theory methodological approach 
envisages, deployment of targeted killing may only serve to alleviate or defer future terroristic 
activities from persons who have been killed rather than eliminate terrorism and its concept 
completely.
 1 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 5 
1.1.1 What is Targeted Killing? ......................................................................................... 8 
1.1.2 Relevance and scope of the Research ..................................................................... 12 
1.1.3 Distinction between Targeted Killing and Assassination ....................................... 13 
1.2 Two paradigms of Analysis: The LOAC vs. IHRL (law enforcement). ........................ 15 
1.2.1 1.2.2. Law enforcement of International human rights laws (IHRL) ...................... 29 
1.2.3. The Caroline Test and Article 51 of the UN Charter ................................................... 31 
1.3 Overview of the Literature: (Theoretical Underpinnings and Original Contribution to 
Research Practice) ..................................................................................................................... 34 
1.5. Research Problems and Methodologies. ............................................................................. 36 
1.5.1. Methodologies .............................................................................................................. 37 
1.6. Summary of Chapters: ........................................................................................................ 37 
1.6.1 Chapter one: .................................................................................................................. 37 
1.6.2 Chapter two: .................................................................................................................. 38 
1.6.3 Chapter three: ................................................................................................................ 38 
1.6.4 Chapter four: ................................................................................................................. 38 
1.6.5 Chapter five: .................................................................................................................. 39 
1.6.6 Chapter six .................................................................................................................... 39 
1.6.8 Definition of Terms an Terminologies ......................................................................... 40 
1.7 Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 40 
CHAPTER TWO: ......................................................................................................................... 42 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TARGETED KILLING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIONS 
PERMITTING THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE, THROUGH THE METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH OF DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS............................................................................... 42 
2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 42 
2.2. What laws appeal to Terroristic Conflicts (Terrorism vs. Targeted Killing)?.................... 44 
2.2.1 LOAC-Conflict ............................................................................................................. 44 
2.2.2 LOAC –Status ............................................................................................................... 46 
2.2.3 LOAC- Rights ............................................................................................................... 47 
2.2.4 LOAC- Mechanism for warfare : US Drone ................................................................. 58 
2.2.5 LOAC Mechanism of Warfare: Israel’s  Scheme ......................................................... 63 
2.5 Terrorism vs. Targeted killings: Applicable under Law IHRL? ......................................... 66 
 2 
 
2.5.1Can the Law Enforcement of Human Rights Regulate Terrorism and Targeted Killings?
 ................................................................................................................................................ 67 
1.7.1 2.5.2. How Article 51 UN Charter relates to Terroristic conflicts .......................... 71 
2.6.3 Current Study: Can existing laws regulate terroristic conflict? .................................... 73 
A HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGIES BEHIND THE TERRORISM VS 
TARGETED KILLING CONFLICT AND DEBATES: THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE 
LIBERAL COSMOPOLITAN, REALIST AND PRAGMATIST SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 79 
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 79 
3.2. Objectives of the Literature Review: .................................................................................. 80 
3.3. The Changing Character of Warfare: ............................................................................. 81 
3.4. Traditional warfare vs. Modern warfare: ............................................................................ 82 
3.5. The Novelty of Targeted killing. ........................................................................................ 84 
3.6. How applicable is Due Process under Law Enforcement of Human Rights? .................... 86 
3.7. What makes the Laws of war inapplicable? ....................................................................... 87 
3.8. Historical Review of Targeted Killing Strategy (the US and Israel): ............................. 89 
3.8.1. Targeted killing by US ............................................................................................ 89 
3.8.2. Targeted Killings by Israel ........................................................................................... 91 
3.9. Ideological Analysis of Terrorism and Targeted Killings .............................................. 95 
3.9.1. The Liberal Cosmopolitan Rationale ........................................................................... 98 
3.9.2The Realist Rationale for Targeted Killings ................................................................ 105 
3.9.3The Pragmatic Rationale for a ‘Guided’ use of Targeted Killings .............................. 114 
3.10. Ethical Concerns by the Three Schools over the Use of Drones .............................. 124 
3.10.1. Drone Debate: The Liberalist Perspective ............................................................... 124 
3.10.2 Drone Debate: The Realist Perspective .................................................................... 131 
3.10.3. Drones Debate: The Pragmatist Perspective and the Researchers Reflection ......... 135 
3.10.4. The Rationale for Exploring the Liberal, Realist and Pragmatist Perspectives ....... 140 
3.11. The Effectiveness of Targeted killing: Current Literature Analysis ......................... 141 
3.11.1. Israel’s Practice ........................................................................................................ 141 
3.11.2.The U.S. Practice: ..................................................................................................... 143 
3.11.3. Justification for Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Killing ........................ 146 
3.11.5. Previous Economics and Game Theory Researches. ............................................ 153 
3.11.6. Derivations on Morality Using Game Theory....................................................... 156 
3.12. The Gaps in the Literature .............................................................................................. 159 
3.13.The Scope of this thesis and the Gaps it intends to fill. ................................................... 166 
3.14.                                 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 168 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 171 
4.2. Research aims and objectives ....................................................................................... 173 
 3 
 
4.3. Overview of the Doctrinal Analysis ............................................................................. 173 
4.5. Empirical Socio-Legal Methodology ............................................................................ 174 
4.3.4 The concept of Interdisciplinary Game Theory Method ............................................. 176 
4.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 212 
5.1. Introduction: ..................................................................................................................... 218 
5.2. The US Counterterrorism Goals: ...................................................................................... 219 
5.3. Data collection/ procedure ................................................................................................ 224 
5.4. Game theory method ........................................................................................................ 226 
5.5. Game plan ......................................................................................................................... 230 
5.6. Components of the Matrices ............................................................................................. 230 
5.7. The goal and values of the parties: ................................................................................... 230 
5.8. Matrices Analysis ............................................................................................................. 231 
5.8.1. Game matrix 1: War (killing) or Peace (no killing) options ...................................... 232 
5.8.2. The rationale behind the suicide bombers scores: ..................................................... 232 
5.8.3.The rationale for the US scores: .................................................................................. 233 
5.8.4. Conclusion on Matrix 1. ............................................................................................ 234 
5.8.5. Matrix 2: War (killing) or Peace (no killing) options with alternative value systems.
 .............................................................................................................................................. 235 
5.8.6. Rationale for the US score ......................................................................................... 236 
5.8.7. Rationale for terrorist scores: ..................................................................................... 236 
5.8.8. Conclusion on matrix 2 .............................................................................................. 237 
5.8.9. Matrix 3: Tit- for-tat Responses ................................................................................ 238 
5.8.10. Rationale for US Scores ........................................................................................... 239 
5.8.11. Rationale for Terrorists scores ................................................................................. 240 
5.8.12. Conclusion on Matrix 3 ........................................................................................... 240 
5.8.13. Matrix 4 : Attacks on assets ..................................................................................... 241 
5.8.14. Rationale for the US scores ...................................................................................... 242 
5.8.15. Rationale for al-Qaeda’s scores ............................................................................... 243 
5.8.16. Conclusion of Matrix 4 ............................................................................................ 243 
5.8.17. Matrix 5: Sanctions .................................................................................................. 244 
5.8.18. Rationale for the US Scores: .................................................................................... 246 
5.8.19. Rationale for Al-Qaeda terrorists scores: ................................................................. 246 
5.8.20. Conclusion on Matrix 5 ........................................................................................... 247 
5.8.21. Matrix 6: Media Campaigns .................................................................................... 248 
5.8.22. Rationale for US Scores: .......................................................................................... 250 
5.8.23. Rationale for Terrorists Score: ................................................................................. 250 
 4 
 
5.8.24. Conclusion on matrix 6 ............................................................................................ 251 
5.8.25. Matrix 7: Cease-fire & negotiate terms for peace. ................................................... 251 
5.8.26. Rationale for the US Scores ..................................................................................... 252 
5.8.27. Rationale for terrorists’ scores ................................................................................. 253 
5.8.28. Conclusion on matrix 7 ............................................................................................ 253 
5.9. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 255 
6.1. Introduction: ..................................................................................................................... 258 
6.2. Limitation of the research ................................................................................................. 258 
6.2.1. Limitation in Scope .................................................................................................... 259 
6.2.3. Methodological limitations ........................................................................................ 262 
6.2.4 Overview of outcomes .................................................................................................... 277 
6.3. Overview of findings ........................................................................................................ 278 
6.4. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 284 
6.5  Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 285 
6.6. Implications for Future Research and Development .................................................... 289 
7.0 . References……………………………………………………………………………....306
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 5 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The United States and Israel have rules, independent of international law, that govern their 
counter-terrorism strategies. Both countries have endorsed targeted killings as a warfare tactic.
1
 
The US favoured method is the missile attack by drones, while Israel prefers bombs in explosive 
booby traps and helicopter missiles.
2
 In the US, the Bush administration declared war on the al-
Qaeda terrorist group after the latter’s attack on US targets on September 11, 2001.3 
Subsequently, the Obama administration began to actively hunt for Al- Qaeda terrorists in order 
to target and kill them, claiming it as an act of self-defence under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter.
4
 Such attacks have led to the controversial killing of wanted leaders of terrorist 
organisations such as Osama Bin Laden in 2010 and Anwar Al-Awlaki in 2011. The Trump 
administration has continued this policy with the killing of al-Bagdadhi in 2019.
5
 US targeted 
killings are not limited to the Asian continent. On 18
th
 March 2015, the Pentagon announced that 
a US drone sent to South of Somalia had targeted and killed Adnan Garar, a leader of Al 
Shabaab, a militant group in Kenya known to have ties with al-Qaeda.
 6
  
                                                          
1
 A. Birdsall, ‘Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of 
International Law.’ [2018] 32(3) Global Society, P241; C. Lovelace, et al. ‘The Domestic use of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles.’ [OUP 2014] P134. 
2
 A. Jurgen, ‘Arms control for armed uninhabited vehicles: an ethical issue.’ [2013] Ethics and Information 
Technology, P16; O. Ben-Naftali, ‘We must not make a scarecrow of the law: A legal analysis of the Israeli Policy 
of targeted killings.’ [2003] 36 Cornell International Law Journal, P1. 
3
 M. Denbeaux, et al, ‘Global War on Terror Timeline: September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009.’ [2017]. 
4
 D. Glazier, ‘Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda within the Law of War.’ [2009] 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.  
P957. 
5
R. Chesney, ‘Who May be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of 
Lethal Force.’ [2010] 13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law,  P3. 
6
 The Pentagon serves as the headquarters of the United States Department of Defence, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/pentagon.htm  [Accessed on 08/12/19] 
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Israel openly adopted a policy of targeted killing at the time of the second intifada
7
 in September 
2000.
8
 So far, the Israelis have identified, located and killed alleged Palestinian terrorists, using 
fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships, tanks, car bombs, booby traps and bullets.
9
In 2012, Israel 
carried out an airstrike that resulted in the targeted killing of Jabari, the Head of the Hamas 
Military wing.
10
  The fact that main targets by the US and Israel have been active Islamic 
terrorists, hints on the fact that the conflict between those targeting and the terrorists being 
targeted is of a religious character.  
 
Targeted killing has been defended as the most reliable counterterrorism strategy where no better 
means are deemed possible in practice.
11
However, targeted killing raises questions as to its 
legality under international law in general and in particular, whether the strategy can be regulated 
by either the Laws of Armed Conflict, or criminal acts requiring ‘due process’ under Law 
Enforcement (IHRL) regimes predicated upon Human Rights norms.  
 
Modern conflict in general and the unique targeted killing counterterrorism strategy in particular 
challenge conventional legal paradigms; thus, the legal literature is divided. Some, authors who 
are preoccupied with determining the legal implications of targeted killing are convinced that it 
is a clear violation of all existing laws that regulate the use of ‘targeted force.’12 Others who are 
convinced that targeted killing is a new conflict strategy which is practically applicable to 
                                                          
7
 Definition of Intifada: Intifada is an Arabic word that translates literally as ‘shaking off’. It has been used to refer 
to legitimate means of resistance against oppression across the Middle East for decades. The second Palestinian 
intifada or uprising, named after the Jerusalem mosque complex where the violence began, occurred at the end of 
September 2000, signifying their frustration over failed negotiations with Israel over the latter’s refusal to relinquish 
authority over the West Bank and Gaza strip. Available at: https://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intifadas 
[Accessed on 19/06/18] 
8
 BBC News, ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada Timeline.’ Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3677206.stm 
[Accessed on 19/06/18] 
9
 S, David ‘Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killings’ (2002) 51 Mideast  Security and Policy Studies. 
10
 L. Kershner, et al ‘Ferocious Israel Assaults on Gaza Kills a Leader of Hamas’. [NYT 2012] P1  
11
 Ibid   
12
 E. Archambault , ‘Targeted Killing, Technologies of Violence, and Society’ [2018] 47(1) Sage Journal of 
International Studies, P144.  
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modern conflict have focused on determining its viability (justification and effectiveness).
13
 In 
this thesis, I argue in favour of the latter. Existing laws that regulate the use of force can be made 
to adapt to the modern context of targeted killing if the strategy is certified as practicable and 
effective. This chapter highlights the scope of the thesis in order to align the expectations of the 
reader to what is addressed in the thesis. The first paragraph contains a brief overview of the 
topics to be addressed and the relevance of the research. Then the chapter defines targeted killing 
and distinguishes it from assassination. In addition, the chapter also defines terrorism. It then 
gives an overview of the literature that will be reviewed in detail in chapter three. Following this 
is a section detailing the relevance of the research. Then chapter then highlights the background 
of targeted killing and distinguishes it from assassination. It also contrasts the two applicable 
legal frameworks for interpreting targeted killing operations: armed conflict versus law 
enforcement.  
 
This chapter also provides an overview of the literature, highlighting the original contribution to 
academic studies of this thesis. It then highlights the methodologies adopted and how they 
facilitate the resolution of the research aims. This is followed by a brief introduction to the 
methodologies used to carry out the research and the summary of chapters.  Then, the chapter 
introduces and explains the rationale for carrying out a systematic analysis of the efficiency of 
targeted killing operations. The terms used in this thesis that are not specifically defined by any 
legal doctrines or organisations are also highlighted. These include terms like: terroristic 
conflict(s), modern or contemporary conflict, the war against terror, etc. Overall, it is argued that 
the adoption of mixed methodologies strengthen the theoretical and analytical dimensions of the 
practicality and effectiveness of targeted killing. In this thesis, questions are asked and 
                                                          
13
 D. P. Hepworth, ‘Terrorist retaliation? An Analysis of Terrorist Attacks Following the Targeted Killing of top-tier 
al-Qaeda Leadership.’ [2014] 9 Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, P1;  A. Zussman, N. 
Zussman, ‘Assassinations: Evaluating the effectiveness of an Israeli counterterrorism policy using stock market data' 
[2006 ] 202 (2) Journal of Economic Perspectives, P194.  
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arguments that consider different viewpoint are put forward. Any conclusions reached are a 
result of navigating and balancing the various viewpoints.   
1.1.1 What is Targeted Killing? 
There is yet to be an international endorsement of the strategy of targeted killings, neither is 
there a universally adopted definition of the term.
14
 Notwithstanding, the explanation proffered 
by the United Nations (UN) serves as an introduction to the concept of the phrase ‘targeted 
killing of suspected terrorists’ in this thesis.  The UN defines Targeted Killing as “the 
intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by states or their agents acting under 
colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual 
who is not in the physical custody of those targeting them.”15 This definition is adopted for the 
purpose of this thesis, to distinguish it from other types of killings conducted by individuals, 
non-state groups or state agents. This act is contemporarily referred to as a government devised 
counterterrorism strategy because attacks are directed against suspected terrorists who are 
deemed enemies of the states targeting them.
16
  
According to Melzer, “while targeted killings almost invariably involve the use of some sort of 
weapon, there are no limits to alternative methods of taking a human life.
17
  Thus, by these 
definitions given, targeted killing is different from accidental killing and killings permitted under 
law enforcement (as a last resort in self-defence). Examples of targeted killings as identified by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) include those of al-Qaeda members after 
                                                          
14
 J. I. Walsh, ‘The rise of targeted killing'’[2018] 41(1-2 ) Journal of Strategic Studies, P145. 
15
 The definition is obtained from P. Alston, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions,” United Nations, Human Rights Council [28 May 2010]. Available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/Permissibility of Targeted Killing 
31314session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (accessed 6 August 2013); and other definitions such as the ones provided by 
N. Melzer, ‘Targeted Killing in International Law [Oxford: University Press, 2008] PP 3-5, particularly at P5; and 
W. J. Fisher, ‘Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law,’ [2006] 45 (3) Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law,  P715. 
16
 – Melzer Supra P 5 
17
 N. Melzer, ‘Targeted Killing in International Law [OUP 2008] P3 
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the latter’s attack on the US.18 However, this thesis focuses on the US and Israel’s targeted 
killing as a counterterrorism strategy, particularly the use of drones by the US. 
 
Similarly, there is no universally agreed definition of Terrorism.
 19 
 Owing to the political and 
emotional nature of the subject matter, which invariably leads to difficulties in achieving 
unanimity, government agencies around the world have adopted different definitions. For 
instance, the US broadly construes terrorism to mean "premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 
agents".
20
 However, this thesis relies on a non state definition offered by the UN general 
assembly which defines terrorism by condemning the following acts:  
‘Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.’ 21 
 
One incident of terrorism that marked the beginning of radicalism occurred on 22
nd
 July 1968, 
when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al flight, 
marking the start of civilian targeting by a terrorist group.
22
 In 1972, the Palestine Black 
September Organisation attacked and killed 11 Israeli civilians, athletes at the Munich Olympic 
                                                          
18
 J. Pejic, ‘Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications.’ International Review 
of the Red Cross,   10.1017/S1816383114000447 , 1. Also available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/.../jelena_pejic-_armed_drones_-_final_pdf.pdf at P1 [Accessed on 09/02/18] 
19
 FMJ Teichmann, ‘Financing of terrorism through the banking system’ [2019] 22(2) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control P189 
20Section 2656f, ‘U.S. Foreign Relations and Intercourse Annual Report on Terrorism.’ Available at:  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f [Accessed on 13/11/19] 
21
 Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/gal3276.doc.htm [Accessed on 13/11/19] 
22
 C. Berrebi, et al, ‘How does Terrorism Risk Vary Across Space and Time? An Analysis Based on the Israeli 
Experience.’ [2007]18 (2) Defence and Peace Economics, P115. 
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games.
23
 In response, Israel devised the active mechanism of targeted killing to prevent terrorists 
from thriving.
24
  Likewise, the United States (US) response to the 9/11, al-Qaeda terrorist attack 
on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon has given rise to a chain of targeting policies aimed at 
checkmating terrorist activities.
25
 This has led to recurrent drone attacks against al-Qaeda 
suspected terrorists resident in Pakistan and Yemen.
26
 The effects of these attacks are probably 
under-reported and include the number of innocent civilians (including women and children) 
who are killed in the process. 
 
These terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism responses are indications of how the scope, scale, 
and very nature of warfare have changed to involve civilian targeting, within civilian territories.  
As these attacks persist, questions about the legality and justification for the targeting process are 
posed in legal debates involving modern armed conflict and self-defence. The questions asked 
include whether the strategy is legal under either the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) or 
international human rights law (IHRL)  that generally regulate the use of lethal force; whether 
the strategy is an admissible form of self defence under article 51 of the UN Charter; and 
whether targeted killing is effective in facilitating an end to terrorism.
27
 The US and Israel claim 
that although it is unconventional, the strategy of targeted killing has proved to be the most 
practicable and effective method of apprehending terrorist attacks.
28
 In examining these claims, 
this thesis recognises the difficulty in focusing on both countries in detail. Thus the majority of 
examples cited will come from the US. However, the role of Israel in targeted killings cannot be 
ignored. Examples from Israel will be cited to emphasise an argument or for comparative 
purposes.  
                                                          
23
 Ibid  P115 
24
HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture In Israel v. Government of Israel (2005) in K. E.Eichensehr, ‘On 
target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the expansion of targeted killings.’ [2007] 116 (8) The Yale Law Journal 
P1873. 
25
 D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Defence?’ 
[2005] 16 (2) EJIL, P188. 
26
 M.E. O'Connell, ‘The Choice of Law against Terrorism.’ (2010) 4  J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y, P343. 
27
 For Example Supra note 2   
28
 R. Murphy, et al, ‘A. J. Due process and targeted killing of terrorists’ (2009) 31Cardozo L. Rev, P405. 
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The fact that terrorism and targeted killing counterterrorism strategy causes legal debates comes 
as no surprise because its nature evidences  a drastic change in the way conflicts are  handled. 
Thus, the legal bounds of international law on conflict are bound to be challenged.   The nature 
of 21
st
 Century armed conflict differs from that of the 20
th
 Century.
29
 The laws that governed 20
th
 
century armed conflict did not envisage the terroristic type of conflicts of the 21
st
 century. So, is 
it time to review old laws and enact new ones that can be made applicable to 21
st
 Century 
conflicts? Should targeted killing be governed by the law of war, human rights laws or a 
synthesis of both?  
 
Any counterterrorism law must prescribe a practicable method for dealing with terrorists. The 
questions that should be asked, and which this thesis ultimately seeks to answer include; is 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy able to achieve the goals of countering terrorism? In 
answering this question, this thesis explores the question of whether targeted killings should be 
quickly dismissed as illegal simply because it is unconventional. Alternatively, should targeted 
killing strategy be considered on its merits as a practicable, necessary and effective 
counterterrorism solution?  
 
Following this overview, the relevance of this research is highlighted. Subsequently, the two 
dominant paradigms through which one can interpret targeted killings are described. The same 
will later be applied to different facts and cases in the body of the thesis. In addition, the 
evolving method of drone operated targeted kinetic strikes and its potential to be Law of Armed 
Conflict compliant or law enforcement compliant will be discussed in the body of the thesis. 
                                                          
29
 R. Sanders, ‘Response to Tanisha M. Fazal’s review of Plausible Legality: Legal Culture and Political Imperative 
in the Global War on Terror.’ [2019] 17 (2) Perspectives on Politics, P499. 
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Whether or not targeted killing, even through the use of drones could be a valid form of self-
defence under international law is a question that this thesis will also seek to answer.  
1.1.2 Relevance and scope of the Research 
This thesis is a critical, doctrinal, hermeneutical and empirical analysis of the strategy of targeted 
killing and an evaluation of its effectiveness. In this way, this research differs from other works 
that adopt purely doctrinal and transcendent forms of critique, or standards in evaluating targeted 
killing. Even the discussion of targeted killing in the literature will progress from the constant 
attempt at determining its legality under international law into discussions that determine more 
pressing issues like its effectiveness in guaranteeing protection from terrorism.  The starting 
point of the research therefore, is to evaluate the operation of targeted killing in response to 
terrorism,  as well as relevant statutory provisions and practical facts. The aim is to determine 
whether the laws fail on their own standards and whether targeted killing strategy meets its own 
expectation. Furthermore, the reasons for any such failures would be extrapolated and analysed 
with the aim of resolving the discrepancies between the law and practice on the one hand; and 
between ‘simply’ expedient and optimal strategies on the other. Thus, the legal position of 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy is critically analysed. This allows for a better 
understanding of the legal issues that generate debate over the use of targeted killing. From this, 
the gaps in the literature and conflict regulatory policies are identified. 
 
The thesis then determines the rationale for targeted killing. This rationale is weighed against the 
conclusions reached from assessing the effectiveness of targeted killing counterterrorism 
strategy. This considers whether targeted killing meets the intended goals for which it was 
designed.  A major contribution to research is that this thesis offers game theory as a novel 
method of analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy in the field of 
law. The thesis also explores new ways of analysing the ideologies behind terror related conflicts 
 13 
 
(subsequently referred to as terroristic conflicts).  In the end, a range of standards by which states 
can effectively defend themselves against terrorists are suggested.   
 
This thesis will not examine local actions (non-international armed conflict), which do not cross 
international boundaries; this is because it examines international actions, such as drone attacks 
by the US outside its territory. Furthermore, this work will not look at political contexts, since its 
focus is on international law. In reading this work, it should always be borne in mind that the 
focus is on the legal context of international terrorism and targeted killing counterterrorism 
responses.  
1.1.3 Distinction between Targeted Killing and Assassination 
 
Should targeted killing strategy be revised by legislators as viable in terms of its practicality, it 
may put an end to the contention that targeted killing is the same as assassination. The distinction 
between targeted killing and assassination has implications in terms of legality and public 
acceptance. However, the concepts are so intertwined that such distinctions are not easy to make. 
The Legal online dictionary has defined assassination as murder committed by a perpetrator 
without the personal provocation of the victim, who is usually a government official. This 
definition is similar to those contained in Webster and Blacks law dictionaries and scholarly 
literature including the report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions.
30
   
 
                                                          
30
Available at: https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/assassination [accessed on 30/06/18];  N. Melzer 
‘Targeted killings in International Law.’ (2009) EJIL, P449; P. Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution Study on Targeted Killings (2006) 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add 
P6.  
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Assassination is per se illegal, whereas targeted killing may be legal or illegal, depending on 
how it is justified under either the laws of armed conflict or the self-defence law.
31
 Targeted 
killing may easily be seen as a modern rhetoric to justify murder because the elements that make 
assassination illegal are all present in a case of targeted killing.  For instance, the fact that 
assassination and targeted killing are premeditated, involving murder of persons who are not in 
the physical custody of those wanting them dead and usually in exercise of state mission, (all of 
which are unjustifiable under law en   forcement courts and the LOAC) are proof 
of their similarities. It is difficult to differentiate between the two. This is why targeted killing is 
dismissed by humanitarian experts as extra-judicial.
32
 It is only on grounds of technicality that 
one can begin to distinguish between the two. While assassination is not a new phenomenon, 
targeted killing by state actors, especially by drones, is a 21
st
 century counterterrorism strategy. 
Targeted killing of terrorists has the tendency to invoke the approval of commentators who 
recognise the seriousness of terrorism. They realise that international laws are very restrictive in 
how they prescribe that such threats can be dealt with.
33
 In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attack, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 permitted the US to take 
‘necessary steps’ towards preventing future terrorist attacks.34 This is proof that the impact of 
terrorism on victims generally invokes worldwide sympathy and any strategy devised for 
tackling terroristic threats should be considered on its merits. As Jose observes, “immediate 
reactions to bin Laden’s targeted killing seemed to take little issue with it. Such was the case 
even among actors who previously opposed other US targeted killings or demanded more 
information about them. This is surprising as its legality was arguably as questionable as the 
                                                          
31
 H. A. Wachtel, ‘Targeting Osama bin Laden: Examining the Legality of Assassination as a Tool of US Foreign 
Policy.’ [2005]55.3Duke Law Journal, P679. 
32
 F. Seatzu, ‘Enhancing the Implementation of  the State's Dut y to Investigate Targeted Killings in the Case-Law of 
the European Court of Human Rights and American Court of H  uman Rights.’ [2018] 34 Anuario 
Espanol de Derecho International  P 601. 
33
 For Example the DPH restrictions under the LOAC Nils Melzer, ‘ Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of DPH 
Under International Humanitarian  Law [2009], https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_il_rule6_sectiona [Accessed on 14/11/19]  
34
 S/Res/1368 [2001] The United Nations, available at: https://www.un.org › counterterrorism › ctitf › sres1368-2001  
; S/Res 1373 [2001] Par. 1-3. Available at: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/databases/recommended-
international-practices-codes-and-standards/united-nations-security-council-resolution-1373-2001/  [Both accessed 
on 14/11/19] 
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killings which were condemned or questioned.”35 The effect of terrorism on its victims evokes a 
high level of sympathy and acceptance of targeted killing as the necessary step towards 
preventing future terrorist attacks.
 36
  It is not likely that assassination will ever evoke similar 
empathy. Thus, the interest that targeted killing evokes in the literature is an incentive for 
carrying out this research.  
 
Many incidences of terrorism and targeted killing responses have resulted is policies and rhetoric 
which blur the edifice of international law and global public order.
37
 These prompt the questions: 
can terrorism be an act of armed conflict? What are the criteria for determining that a situation is 
an armed conflict? Will terrorism meet those criteria? If it does, then can the targeted killing of a 
terrorist be justified under the LOAC? If a terrorist act does not meet the LOAC criteria, how 
will this affect a targeted killing response? Will the targeted killing response be justified under 
another rule i.e under IHRL? The controversy generated by the novelties in modern warfare 
comes sharply into focus with regard to targeted killing; the following paragraphs attempt to 
answer the questions by clarifying the positions of the relevant laws. 
1.2 Two paradigms of Analysis: The LOAC vs. IHRL (law enforcement). 
The ongoing conflict between terrorists and western states including the US, often referred to as 
modern or contemporary warfare, is different from that of traditional warfare which is governed 
by the LOAC. The conflict is also alien to the IHRL because it does not usually consider due 
process of law which is a characteristic of the IHRL. Hence, questions arise generally as to the 
applicability of either the LOAC or the IHRL to contemporary warfare involving terrorism and 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy. The dual applicability of both regimes to terroristic 
                                                          
35
 B. Jose, ‘Bin Laden’s Targeted Killing and Emerging Norms.’ [2017] 10 (1) Critical Studies on Terrorism, P52. 
36
 See generally Article 39, 41, 42 and 51, Charter of the UN; Available at: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7158.doc.htm [accessed on 30/06/18].  
37
 The Israeli case supra; D. Kaye, ‘International Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Targeted 
Killing’ (2013) 8 ASIL Insights, P3 
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conflicts (terrorism v. targeted killings counter terrorism) is one that both parties to the conflict 
seek to exploit.  
Targeted killing operations can be used in a dual legal and operational context and there are two 
regimes under which they can be evaluated. They may be viewed under the models of either law 
enforcement of international human rights laws (IHRL) or warfare regulated by the laws of 
armed conflict (LOAC), otherwise known as International Humanitarian Law. The LOAC 
regulates warfare and the IHRL is applicable in absence of war (peacetime).
38
 This means that 
targeted killing can either be within the context of an ongoing armed conflict situation and/or as 
part of a ‘beefed up’ police operation.  
 
Under the LOAC, a distinction can be made between non international armed conflict and 
international armed conflict. Under Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, non-international armed conflicts are armed conflicts in which one or more non-state 
armed groups are involved.
39
 Depending on the situation, hostilities may occur between 
governmental armed forces and non-state armed groups or between such groups only.
40
 Indeed, 
any armed conflict between governmental armed forces and armed groups or between such 
groups should ideally take place on the territory of one of the parties to the Convention.
41
 
Furthermore, two requirements are necessary for such situations to be classified as non 
international armed conflicts: Firstly, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity.
 42
 
This may be the case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the 
government resorts to using the means and methods of warfare against the insurgents, instead of 
                                                          
38
 . M. Coleman, ‘The Legality Behind Targeted Killings and the Use of Drones in the War on Terror.’ [2014] 5, 
Global Security Studies, P1. 
39
 Common Article 3, GC 1949, Available at: https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/non-international-armed-conflict 
[Accessed on 11/12/19] 
40
 Ibid 
41
 Ibid 
42
 Ibid 
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the use of police forces.
43
 Secondly, non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be 
considered as "parties to the conflict."
44
 This may mean for example that these forces have to be 
under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations.
45
  
 
In contrast, an international armed conflict occurs when one or more states have recourse to 
armed force against another state, regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this 
confrontation.
46
 The LOAC extends the definition of international armed conflicts to include 
armed conflict situations in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien 
occupation or racist regimes.
47
 No formal declaration of war or recognition of the situation is 
required. The existence of an international armed conflict, and the consequent possibility of 
applying the LOAC to this situation depends on what actually happens on the ground (jus in 
bello criteria as described below) i.e. It is based on factual conditions.
48
 There remains the gap in 
legislation that fail to prescribe how to regard a conflict between state actors from one state and 
non-state actors from another state as occurs with terroristic conflicts. However, the transnational 
nature of terrorism and targeted killings is suggestive of the fact that it could be treated as 
international armed conflict.   
 
Under law enforcement, targeted killing could occur in any number of contexts. These may 
include killing as a means of self-defence from impending danger, or instances where people are 
                                                          
43
 K. Onishi, ‘Rethinking the Permissive Function of Military Necessity in Internal Non-International Armed 
Conflict.’ [2018] 51 (2) Israel Law Review, P240. 
44
 Article 3 Common to Geneva 4 Convention 1949; Articles 3 applies to "armed conflicts not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties"- These include armed conflicts in which 
one or more non-governmental armed groups are involved. 
45
 Ibid 
46
Available at: https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/international-armed-conflict [Accessed on 11/12/19] 
47
 Article 1(4) AP 1 GC, 1977. 
48
T.C.  Ngai, ‘Was Iraq War a “Just War” or Just a War? An Analysis from the Perspectives of Just War Theory.’ 
[2019] 9(2) Open Journal of Political Science, P374. 
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killed by their state agents as a result of death penalties by their state judiciary.
49
 Bearing in mind 
that the latter are examples of targeted killing based on its literal definition, the extent to which 
targeted killing is a counter-terrorism strategy under law enforcement varies with jurisdictions. 
Some jurisdictions like China have specific guidelines that permit killing of suspected terrorists 
without putting them on trial.
50
 Some other jurisdictions like the UK employ the strategy of 
‘shoot to kill’ of terrorists who are considered too dangerous to attempt an arrest.51 Whilst these 
issues remain subjects of debate in chapters two and three of this thesis, the point worthy of note 
here is that both regimes are not identical but applicable under different conditions and criteria. 
During peacetime, the IHRL is the default regulatory mechanism and the LOAC is inapplicable. 
However, during armed conflict between states and/or organisations, the LOAC becomes the 
applicable law.
52
  
 
Both regimes are subject to Article 51 of the UN Charter which provides: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
                                                          
49
 S. Xiao, ‘The Influence of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the Death Penalty 
Legislation in China: Judicial, Administrative and Humanitarian Problems of State Structures and Economic 
Subjects.’ [2018] Atlantis Press, P739. 
50
 Israeli case supra; D.Kaye, ‘The US White Paper’ supra; See also, Jeremy Wright, ‘The modern  law of self-
defence: Attorney General’s speech at International Institute for Strategic Studies’, 11 January 2017, Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-international-institute-for-strategic-
studies [Accessed on 26/11/19] 
51
 G.N. Giordano, et al, ‘The 2005 London terror attacks: An investigation of changes in psychological wellbeing 
and social capital pre-and post-attacks.’ (2003-07)-A UK panel study.’ [2016] 2 SSM-population health, P485. 
52
 P. Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,’ United 
Nations, Human Rights Council (28 May 2010): A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 para. Available at : 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf  10, [Accessed on 
26/11/19]  M. Coleman, ‘The Legality Behind Targeted Killings and the Use of Drones in the War on Terror.’ 
[2014] 5, Global Security Studies, P1.  
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Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’ 53 
 
The LOAC and IHRL regimes have some overlapping norms, in that they both aim to protect the 
health, dignity and lives of individuals.
54
 There is therefore a certain amount of hybridity and 
fluidity between both regimes. This means that an action may be justified using either regime if 
it meets the criteria set out in the previous paragraph.  For example, the evolving method of 
targeted killing by drones has the potential to be justified under the LOAC or if viewed as 
enhanced international policing, under the IHRL. For targeted killing to be justified under the 
IHRL it will have to be an act of self-defence as would occur for example if the strike was 
against a person about to commit an act of aggression.
55
 Targeted killing, e.g by drone strikes on 
terrorists could be similarly justified under the LOAC if carried out to prevent a breach of 
international human rights such as genocide. There is however a slight difference in the 
parameters with which states or individuals can express their rights under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.  While drone attacks which are pre-emptive in nature may be justified under the LOAC, 
the IHRL would require a would be victim to be certain of an impending attack before any self 
defence counter attack can be contemplated and launched.
56
 This disqualifies any premeditated 
form of self defence responses under the IHRL, including drone attacks.   
 
 As will be seen later in the chapter, there are operational differences between targeted killing 
under the LOAC regime and one carried out as an international human rights response. In the 
former case for example, there is no requirement for the arrest and conviction of the terrorist. A 
pre-emptive targeted killing strike by a drone may in some circumstances, meet the conditions 
                                                          
53
 Article 51, UN Charter 
54
 M.E. Newell, ‘Interstitial Rules and the Contested Application of Human Rights Law and the Laws of War in 
Counter-terrorism.’ [2016] 5(2) Global Constitutionalism, P207. 
55
 Article 51 UN Charter. 
56
 J. D. Huntsman, ‘Just Strike: A Commander's Guide to Preemptive Self-Defense.’ [2018] Naval Postgraduate 
School Monterey United States,  P4. 
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under the LOAC but will certainly not be justifiable under the IHRL, as pre-emptive strikes do 
not envisage arrest and trial of suspected terrorists. In the same way, a last resort killing may be 
justifiable under IHRL. It is also possible that the targeted killing does not meet the conditions of 
either the LOAC and IHRL regimes as will be concluded in this chapter.  
 
Arguably, the LOAC and the IHRL are not interoperable, although several scholars suggest that 
a ‘mixed model’ should be formed in which they should jointly be made to regulate terroristic 
conflicts.
57
 An appeal to both laws to justify targeted killing cannot stand.  International law is 
planned in such a way that it does not allow for abuse in the application of force. This defines 
state and individual rights and limits to use force. The liberal approach to pre-emptively use 
force under the LOAC is curbed by a restriction on who is permitted to apply such force, against 
which such force is applicable and the circumstances in which force can be applied. 
Furthermore, the permission to use force under the IHRL is subject to judicial inquiry and 
verdict. This is why the LOAC was designed for the purpose of regulating warfare and the IHRL 
is appropriate for regulating peacetime.  
 
Regardless of the setting (warfare or peacetime) any individual or nation that claims to have used 
force under Article 51 of the UN Charter must be seen to have complied with the restriction on 
the circumstances in which such force is applicable. At any rate, between the two conflict 
regulatory regimes, the LOAC is the main contender. This is because although there are very 
rigid differences in applicability of both regimes, terroristic conflicts have become so complex 
that the differences between them are difficult to observe in practice. In addition, the gravity of 
terroristic threats may render the IHRL impracticable; in fact it will render all targeted killing 
                                                          
57
 D.Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Defence?’ 
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cases illegal. This is why this thesis argues in favour of an amendment to the LOAC to solely 
regulate terrorism and targeted killing. Since it is not illegal for combatants to kill other 
combatants during armed conflict, targeted killing will not be out rightly dismissed as illegal. 
Instead, a lawful or unlawful case of targeted killings will depend on the circumstances in which 
they are carried out. Notwithstanding, the competence of both regimes are described and 
analyzed below, starting with the LOAC. 
 
 
1.2.1. The LOAC 
The LOAC is flexible, recognising the need to launch pre-emptive strikes in response to 
anticipated attacks. Firstly, as far as the LOAC is concerned, to the extent that individuals are 
enemy combatants and in the event of armed conflict, lethal force can legally be applied.
58
 In 
particular, the LOAC emphasises that the protection of civilians is paramount.
 
The latter must 
not be the object of deliberate attacks and should be treated humanely if they ever have an 
encounter with enemy combatants.
59 
In fact, the laws regulating armed conflict regard the 
launching of indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations as a grave breach.
60
 Combatants 
are under serious obligation to distinguish civilians when targeting.
61
A civilian may be targeted 
and killed only for such time as the civilian “directly participates in hostilities.”62   
                                                          
58
 Art. 43 (2) AP1 GC1949 defines combatants as-Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than 
medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they 
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60
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61
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62
 Common Article 3, Additional Protocol 1, Geneva Conventions; 
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The notion of direct participation in hostilities evolves from the phrase “taking no active part in 
the hostilities” used in the common article 3 of the Geneva Convention I-IV. Although the 
English editions of the Geneva conventions and additional protocols use the words “active” and 
“direct”, interchangeably, the consistent use of the phrase participent directement in the equally 
accurate French text demonstrate that the terms “direct” and “active” refer to the same quality 
and degree of individual participation in hostilities.
63
  
 
This general principle embedded in the Common Article 3 to the fourth Geneva Convention (the 
laws of war) provides that civilians must not be targeted during armed conflict, except for 
“…such a time that they are found to be directly participating in hostilities.”(DPH)64  Civilians 
are defined by the ICRC as all persons who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to 
the conflict nor participants in a levée en masse.
65
  ICRC guidance on the conduct of hostilities 
defines both civilians and the act of DPH thus: 
‘For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, 
all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of 
a party to the conflict are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct 
attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. In non-
international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a 
non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous 
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat function”).’ 66 
 
Under the LOAC, individual conduct that constitutes part of the hostilities is described as ‘direct 
participation,’ regardless of whether the individual is a member of the armed forces or a 
                                                          
63
 Article 3 Geneva Convention I-IV; Articles 51 [3] AP I; 43 [2] AP I; 67 [1] (e) AP I and 13 [3] AP II. 
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 GP 1, Art. 48, 52(2) 
65
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66
 N. Melzer, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities.’ Available at: 
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civilian.
67
 For example, if harm is caused by killing civilians and it is related to the conflict, it 
constitutes direct participation.
68
  Conversely, it does not constitute direct participation if a 
civilian definitely resigns and desists from such military activity. For example, the handing over 
of weapons of warfare is seen as an expression of non-participation, or by a long period of non-
participation.
69
 In acknowledgement of the fact that direct participation implies involvement in 
physical attack, the ICRC has proffered a three part test for active participation.
70
 It refers to 
specific acts, carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an 
armed conflict. In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, the specific act must meet 
the following criteria: 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a 
party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or 
objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm). 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result, either from 
that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part 
(direct causation), and 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in 
support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus). Measures 
preparatory to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that 
act. Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting 
to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed groups belonging to a 
                                                          
67
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non-state party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians (see above II ), and lose protection 
against direct attack, for as long as they assume continuous combat function.
71
  
 
In order to make it easier to comply with this principle of distinction, traditional warfare is 
usually restricted to defined battle zones and only combatants who are parties to the conflict are 
deployed to the zones.
72
 Combatants are also under obligation to wear uniforms, tags or emblems 
that make it easy to identify the army they represent and differentiate them from civilians.
73
 This 
enables combatants to use lethal force against enemy combatants with little concern about 
grievously harming civilian targets.
74
  
 
Traditionally, wars were also fought under specified guidelines that were clear and understood 
by all parties (combatants) to the conflict. There were identified battle-zones and ideally, 
targeting during warfare was proximal and anticipated.
75
 The resolutions of warfare were usually 
also anticipated.
76
 These traditional norms were inspired by the just war principles.
77
 The just 
war theory (jus bellum iustum) which formalizes the moral justification for war, primarily seeks 
to answer two questions: whether or not the decision to go to war is morally justifiable (jus ad 
bellum) and whether combatant conduct during warfare is moral and complies with the 
Distinction, Proportionality and Military Necessity targeting criteria (jus in bello).
78
 There is a 
third criterion– jus post bellum – which deals with justice and regulates post conflict 
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relationships. In theory, declaring war against an enemy at the first instance is justified by jus ad 
bellum considerations.
79
  
 
Any consequent application of force to that enemy is legally justifiable whether or not the war 
itself is justified: all that is necessary is that a state of armed conflict exists, and the targeted 
individual is a member of, or directly and actively contributes to the military threat posed by the 
enemy.
 80
Therefore, it is not the conduct of the targeted individual that makes him a permissible 
target, rather his status as a member of the enemy force. Under this war model, enemy 
combatants are targeted only by virtue of their ‘status’.81  Whether by rifle fire or missile strike, a 
person is a justifiable target as long as they are wearing a recognisable emblem or uniform 
and/or operating under a command structure of an enemy force.
82
 Even then, when combatants 
are targeted in armed conflict, it is not necessary to justify the application of force on a case-by-
case basis.
83
  
 
War crimes are perversions of legitimate and accepted conduct in warfare.
84
 It is a war crime to 
launch an attack with intent to cause incidental loss of life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects or extensive and serious damage to the natural environment that is evidently excessive in 
relation to overall military advantage anticipated.
85
  Traditionally, the death of civilians during 
armed conflict does not in itself constitute a war crime, no matter how grave and unfortunate. 
However, a war crime occurs when there is an intentional attack directed against civilians 
(distinction principle)
86
 or an attack is launched against a military objective in the knowledge 
that incidental civilian injuries will be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military 
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advantage sought (principle of proportionality).
87
 The principle of necessity requires that attacks 
can be launched only if  they are helpful in the military defeat of the enemy; any attack must be 
within the parameters of a military objective and the harm caused to civilians or civilian 
properties must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.
88
 
These are applicable standards whether or not the armed conflict is between states (an 
international armed conflict) or between a state and recognisable political groups (non-
international armed conflict).
89
 The laws of armed conflict obligate states to investigate war 
crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, on their territory, or over 
which they have jurisdiction, and if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.
 90
 The state must also 
investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute 
the suspects.
91
  
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) established four core international 
crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
92
 Thus, the 
ICC is responsible for investigating war crimes but only when and if an individual state is unable 
to or unwilling to do so themselves.
93
 The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed in the 
territory of a state party or if they are committed by a national of a state party.
94
 This court may 
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also have the jurisdiction to try offences of aggression that are permitted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC).
95
 
 
Both article 2 (4) of the UN Charter which prohibits states from applying force in the territory of 
other states, except when exercising their inherent right of self-defence, and Article 51 which 
prescribes the use of force in self-defence derive their principles from the just war theory.
96
  
Under this just war theory, the laws of war standards laid out in the body of the Geneva 
Conventions and in customary international law, are derived and established to limit unnecessary 
violence and suffering in war to the furthest extent possible.
 97
 It is under this law of war 
paradigm that enemy combatants can be targeted and killed without recourse to any ‘due process. 
However, targeting enemy combatants is permitted only during warfare and can only be 
conducted by the warring parties.
98
 It is important that targeting conforms to strict compliance 
with the three LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality.
 99
 Enemy combatants can be 
targeted whether or not they are dangerous, armed or asleep. However, combatants who 
surrender their weapons at discretion indicate an unwillingness to continue carrying out 
hostilities and therefore must not be targeted.
100
 Hurting or killing a combatant who has laid 
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down his arms or having surrendered, no longer has a means of defence is regarded as a war 
crime.
101
 In addition, the killing must be militarily necessary; the use of force should be 
proportionate to prevent mistakes and minimize harm to civilians.
102
  As prescribed by the 
LOAC, a combatant surrenders as an indication of the desire to refrain combating.
103
  Attacks are 
also prohibited against those placed hors de combat by sickness, injury, detention or any other 
cause. 
104
  
 
As gleaned from the description of the LOAC above, military targets are targetable simply 
because they are combatants and at war against those targeting them. In contrast, terrorist have 
no military status as they do not operate on behalf of any state. Since terrorists do not fit the 
description of combatants as recognised under the LOAC, they are by default to be regarded as 
civilians subject to law enforcement of the IHRL. Persons with civilian status can be targeted 
only and when they are found directly participating in hostilities.
105
  
 
As it stands, the US and Israel do not consider the implication of targeting terrorists who have 
civilian status. They also target terrorists at any time and on any occasion; whether or not the 
targets are found participating in hostilities at the time they are targeted. This counterterrorism 
approach comes across as a form of punishment for terrorist past actions, thereby disregarding 
the principle of distinction under the LOAC. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that targeted killing 
is LOAC compliant. However, in order to award the states the benefit of doubt, chapter two and 
three will critically explore the reasons why targeted killing is used despite its non conformity 
with LOAC. Even less applicable is the IHRL (law enforcement) regime to terroristic conflicts in 
general and targeted killing in particular.   
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1.2.1 1.2.2. Law enforcement of International human rights laws (IHRL) 
The IHRL is not as flexible as the LOAC in regard the manner in which lethal force can be 
applied. Classification of targeted killings as ‘extra-judicial executions’, rather than war crimes 
or grave breaches of international humanitarian law infers that the applicable legal regime is a 
state’s criminal code which derives its standards from  international human rights laws and 
norms.
106
 Under law enforcement of IHRL, any target is suspected of a kind of legal guilt 
regarded as a criminal act.
107
 The state is obligated to respect and guarantee the rights of every 
person to life and due process of law.
108 
Individuals outside the context of armed conflict must be 
presumed innocent, awarded due process of fair trial and punished only when proved guilty.
109
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) lays out specific criteria that guarantee 
individual human rights.
110
 In particular, the protection against arbitrary deprivation of human 
life is provided for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and firmly established in the UDHR.
111
 A 
similar provision included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
prohibits “arbitrary” and punitive killing of individuals.112 These human rights laws are also 
present in the constitutions or bill of rights of some states.
113
  
Any deliberate use of lethal force by state authorities that is not justified under provisions on the 
right to life will by definition be regarded as an ‘extra-judicial execution.’114  Thus, a state is 
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prohibited from killing individuals without following judicial due process of fair hearing, 
irrespective of whatever crime he or she is alleged to have committed.
115
  Due process under law 
enforcement serves as a legal guide to determine whether or not our moral or legal accusations 
are warranted. Only after this can justifiable action be taken against culprits in the form of 
punishments.
116
 Therefore, failure to make due process available to a suspect (i.e., simply killing 
them) cannot stand.
117
  
 
Killing must not be the sole purpose of an operation under a law enforcement paradigm. Thus the 
intentional and premeditative nature of targeted killing strategy is a flagrant disregard of the 
requirements under law enforcement. Even when a state or an individual relies on Article 51 of 
the UN Charter that allows them to use force against a person or an individual in self-defence, it 
is with strict limitations.
 118
  A degree of proximal imminence in the approaching danger must be 
anticipated before an attack in self-defence can be launched.
 119 
The imminence of the 
approaching danger must leave no room for deliberations upon alternative means of self-defence 
and such a response must be commensurate to the impending attack.
120
 This is in contrast to a 
more liberal exercise of Article 51 under an armed conflict situation, in allowing a combatant to 
pre-emptively launch lethal attacks against other combatants during armed conflict attacks. 
During armed conflict attacks, a state can launch an offensive on a potential enemy combatant 
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before that enemy combatant has had the chance to carry out an attack.
 121
  In essence, under both 
regimes, the lawfulness of the use of force in self-defence against anticipated attacks depends, 
inter alia on necessity and proportionality.
122
 
 
1.2.3. The Caroline Test and Article 51 of the UN Charter 
After the Second World War, delegates from fifty one states drafted the UN Charter, their main 
objective: to protect succeeding generations from the afflictions of war.
123
 As, already noted, this 
charter established a strict principle under Article 2(4) that obliged states to refrain, in their 
international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, except the use of force is in exercise of the right under Article 51 UN Charter against 
anticipated armed attack as described above.  
 
The anticipatory self-defence doctrine was first established under the oft-cited Caroline Case.
124
 
In the early nineteenth century, an anti-British insurrection took place in Canada which was
 
at 
the time still a British colony. The US and Great Britain were not in conflict at the time, 
however, the Caroline, a ship owned by US nationals  was allegedly providing assistance to the 
rebels.
125
 At dusk on 29
th
 December 1837, while the ship was moored on the US side of the 
Niagara River, some British soldiers crossed the river, boarded the ship, killed several U.S. 
nationals; set fire to the ship, and sent the vessel over Niagara Falls. The British claimed that 
they were acting in self-defence, but after some deliberations with the American Secretary of 
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State Daniel Webster, (as he then was) the British government apologised for their actions.
126
 
This led to the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty with the British North American colonies.
127
 
Nevertheless, over the course of diplomatic communications between the US and Britain, two 
principal criteria for permissible self-defence—including pre-emptive self-defence—were 
articulated:  
1. The use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent and, thus, pursuing 
peaceful alternatives is not an option (necessity);
 128
 
2. The response must be proportionate to the threat (proportionality). 129  
The terms ‘anticipatory self-defence’, ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ and ‘pre-emption’ traditionally 
refer to the right of a state to strike first in self-defence when faced with imminent attack.
130
  
 
As Webster explained in a letter to Lord Ashburton, who, at the time, was a special British 
representative to Washington; ‘in order for Britain’s claim of self-defence to succeed it must be 
demonstrated that the necessity of self-defence must be instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’131 This has come to be referred to as ‘instant 
and overwhelming necessity’ or the ‘imminent threat doctrine’. In other words, the exercise of 
such right of self-defence from imminent attack was a ‘last resort.’132 Killings in self-defence are 
considered necessary under international law only if there are no other non-lethal means of 
preventing the threat to human lives. It was upon this concept that the Caroline test was formed 
as a prerequisite for exercising the right to strike first in self defence.
133
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This test came to be accepted as part of customary international law.
134
  The notion of self-
defence was acknowledged prior to this, but it was the test that established specific criteria by 
which it could be determined whether there had been a legitimate exercise of the right of self 
defence from imminent attack.
135
  Thus, if an individual or a state can demonstrate necessity- 
that the opposing party was about to engage in an armed attack- and act proportionately, 
premeditated self-defence in the form of a counter attack would be deemed lawful.
136
 The 
problems with establishing imminent threat, in practice, are a subject for debate in chapter two of 
this thesis. It seems though that the recognition of the problems has led the UNSC to approve of 
targeted killings. 
 
In the exercise of the right of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter, the Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 permit states to take necessary steps towards preventing future terrorist 
attacks.
137
The UNSC has ultimate responsibility on matters of international peace and security 
and has to be informed of any measures taken in self-defence; according to Article 24 of the UN 
Charter, the Security Council is the main body responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security
138
. The UN charter permits both application of force authorized by the 
Security Council and force exercised in self-defence.
139
 Under Article 39, the Council is 
empowered to determine acts that constitute a “threat to peace, breach of peace, or an act of 
aggression”. If the Security Council so determines, it can authorize the use of force against the 
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offending state under Article 42.
140
 Thus, the UNSC reserves the right to limit use of force in 
self-defence.  
 
One fact worthy of note is that the UNSC has not prohibited targeted killing in general and the 
use of drones in particular. This suggests that international law approves of targeted killing as a 
necessary counter-terrorism strategy and drones as permissible weapons for carrying out the 
killings. Whilst this implied permission to use targeted killing raises contention in the literature, 
it is argued that the absence of discussions on terrorism related conflicts in the laws that regulate 
the use of force is what causes debates. Although the UNSC perceives that the new threat in 
terrorism may require an active counter terrorism approach like targeted killings, legislators are 
slow to endorse targeted killings. The reason for this will be explored in the hermeneutic 
discussions gleaned from several schools of thought in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
 The US has continued to launch attacks aimed at eliminating suspected terrorists since 2004.
141
 
However, terrorism continues to such an extent that it  casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy. On the one hand, it is strongly recommended in this 
thesis that targeted killing be seen as a practical counterterrorism strategy albeit unlawful. On the 
other hand, it is the argument that targeted killing is effective that remains debatable, giving rise 
to a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of targeted killing in chapter five of this thesis. 
  
1.3 Overview of the Literature: (Theoretical Underpinnings and Original Contribution 
to Research Practice) 
The literature is replete with research assessing the standards for judging targeted killings and 
determining the guilt of alleged terrorists.
 142
  Accordingly, there has been a substantial amount 
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of literature on targeted killing by Israel and the US, chronicling the major developments in the 
targeting process.
143
 The legality of targeted killings as well as permissible means for engaging 
in armed conflict has been the subject of several texts and articles by academics and 
journalists.
144
  
 
The analysis of the distinctive nature of Israeli and US targeted killing has gradually developed 
since Israel invoked the law of war against terror in 2002, making targeted killing the country’s 
main anti-terrorism strategy. Commentaries by Special Rapporteurs to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Media form a major part of the literature on the 
legality of targeted killings.
145
 This class of literature is mainly expository and seeks to draw 
attention at national and global levels, to systemic and other violations of the principles of war 
and human rights. On the other side of the spectrum, academic literature offers critiques, 
opinions and recommendations for international law reforms. Contributions here have also been 
varied. Some of the literature has focused on determining the legality of the killing of those who 
have been targeted without resort to due process, for example, the targeted killing of Osama bin-
Laden and Anwar Al-Awlaki.
146
 Other writings have analysed the impact that targeted killing 
has on innocent bystanders.
147
 However, only a few have focussed on assessing the effectiveness 
of targeted killing. It is the scarcity in this latter group that this thesis is most concerned with.  
 
Generally, there is a deficit of research in the literature that determines the effectiveness of 
targeted killing. There is also little empirical analysis of the effectiveness of targeted killing. 
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Carson’s assessment of the effectiveness of targeted killing has  focused on clarifying the 
effectiveness of ‘high profile’ targeted killing of notorious leaders of terrorist organisations.148 
Falk who used a non-specific game theory method to derive empirical data only assessed the 
effectiveness of targeted killing in relation to the cost borne during the targeting processes. His 
assessment considered only the impact of Israel’s targeted killing campaign against Hamas 
Palestinian group but did not consider the targeted killing drone campaign by the US against 
terrorists in Pakistan.
149
 Such a non-holistic analytical approach to research is arguably bound to 
yield inaccurate results on the general effectiveness of targeted killing. Giving the vastness in the 
literature on the subject matter, it is perhaps difficult if not impossible for one research to cover 
all areas. However, this thesis identifies a gap in the literature on the effectiveness of targeted 
killing in relation to the main goal for which it is used, to generally eliminate the threats posed 
by terrorists.  This thesis attempts to fill this gap using a systematic and mathematical Peace War 
game theory method. This thesis will be the first in the literature to use a combination of the 
doctrinal, hermeneutical and game theory approaches to arrive at the conclusions to be gained at 
the end of this research. 
 
 
1.5. Research Problems and Methodologies.  
In the course of assessing the standards for the justification and effectiveness of targeted killings 
under international law, the two paradigms of international law that regulate the application of 
force will be assessed.  This would be followed by assessing the liberal, realist, and pragmatic 
perspectives of targeted killings. Lastly, recommendations of empirical research-informed 
reforms to counterterrorism approaches and existing legislation will be made. 
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1.5.1. Methodologies 
This thesis adopts a variety of methodologies to test the viability of targeted killing. The 
doctrinal, hermeneutical and socio-legal methodologies, detailed in chapter 4 of this thesis, are 
used to study the main and ancillary effects of targeted killing of suspected terrorists. Relevant 
statistics are also used to determine whether the common defences and justifications given for 
targeted attacks are reasonable, in view of the deaths and harm caused. Through the doctrinal 
analysis, the rationale and validity of the defences used to justify targeted killings will be 
explored against the benchmark of human rights principles on the one hand and warfare 
principles on the other.   
 
Through the hermeneutical approach, this thesis aims to explore the ideological/philosophical 
background upon which terrorism and targeted killings are predicated. It aims to confirm the 
reasons why, of all other less legally controversial counter-terrorism approaches, targeted killing 
is considered to be practically effective in dealing with terrorism.  
 
Through the socio-legal game theory approach, the concept of a more effective strategy than 
targeted killing will be explored. This aims at a compromise agreement that balances the rights 
of the perpetrators and victims of targeted killings. Furthermore, the thesis aims to determine 
whether targeted killing practice is effective in relation to its goal of eliminating terrorism. It is 
hoped to create research-informed proposals over targeting practice, advocate for law reforms 
and propose recommendations that will adequately address contemporary conflict. 
 
1.6. Summary of Chapters:  
1.6.1 Chapter one:  
Chapter one introduces the subject matters explored in the thesis. It gives a brief overview of 
legal and empirical findings as well as relevant research on the subject matter. It also defines the 
general terms and terminologies used by authors, news commentators and international 
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organisations in reference to issues relating to the subject matter. Thereafter, the chapter 
proceeds to explain how the methodologies adopted in the thesis facilitate the resolution of the 
research aims. Overall, it explains how the adoption of the Doctrinal, Critical Hermeneutical and 
Game Theory methodological approaches strengthen theoretical and analytical dimensions of 
targeted killing vs. terroristic warfare debates. The chapter emphasises how the combined use of 
the three methodologies enhance a proper evaluation of the implementation of targeted killing. 
The conclusion of chapter one defends the rationale behind the research. 
 
1.6.2 Chapter two:  
Chapter two explores the legal implication for utilizing targeted killing counterterrorism strategy. 
It highlights the legal uncertainties surrounding the status of terrorists and the justification for 
targeted killing. It asks and attempts to answer questions on the applicable regime for regulating 
terroristic conflict, i.e. are terrorists combatants in an armed conflict or civilians only targetable 
when operational (directly participating in hostilities)? It then identifies the main arguments 
against the legality of targeted killing under the LOAC and Law enforcement of human rights 
regimes.  
1.6.3 Chapter three: 
This chapter shall re-conceptualize the analysis of the justification of terrorism and targeted 
killings by exploring the literature through a hermeneutical approach. Islamic extremism 
expressed through acts of terror is an ideology that is imbibed and practised by many 
perpetrators across the globe.  Democracy is the main ingredient of modern governmental rule 
that terrorists protest against. The collision of both ideologies is the main focus in chapter three. 
1.6.4 Chapter four: 
This chapter will establish details of the doctrinal, hermeneutical, socio-legal (game theory 
method) methodologies used for carrying out the research on targeted killing. It will explain how 
and why the doctrinal and hermeneutical methodologies were used in chapters two and three 
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respectively and how and why the game theory method will be applied as the main method for 
carrying out the assessment on the effectiveness of targeted killing in chapter five.  
 
1.6.5 Chapter five: 
The interdisciplinary method of game theory which falls under the socio-legal/empirical type 
approach will be applied in chapter five which is the analysis chapter. This method was devised 
by the main proponents of game theory, to systematically analyse strategic options faced by 
parties in conflict in relation to their goals, how they make decisions on what options to use and 
the responses triggered by the use of those options. What makes game theory analysis different 
to other theoretical and empirical types of analysis is in its presentation. This method will be 
used in the analysis chapter for assessing the effectiveness of targeted killing. The game theory 
method proposes to offer transparency to what is being analyzed. This is mainly because of the 
format in which the interactions between opponents in a conflict or competition are explicitly 
written down, tabulated and quantified. This outline proposes to promote objectivity when 
studying the outcomes of each interaction and may hopefully yield results different from analysis 
that are merely dependent on intuitive assessments.  
 
1.6.6 Chapter six 
This chapter will conclude on the discussions in the thesis by detailing the limitations 
encountered from using the doctrinal, hermeneutical and socio-legal game theory methodologies 
in this thesis. It will also explain how each limitation should be addressed. It will do this by 
distinguishing between the realistic expectations to be gained from using the methodologies and 
their inadequacies. The chapter will then suggest ways in which future researchers can realise the 
full potentials of the methodologies. Further, this chapter will conclude the research by 
summarising the key findings explored. The chapter will also detail the contributions this 
research seeks to make to the field of research and legislature. The chapter will then discuss the 
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implications of the research conducted and make recommendations to future researchers of the 
subject. 
.  
1.6.8 Definition of Terms an Terminologies  
This thesis will generally regard the modern conflict involving terrorists organisations and states 
as terroristic, modern or contemporary conflict. Reference to the terms is suggestive of the idea 
that there is no name given to such conflicts in international law. In addition, the term, the ‘war 
against terror’ is simply a description of terroristic conflicts, when, for the purpose of analysing 
an issue, the writer is under the assumption that warfare exists between states and terrorists. 
Lastly, in chapter two, the term ‘DPH’ will be used to mean those referred to in the LOAC as 
‘participants in hostilities’. This may sometimes be used to refer to terrorists when they are 
found to be directly participating in hostilities. 
 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
This first chapter has introduced the topic of the research— evaluating the effectiveness of 
targeted killing and the adopted methodologies – Doctrinal, Hermeneutical and Socio-legal 
approaches to analysing the topic. There is a gap in the current literature pertaining to an 
empirical approach that assesses the effectiveness of targeted killing in relation to the goal for 
which the strategy is used. It was clarified that the research would apply the game theory method 
to analyse the effectiveness of targeted killing, in order to make an original contribution to the 
literature. The aim is to decide upon better antiterrorism strategies. It would then proceed to 
recommend practical reform proposals to improve the academic literature and practice.  
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The chapter further set out the stages of the research and how it intended to both apply and 
overcome some of the peculiar challenges of the doctrinal, hermeneutical and game theory 
methodologies. The legal sources to be relied on as well as the challenges and limitations of 
these sources were stated and explained. Having set out and explained these steps, the research 
will now proceed to its first stage which is to discuss the issues, dilemmas and current legal 
interpretations of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TARGETED KILLING COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
LEGISLATIONS PERMITTING THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE, THROUGH 
THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH OF DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS. 
2.1. Introduction 
The targeted killing of terrorists like bin Laden and Baghdadi may have evoked more 
applause than disapproval, simply because of the notoriety of the targets.  Regardless, such 
killings are not void of moral and legal implications. Chapter one has explained the general 
prescription of permissible use of lethal force as contained in the LOAC and IHRL. It 
distinguished between the lawful and unlawful use of force. This chapter scrutinises the laws 
that may be made applicable to targeted killings in order to answer the following questions: 
Firstly, what law can targeted killing appeal to? Is the so called ‘war against terror’ a 
legitimate one? If terroristic conflict must be regarded as an act of war to be regulated by the 
LOAC, then, is the response of targeted killing a legitimate response under the LOAC? Can 
combatants lawfully launch lethal attacks against transnational terrorists specifically 
identified by name? In other words, is it alien to the traditional norms of war for the US or 
Israel to have a ‘kill list’ containing the names of terrorists that they have pre-identified with 
the intention of killing them at a later date?  
 
This chapter clarifies the current legal interpretation of targeted killings, identifying and 
critically analysing the legislations permitting the use of lethal force. It does this by outlining 
and putting into context, controversial issues, dilemmas and legal interpretations surrounding 
targeted killings. It precedes the literature review because it introduces and highlights topical 
issues, specifically: inchoate and ambiguous provisions of law on terrorism and 
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counterterrorism strategies that are subjects for philosophical/ideological debate in the 
literature review.  
 
The first part of this chapter scrutinises the legal basis for targeted killing. It does this by 
outlining the legal relationship of targeted killing with the LOAC on the one hand and the 
IHRL on the other. While assessing the implications of targeted killing under the LOAC, a 
critical analysis of the legal and practical implications of the use of drones by the US is made. 
Major facts that describe the counterterrorism strategy of targeted killing adopted by US and 
Israel are referred to. They include summaries of some controversial targeted killings that 
have occurred in the early 21
st
 century. Although targeted killing as practised by both the US 
and Israel is generally controversial, even more so is the US use of drone to carry out the 
killings. Thus, the chapter makes reference to the assorted weapons used by Israel to carry 
out targeted killings.  It considers the compliance of drone technology, the specific strategy 
used by the US, within the LOAC. The focus of the drone analysis is on the LOAC and not 
the IHRL because the US claims that it is at war with terrorist organisations, especially al-
Qaeda.  This hinges on the notion that the targeting of terrorists is a military necessity and the 
drone mechanism is used as an attempt to comply with the principle of distinction under the 
LOAC. It then highlights the ambiguities and the absence of conclusive prescriptions on the 
limits or extent to the use of force under the LOAC. Further, an analysis under the IHRL is 
made.  
 
It is a straight forward condition that the IHRL requirement of due process must precede 
every other concept under the IHRL. Thus, it is the concept of self-defence attack under the 
IHRL that is emphasised and explored in this chapter. The aim of this chapter is to expose 
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aspects of international law that should determine the legal implications of targeted killings. 
In the end, the rationale for targeted killing is highlighted. This clarifies why the US and 
Israel prefer the controversial targeted killing as a counter-terrorism strategy and why they 
nominate the LOAC to be the regime to regulate it. Deducing the US and Israel’s rationale 
for using targeted killing also serves as a prelude to chapter three, which critically analyses 
the ideological concepts around targeted killing.  
 
2.2. What laws appeal to Terroristic Conflicts (Terrorism vs. Targeted Killing)?  
The unavoidable question arises as to whether terroristic conflicts can be regarded as warfare 
to be regulated by the LOAC or whether targeted killing counterterrorism strategy is criminal 
conduct requiring judicial intervention under a state’s criminal code that enforces human 
rights laws. A third consideration is whether terroristic conflicts are simply incompatible with 
either regime. The nature, status and rights of those involved and gaps in the laws pertaining 
to terroristic conflicts are observed thus: 
2.2.1 LOAC-Conflict 
 
 
Justifying targeted killing hinges on the applicability of the LOAC paradigm. Making the 
case for this applicability requires answers to the question whether it is acceptable from a 
legal point of view to hold that a state can wage war on a non-state organisation.  
 
A literal interpretation of the Geneva Convention suggests that it is not a tradition for 
countries to be at war with individual non state actors.  In suggesting the mechanism for the 
application of laws of armed conflict, common Articles two of the Geneva Conventions states 
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“The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more “High Contracting Parties” (signatories).150 
The law of war is therefore applicable in a logical sense to international war, that is, an armed 
conflict involving two or more countries. Article Three extends the laws of war to cases of 
armed conflict “not of an international character” which occurs “in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties.”151  
 
The language of this article extends the application of humanitarian norms to conflict beyond 
the conventional war of country versus country. However, the broadened definition of Article 
Three remains unclear with regard to its application to certain contemporary forms of armed 
conflict. At first glance, Articles Two and Three appear to consider all possible forms of 
conflict: Article Two applies to conflict international in nature, and Article Three applies to 
conflict not international in nature. However, as Article Two was formulated and has since 
been interpreted, it does not consider a situation whereby one party is a state and the other is 
not. Furthermore, Article Three does not apply to all armed conflict that is not international in 
character.   
 
Unfortunately, terroristic conflicts may fall outside of the scope of either of the two Articles. 
In the rhetoric regarding the war against terror, it is clear that the US is not at war with a 
state, but neither is the conflict necessarily restricted by a single national boundary. Terrorist 
organizations are not concerned with any one particular country, and can easily migrate from 
country to country to carry out hostilities. There is therefore a regulatory gap in the law 
unforeseen by 20th Century legislatures. Whether or not the LOAC apply to cross-border 
military operations against non-state actors is a question that is yet unanswered. Pending a 
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legislation that considers 21
st
 century type of conflicts between state and non state actors, 
Military operations involving targeted killing will continue to fall out of character with the 
LOAC. 
 
2.2.2 LOAC –Status  
 
When combatants are targeted during warfare, there is no need to justify the application of 
force on a case-by-case basis, as is the case under the IHRL. In theory, declaring war against 
an enemy is justified by jus ad bellum considerations. Any subsequent application of force to 
that enemy is legally justifiable, regardless of whether the war itself is justified: all that is 
required is that a state of armed conflict exists and that the person targeted is a member of, or 
directly and significantly contributes to the enemy military threat.
 152
  Thus, it is not the 
conduct of the targeted individual that makes him a permissible target, but rather his status as 
a member of the enemy force; as an enemy combatant. 
153
  Therefore, enemy combatants are 
not individually identified by name or punishable and targeted on account of specific 
conduct; they are targetable by virtue of their status as military state actors.  
 
In contrast, the premeditated strikes launched against terrorists, following a process of 
identification of specific targets by name on a kill list, alienates itself from the principles and 
norms of the LOAC. 
154
 To start with, the fact that international law or even state laws do not 
confer combatant status on terrorists suggests that terrorist organisations are not militarily 
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recognised at any level. 
155
 This may be due to the fact that terrorist organisations like Al-
Qaeda or Hamas do not have the political structure that would warrant military recognition.
156
 
It may also be because terrorist organisations themselves have no interests in conforming to 
armed conflict rules.
157
 At any rate, the only legal option left to the parties at conflict with 
terrorist groups is to regard them as civilians under the LOAC. This implies that targeted 
killings against them, in the name of warfare, are unlawful because terrorists have the same 
‘civilian immunity’ as civilians.158 Thus, it is erroneous for the former US President, George 
Bush to have declared war against these groups of non-state actors with no military status.
 159
 
 
It is also erroneous for the Israeli government to claim to be at war with Palestinian terrorists 
of Hamas who are also not state actors.
160
 It questions whether Bin Laden, Anwar al- Aulaqi 
Ahmed Farouq, Adam Gadahn and other suspected terrorists targeted were legitimately killed 
under the LOAC.  
 
2.2.3 LOAC- Rights 
As earlier noted, not all civilians have the right to claim immunity from being targeted under 
the LOAC. Due to frequent civilian participation in hostilities during the Second World War, 
the laws regulating armed conflict were revised to identify when a civilian becomes a defacto 
combatant.
 161
  The LOAC addressed this by providing a fundamental principle embedded in 
both Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, by which civilians have immunity 
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from direct attacks from combatants “unless and for such a time as they directly take part in 
hostilities.” (DPH)162  
 
The most serious challenge to this is the principle of distinction. Distinction prohibits the 
intentional killing of civilians by the military, requiring military combatants to avoid civilian 
casualties to the greatest extent possible. The heart of the issue is that non-uniformed, non-
state actors and organizations do not neatly fit into the categories laid out by the Geneva 
Convention. In the traditional war context in which the Geneva Conventions were written, 
combatants were easily identified by uniforms or insignia, or carried arms openly in order to 
distinguish themselves from civilians.
163
 Generally, the DPH principle does not explain what 
constitutes “direct participation” which would make an individual subject to attack. Secondly, 
it does not describe the extent of participation required for confirming that a person directly 
takes part in hostilities. Thirdly, it does not prescribe how long a combatant will have to have 
been withdrawn from participation before he is considered to revert to civilian status and so 
not be targetable. Fourthly, the clause ‘for such a time’  which suggests that the civilians in 
question must be targeted only when they are found taking part in hostilities, does not put into 
perspective the nature and characteristic of terroristic conflicts.  
 
One reason why it is difficult to comply with the principle of distinction is that direct 
participants in hostilities do not always distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population.
164
 Consequently, innocent civilians are at risk of being targeted. This is 
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unfortunate because it is under this provision that the determining factor for the legality of 
targeted killings is predicated. Consequently, there are differences of opinion about whether a 
state is justified to pursue proven terrorists if they have not taken part in action for some time. 
Crucially, the phrasing of the DPH principle is ambiguous:   
 
2.2.3.1 ‘Direct’ participation in Hostilities: What acts of hostilities are ‘Direct’? 
 
 
On its own, the ICRC definitive rationale for a direct participant in hostilities is 
incomprehensible and hypothetical. One must look to the literature for what scholars opine to 
be the hidden meaning of the DPH notion. M. N. Schmidt offers that ‘direct’ connotes a 
convincing level of ‘connectivity’ to hostilities.165  The ICRC three part test as listed in 
chapter one, 1.2.1 of this thesis, does not proffer any precise’ means’ of defining who a direct 
participant is. The three part test only goes as far as hypothetically describing scenarios that 
feature the actions, without defining the actions themselves. For example the wording “ 
…direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result, either from that act, or from 
a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), is arguably a more complex rewording of the phrase ‘direct participation’. The 
provision also offers no real meaning in terms of classification of the specific activities that 
constitute direct participation.   
Firstly, in terms of the actual acts to consider, what side of the line of distinction between 
civilian and combatant can we group as terrorist? Subject to the quality and degree of such 
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involvement, individual participation in hostilities may be described as “direct” or 
“indirect”.166 
 
The LOAC and the ICRC do not proffer a distinctive, prescriptive list containing a spectrum 
of involvement in hostilities that separate “direct” from “non-direct” participants.  
The three part test implies that, “direct participation in hostilities” is determined by ‘conduct’ 
rather than by ‘status.’ For example, an ‘insurrectionist sniper’ would be regarded as a direct 
participant rather than his assistant. Therefore, in acknowledgement of the fact that direct 
participation may include other acts around the physical attack itself, the ICRC has adduced 
that a penumbra of preparatory and concluding activities may also qualify, as long as the 
proximate causality criterion is met.
167
 In contrast, the test will not regard as targetable, 
individuals that recruit or finance belligerents, or engage in decision-making about hostile 
activities. It is easy to conclude that those who carry out the attacks are direct participants in 
hostilities.  However, the problem lies in the assumption that the accomplices of those who 
carry out attacks are not liable targets simply because they were not visibly seen carrying out 
hostilities. For instance, if an armed terrorist has just finished operating but was not found 
doing so, it would be unlawful to target and kill him or her.  
 
This provision fails to draw limits to the distinctive behaviour that suggests indirect 
participation. The ICRC illustration above suggests that an ‘insurrectionist sniper’ would be 
regarded as a direct participant, in contrast to his assistant.
168
  The ICRC has however 
concluded that “direct participation” may be construed as “more accentuated and continuous 
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combat functions”.169 A common practice would be the physical conduct of hostilities in 
civilian territories, including cases of urban conflict, characterized by an intermingling of 
armed actors and civilians. According to the ICRC, there must be a necessarily close causal 
connection between the act and the resulting harm.
170
 Standards such as “indirect causation of 
harm” or “materially facilitating harm” are clearly too broad, as they would bring the entire 
war effort within the concept of direct participation in hostilities and would thus deprive large 
portions of the civilian population of protection against direct attack.
171
 Instead, the 
distinction between direct and indirect participation in hostilities must be interpreted as 
corresponding to that between direct and indirect causation of harm.  
 
The ICRC exclusion of those who engage in decision making, including ordinary members 
who do not carry arms as un-targetable, while those who carry out the orders by physically 
launching attacks are targetable is unrealistic and illogical.
172
 The exemption of the former 
could make the fight against terrorism futile. This is because several acts of terrorism are 
instigated by those who are not inclined to execute the attacks themselves; but without them 
such attacks may not be carried out. For example, Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al-
Qaeda terrorist organisation which spearheaded the 9/11 attack and inspired other 21
st
 century 
terrorist attacks. However, he was never reportedly seen to physically carry out acts of 
hostilities. Those who criticise the killing of Osama-bin Laden consider it illegal under the 
LOAC because he was not a direct participant in hostilities.  Such individuals should be 
regarded as direct participants in hostilities because they are the main perpetrators of 
terrorism.  
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It may be difficult to include all the necessary acts of hostilities on a list of criteria so that 
important activities are not omitted, leaving the DPH rule open to abuse. This problem could 
potentially be solved by excluding the word ‘direct’ from the proviso, to infer that any form 
of activity deliberately done to precipitate attacks on opposing forces should strip the civilian 
in question of his or her immunity. The challenge with this option is that DPH will have to be 
established on a case by case basis. It is however a valid consideration pending legislative 
decisions on what status to confer on terrorists. Even M.N. Shmitt offers a similar option by 
stating that:  
 “The approach which best comports with the purposes of humanitarian law 
is one which assesses the criticality of the act to the direct application of 
violence against the enemy. For example, working in a munitions factory is 
distant from the direct application of force, whereas providing tactical 
intelligence is essential and immediate.”173 
 
Schmitt suggests that gray areas should be interpreted liberally, i.e., in favour of 
finding direct participants. 
 
 
2.2.3.2 ICRC’s Failure to clarify how long a combatant will have withdrawn from 
participation in hostilities in order to re-claim civilian status. 
According to the ICRC interpretive guidance, the concept of direct participation in hostilities 
includes the immediate execution stage of a specific act meeting the three criteria of 
threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus.
174
 Any terrorist who is short of 
meeting these criteria is presumed to be a civilian who has immunity from targeting under the 
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LOAC. This is interpreted as the process of preparing to execute acts of hostilities, as well as 
the deployment to and return from the scene where he/she carried out hostilities.
175
  However, 
as exemplified above, apprehending terrorists under these three circumstances may be 
challenging, as terrorists attacks are covert until instantaneously launched against 
unsuspecting victims. If unharmed or apprehended, terrorists are inclined to flee the scene 
immediately following such attacks, making it even harder to identify them in future. Even 
though the ICRC has clarified that the terrorist is still targetable when returning from the 
scene of hostilities, it has not made clear the point at which the terrorist regains civilian 
immunity. If it is to be assumed that immunity is regained immediately he/she gets home, 
what happens if the terrorist’s does not go straight home after carrying out hostilities? 
 
In any case, there is the concern that the above criteria offer terrorists a strategic protective 
advantage to resume hostilities at will and unannounced. This is what the literature refers to 
as the ‘Revolving Door Theory.’176 It is used to explain how the frequently alternating civilian 
status of terrorists allows them to ‘pick up arms’ immediately after regaining immunity.177  
This is considered as giving a terrorist an unreasonable repetitive advantage: targetable only 
when in active conflict and immune immediately afterwards when inactive.
178
 This no doubt 
limits the number of opportunities for a state to exercise the right to use force in combating 
terrorism. Whilst state combatants attempt to comply with the LOAC principles, terrorists 
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randomly attack victims, showing no interest in obeying the principles.
179
 The LOAC, or any 
law for that matter, that allows terrorism and subversives to thrive is arguably bad law
180
 that 
should be abolished. 
 
In addition, temporary abstention from hostilities should not be interpreted as resignation. 
Inquiries about the legality of bin-Laden’s killing was predicated on this argument.181It was 
reported that in May 2nd 2011, Osama bin Laden was shot by US Special Forces. He was 
reported to have been unarmed when shot and killed in front of his family members. 
However, weapons were later found in the room in which he was killed.
182
 The legality of 
bin-Laden’s killing under the LOAC  is highly debatable as it appears that he was not given 
an opportunity to ‘surrender’ himself, as is typical of a soldier on a battle-field who is 
incapacitated and no longer has the means to continue the warfare.
183
 Whilst many aspects to 
the facts of his killing are unclear, one thing that is consistent is that he was not found 
directly participating in hostilities at the time he was killed.   
 
At face value it may seem that Bin Laden was unlawfully killed, as there is nothing to show 
that he was found directly participating in hostilities. However, who is to say that he may not 
have been covertly plotting future attacks (such as directing hostilities, mobilising forces, 
teaching Islamic extremism or configuring of explosives to be detonated at a future date). The  
implication under the interpretive guidance of the three part test that motivating actions that 
encourage terrorism do not constitute direct participation is erroneous.  Arguably, such an 
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action should be regarded as “direct participation.” Assuming secretly plotting attacks were 
regarded as direct participation, even the requirement to wait for obvious signs of direct 
participation is futile.  It may even be more difficult to look out for signs of participation 
because of the distance between the US that has to carry out the observation and Pakistan and 
Yemen where terrorists reside. It is little wonder why the US prefers the simpler option of 
premeditatedly determining who should be targeted on what is classed as a ‘kill list’ before 
deploying the drones to the territories of Pakistan and Yemen to carry out the killings. 
184
Even if there is no distance barrier, the covert nature of terrorist plots would make it 
difficult to ascertain when a terrorist has desisted from participating in hostilities, unless 
he/she publicly resigns or retires. 
 
 Surrendering, handing over or laying down of weapons are convincing ways in which 
soldiers indicate that they are no longer engaged in warfare, so that he/she can be rendered 
hors de combat under the LOAC.
 185
 
 
Arguably, this cannot serve as a distinguishing 
technique in practise: Firstly, considering that terrorists strategise by taking their victims by 
surprise. When they attack, they are not likely to pick up arms and are therefore not required 
to lay them down.  Assuming that terrorists carried arms openly, laying down weapons that 
can quickly be picked up again is a less reliable sign of non-participation when compared 
with handing over weapons once and for all. It is also noteworthy that bombs and explosives 
are ‘arms’ commonly used by terrorists to carry out hostilities. The laying down of an 
explosive weapon in this scenario is an act of hostility in itself, rather than a sign that a 
participant has decided to withdraw from armed conflict. As enunciated above, the terroristic 
conflict setting is totally different from what the drafters of the LOAC ever anticipated; 
consequently there are no prescriptions under the LOAC for the above scenarios.  
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2.2.3.3 The inconceivable requirement of limiting targeting to only when civilians ‘for 
such a time’ DPH 
If the only legal means of apprehending terrorists is to react when they ‘for such a time’186 
participate in hostilities, terrorism may thrive for the following reasons: 
  
Unlike traditional warfare where uniformed combatants are faced with enemies in identifiable 
uniforms, terrorists do not undertake any such obligation. Further, terrorist attacks against 
civilians are usually spontaneous and unforeseeable (in terms of the location of attacks and 
victims) they usually appear in conflict scenes without distinguishable emblems.
187
 
 
 It will be inconceivable to facilitate an effective counter attack against terrorists, who are de 
facto civilians, if they can only be targeted whilst they directly partake in hostilities, i.e, at the 
scene of the attack. ‘For such a time’ under Article 51 (3)  AP1, 1977 presupposes that future 
acts of terror, including the time and place of intended attacks are preceded by warnings, to 
allow the victim states mount an effective defence. In the reality of terrorists attack, the 
opposite is the case; terrorist attacks are not usually preceded by warnings. In fact this is 
supposedly the reason why spontaneous attacks are one of several strategies terrorists use to 
disadvantage victim states.
188
  With advances in technology, deadly weapons have been 
disguised to look like harmless implements in order to avoid recognition. In fact, seemingly 
harmless machines including automobiles are used as weapons of terror, making the terrorist 
attacks even more unsuspecting.  Some terrorists who are not apprehended at the scene of an 
attack tend to flee and merge into the civilian population to avoid detection. For example, a 
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Jihadist inspired by ISIS drove a truck into a crowd of people who had gathered on the Nice 
waterfront to watch the fireworks celebrating Bastille Day. He killed 86 persons and injured 
several hundred. The driver fled the scene of the attack immediately afterwards. 
189
  
 
Even after increased US vigilance following the 9/11 attack , several terrorist plots have been 
successfully executed. It is true that between 2001 and 2019 some small scale terroristic plots 
were successfully intercepted and averted by U.S intelligence.
190
 These include the arrest of a 
man caught attempting to detonate a shoe bomb on a long distance flight in 2001, the arrest of 
two men attempting to detonate a bomb in New York and a host of others.
191
 Lone wolves 
and leaderless Jihadists still carry out terrorist attacks often resulting in fatalities.
192
   
 
The above examples clearly illustrate terrorists penchant for secretly plotting and openly 
executing attacks in places least expected, with little chance of apprehension. Usually, it is 
only after the attacks have occurred that a state can begin to plot counter-attacks.
 193
 Not only 
is the DPH rule ambiguous, it is also ineffective for any state wish to limit its counter-attacks 
to the illogical dictates of the DPH rule. Should the DPH rule apply to terrorists, it would not 
be without a liberal interpretation. Thus, the LOAC  would need to be revised to either 
change the status of terrorists from civilian status to a more counter-terror friendly status, or 
remove the limitations under the DPH scope to allow for a more proactive apprehension of 
terrorist targets . This would give states more lawful opportunities to exercise their rights to 
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defend themselves.   
 
2.2.4 LOAC- Mechanism for warfare : US Drone 
Nothing in the definition of targeted killing in chapter one suggests that it is only carried out 
by drones. Indeed Israel employs different weaponry to the US. It is the drone compatibility 
with the DPH principle and the principle of distinction and the rationale for its use that is 
being accessed in this paragraph. 
 
The rationale for the U.S use of drone within civilian territories is predicated upon the 
following reasons: Terrorists do not distinguish themselves from innocent civilians, but, 
instead, limit their movement to civilian territories;
194
 Civilian territories have become the de 
facto battle field in the war against terror; the desperate need for the US to eliminate terrorists 
motivates its actions, even within civilian territories in Pakistan and Yemen.
 195
 The US 
claims that the drone mechanism makes invading the civilian terrain less chaotic, as it limits 
the rate of stampede by infantry soldiers.
196
 Therefore there is a reduction of human costs for 
the forces using them.
197
  The US argues that through the use of drone technology, it is able 
to gather intelligence and engage military targets without risk to its soldiers.
198
  
 
Some scholars express the view that removing drone operators from harm’s way enables the 
drone pilots to more “carefully evaluate a situation without combat fears and anxiety.”199 
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Some also argue that the recording technology in drones makes it easier to hold operators 
accountable for any breach of the laws of war and the principles of Just War law than 
traditional pilots.
200
 However, there is no report that suggests that this has ever happened. 
There is also an economic argument that a drone attack is more economical than a large scale 
operation with helicopter support to capture the terrorists alive.
201
 In fact, the UNSC 
impliedly permitted the use of drones in Resolutions 1368 and 1373, where it endorsed states 
use of “necessary steps” to fight terrorism.202 Therefore the drones are considered necessary 
for safety and economic reasons.
203
 Commentators in favour of the US targeted killing by 
drones also argue that the strategy complies with the LOAC proportionality and distinction 
principles. Drones are not prohibited so they can be seen as legitimate weapons permissible 
during warfare.
204
  
 
The US government utilises drones as a necessary weapon of war.
205
  The US has listed a set 
of criteria for the approval of drone strikes: “near certainty” that the target was present and 
that civilians would not be harmed or killed; capture of a terrorist is not feasible in a 
transnational type of conflict; failure of the authorities of the country in question to capture or 
address the terrorist threats; and no other reasonable alternatives are available.
206
 One reason 
for its preference is that drones are configured to target with precision.
207
  With the aid of 
drones, it is easier to comply with the LOAC principle of distinction than an infantry man 
                                                          
200
 E. Di Nucci, et al, ‘Drones and Responsibility.’ [2016] Legal, Philosophical and Socio-Technical 
Perspectives on Remotely Controlled Weapons, P1. 
201
 A. Basham, ‘Eichmann and Bin Laden: extraterritorial abduction and targeted killing as tools of national 
security.’ [2012]. San- Diego State University Thesis, P1.  
202
 Y. Shiryaev, ‘Cyber-terrorism in the context of contemporary international law’ [2013]3, Legal Studies 
Research Paper, University of Warwick, P141. 
203
 Ibid 
204
 M. Schulzke, ‘The Morality of Remote Warfare: Against the Asymmetry Objection to Remote Weaponry.’ 
[2016] 64(1) Political Studies, P90. 
205
 E. Schwarz, ‘Prescription drones: On the Techno-biopolitical Regimes of Contemporary Ethical 
Killing’ (2016) 47.1, Security Dialogue, P59. 
206
 A. Hashim, ‘The Controversy Over Drone Warfare.’ [2013] 3 (1), Journal of Defence Management, P122. 
207
 
207
 M. Schulzke, ‘Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use  Technologies.’ [2018] 
 International Studies Review, P500 
 60 
 
would, when targeting terrorists within civilian territories.
208
  This fulfils the goal of 
minimising civilian casualties.
209
  This is the strongest argument used by those who justify 
the drone mechanism.  However, the argument that the drone mechanism allows for 
compliance with the LOAC principle of distinction may be compelling until we look at 
figures.  
 
Research shows that between 2004 and 2012, the US employed the services of its CIA to 
control drone strikes in Pakistan.
210
  These drone strikes were criticised for their inability to 
reach the minimum thresholds of transparency and accountability required under international 
law.   
 
One of the earliest such recorded strikes was deployed against al-Qaeda in Yemen in 2002. 
Since then, the locations for the drone strikes have been in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
211
  
According to the estimates made by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, deaths and harm 
caused from the drone programme in these three countries are summarised in the table below: 
Pakistan (2004 – May 21st 
2016) 
 
 
Yemen (2002 – July 16, 
2016) 
 
Somalia (2007 –  June 21st 
2016) 
 
Obama strikes: 373 Confirmed drone 
strikes: 127-147 
Drone strikes: 21-31 
 
Total killed: 2,499-4,001 Civilians killed: 65-101 
 
Children killed: 0-2 
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Civilians killed: 424-966 
 
Children killed: 8-9 
 
Civilians killed: 3-10 
Children killed: 172-207 Injured: 96-228 Injured: 2-8 
Injured: 1,161-1,744 Total killed: 552-806 Total killed: 222-386 
Total strikes: 424 Possible extra drone 
strikes:89-106 
Other covert operations: 9-
13 
 Total killed: 351-503 
 
Children killed: 0-2 
 
 Civilians killed: 26-61 
 
Civilians killed: 7-47 
 
 Children killed: 6-9 Injured: 11-21 
 Injured: 82-109 Total killed: 59-141 
 Other covert operations: 15-
78 
 
 Children killed: 26-28 
 
 
 Civilians killed: 68-102 
 
 
 Injured: 45-132  
 Total killed: 203-436  
 
Between 2004- 2019, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism recorded in summary: 
6,786 minimum drone strikes; 
8,439-12, 105 of persons killed; 
769 – 1,725 of civilians killed and 
253- 397 of children killed by the drone strikes.
212
 
The above table represents the scale of drone operations and casualties that have occurred in 
over  15 years.
213
 Childhood deaths are a first point of concern. If it may sometimes be 
difficult to distinguish culprits from innocent civilians, is it also true to conclude that it is 
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difficult to distinguish children from adults? When drone strikes involved less militant deaths 
and more civilian deaths, the percentage of civilian casualties increased to 40%.
214
 These 
facts in estimates weaken the argument that the drone programme complies with the LOAC 
distinction and proportionality principles. and has the ability to target with precision. Fewer 
casualties may be defended as accidental but so many casualties calls for a reconsideration of 
either the use of drones or the manner in which they are used.  If the drones target precisely, 
then perhaps it is the pilots who do not exercise due caution when launching missiles. 
Perhaps the criticisms against the use of drones will abate if the drone pilots are  trained to 
pilot discriminately. If drones are indeed devised to target with precision, then it seems that 
the liability of indiscriminate killings falls on the shoulders of drone operators and not the 
drones themselves.  
 
Even the ICRC confirms that drones are not weapons of mass destruction.
215
 It agrees that 
drones are not indiscriminate weapons and so have the capacity to prevent unnecessary loss 
of life, harm and suffering to innocent persons if used properly.
216
 It is true that civilian 
casualties are a common phenomenon during warfare. It is possible to accidentally target 
children and innocent civilians within the nexus of a battlefield. Who is to say that an infantry 
soldier can prevent such accidents from happening? The emphasis of Article 51 (2) AP1, GC 
1977 is that they must not be ‘deliberately’ targeted.  
 
It is possible to argue that drones weaponry is not illegal. However, this does not eliminate 
the ethical question that those in favour of drones might struggle with: Can the drone 
mechanism fully comply with the LOAC in terms of making life and death decisions on the 
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battlefield? Who can be made accountable if the use of drones results in a war crime: the 
drone pilot, the manufacturer or the person giving the command, or all of the above? If 
remotely piloted drones become permissible machinery for engaging in warfare, two parties 
engaging each other on a battlefield may be evenly represented by drones instead of infantry 
as is the norm. It is difficult to picture such a scenario whereby, opposing parties remotely 
pilot drones against each other. There is nothing separating such an experience from that of a 
video game. This is why some scholars have referred to those who pilot the drones as the 
‘Joystick/play-station’ soldiers.217 It is impractical to have a scenario in which, in order to 
save human lives only drone machines should be present in a battlefield. It becomes a case of 
one army’s missile attempting to overpower the missiles fired from the drone belonging to 
the other party, making such type of warfare pointless. The point is that at any given time or 
place; the idea of fighting a war without humans to engage each other on a battlefield is 
inconceivable. The drone strategy induces controversy only because it is new and not 
formally recognised under international law. If we do not ignore the fact an advance in 
technology is inevitable then, perhaps legislators may devise ways in which the drone itself 
may be regulated. 
 
2.2.5 LOAC Mechanism of Warfare: Israel’s  Scheme 
Israel specifically defends its right to target and kill terrorists under the laws of war.
218
  The 
military force of Israel is designated to carry out targeted killings against Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad terrorist groups in Palestine. Its actions are predicated on the grounds that a state has 
the right to devise means to actively protect its citizens.
219
  To the Israeli government, 
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targeted killing is a sophisticated military machinery that is intended to minimize the number 
of Palestine civilian casualties.
220
 The Israeli Supreme Court in Public Committee against 
Torture in Israel v. the Government of Israel enforced targeted killings of Hamas Palestinian 
terrorists using guns, bombs and explosives as regular warfare tactics.
221
 It has been argued 
that the war between Israel and Hamas is valid because Hamas members can be classed as 
non-state actors with a hybrid military identity, meaning they incorporate a range of different 
modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities of an army,
222
 making targeted killing 
against them valid. Whilst this claim remains debatable, Israel’s targeted killing is met with 
criticism, mainly because neither its implementation nor the terrorist attacks it faces are done 
with regard to the LOAC. Targeted killing and terrorism are deliberately carried out within 
civilian territories, with the knowledge that civilians are in close range to the targets
223
  For 
instance, while Israel’s tanks and bulldozers have expelled Palestinians from the West Bank, 
bombs and missiles have developed into the ‘weapons of choice’ for displacing Palestinians 
in Gaza.
224
  When Palestinian terrorists enter into Israel’s civilian terrain to perpetrate 
hostilities, Israeli civilians are usually the object of attacks.
225
  Records show that Palestinian 
terrorists have on several occasions entered Israeli territory, wounding and killing Israeli 
civilians with knives and guns.
226
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The US drone warfare strategy motivated Israel to formulate a fresh method of applying 
transnational force in their fight against terrorism. Recently, Israel negotiated the use of 
drones to achieve their counter-terrorism goal.
227
  Some scholars contend that Israel’s 
targeted killing policy should be supervised; others argue that Israel is justified in pursuing 
the policy until Palestinian authorities are willing to challenge Palestine terrorist 
organisations for the atrocities they commit in Israel.
228
 The current policy to use military 
assets including explosives, helicopter gunships and booby traps received international 
condemnation by many organisations including the UN for its tendency to maximise 
collateral damage.
229
  There were several petitions intended to protect human rights .
230
  It 
was decided that a more “proportionate” and less adverse measure, in terms of the capacity of 
bombs, be used.
231
 
 
However, Israeli Intelligence found that the reduction in the capacity of explosives allowed 
by the courts weakened what the state considered the ‘necessary’ amount of force needed to 
defeat terrorists.
232
  To date, Israel relies on targeted killing as its main counterterrorism 
strategy. It claims that this inhibits the progress of some planned attacks, postpones or 
impacts plans for future attacks and minimizes collateral damage.
233
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It is noteworthy that the targeted killing counterterrorism strategy is highly applauded by 
many commentators as the most practical and effective strategy. Irrespective of this, targeted 
killing is a new strategy that has not yet been legally endorsed under the LOAC. If terroristic 
conflict in general and targeted killing in particular are generally incompatible with the 
LOAC as shown above, targeted killing is even less compatible with law enforcement. This is 
because it does not allow for law enforcement requirements of due process and fair 
hearing.
234
   Nevertheless, it is time to explore the applicability of the law enforcement 
regime to terroristic conflicts in greater detail.  
 
2.5 Terrorism vs. Targeted killings: Applicable under Law IHRL?  
 The failure of the U.S and Israel to put suspected terrorists on trial before killing them raises 
controversy amongst Human Rights activists.
235
 They question the legitimacy of such killings 
under Human Rights Laws. For instance, should the U.S have attempted to put Bin Laden, 
Anwar al- Aulaqi Ahmed Farouq, Adam Gadahn and other suspected terrorists on trial before 
they were killed for their alleged crimes? What is the justification for not putting these 
suspected terrorists on trial before killing them? Under what circumstance is it lawful to kill 
without resort to due process?  Ultimately, should Enforcement of Human Rights Laws 
regulate terroristic activities? 
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2.5.1Can the Law Enforcement of Human Rights Regulate Terrorism and Targeted 
Killings? 
International Human Rights Law specifies a set of rights and entitlements guaranteed to 
individuals by virtue of their humanity.
236
 These norms are expressed in various treaties and 
conventions and are viewed as an ethical minimum that applies to all and for all time. The 
most pertinent provision of human rights law with regard to targeted killing is the right 
against arbitrary deprivation of life. Pursuant to this right, a state would be prohibited from 
killing an individual in the absence of due process, regardless of any alleged criminal guilt of 
which he or she may be accused. As previously mentioned, targeted individuals outside of the 
context of armed conflict must be afforded due process. Their protection against arbitrary 
deprivation of life is firmly established in almost every body of IHRL.
237
 
 
The questions asked above result from an attempt to regulate the terrorism vs. targeted killing 
conflict under the Law enforcement of human rights regime. Is law enforcement able to 
regulate actions of suspected extraterritorial terrorists, who cannot be easily apprehended 
because they do not reside in the states seeking to prosecute? If the law enforcement model 
should regulate terrorist activities, then what methods can be used for holding individual 
suspected terrorists accountable without violating the HRLs stated above? Is it practicable for 
terrorists to be treated as criminals under law enforcement, or military state actors whose 
actions are to be regulated under the LOAC regime?   
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We have already considered the LOAC to be incompatible with terroristic conflict because 
one of the parties does not possess the military status required to qualify for LOAC 
regulations. Now the only other option available is to consider terrorists to be suspects of 
criminal act(s) whose alleged crimes must be confirmed by law enforcement due process of 
fair hearing.
238
  The twenty-first century conflict between terrorists and state actors creates 
some difficulties for domestic laws. The mass deaths and destruction of properties that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, is one of several examples that show its complexity.
239
 Is it 
possible to judge each death on a case by case basis as required under law enforcement?  Due 
Process of fair hearing affords a person suspected of committing a crime the opportunity to 
plead their case against all allegations made.
240
 This means that an accused person charged 
for multiple offences is expected to plead against the charges individually.
241
  If we take into 
account the proliferation of terrorist  attacks leading to mass casualties, we begin to realise 
that perhaps terrorist operations are too extreme for law enforcement to handle.  It may be 
time consuming and impractical to charge an offender accused of causing thousands of deaths 
on each count.  For example, Osama bin laden was alleged to have been responsible for 
spearheading the 9/11attack that claimed the lives of 3000 victims, as well as mobilising 
other 21
st
 century terrorist attacks.
242
 Law enforcement would require that he be tried for each 
attack as well as the death of each victim.  This is a huge task for the judiciary owing to the 
high number of deaths and the fact that not all deaths may easily be accounted for; especially 
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in mass murders like that of the 9/11 incident. In the aftermath of that incident, some families 
were advised to presume the death of victims that were unaccounted for.
243
 
 
Further, terrorists depend on secrecy as a foundational concept for their organizations.
244
  
This includes covert plots, secret leadership, secret communications and the concealment of 
their faces during operations.
245
  This would make it difficult to determine the main actors in 
any terrorist organisation. These groups use modern information technology to execute their 
operations with minimal risk of disclosure.
246
  Tools with no obvious military use which were 
purchased at local shops can be fashioned to construct bombs. For example, the bomb blast 
by Islamic terrorists, which occurred on August 7 1998 at two American embassies in Africa 
killed about 200 innocent people, including 12 American citizens, and injured about 5,000 
civilians.
247
 The explosive devices were improvised, small and inexpensive so that they did 
not raise suspicion from passers-by, prior to deployment.
248
  
 
The 9/11 incident serves as a reminder that ‘suicide bombing’ is one of several ways by 
which terrorist organizations maintain confidentiality and avoid publicity. The deaths 
registered during the incident included those of the main perpetrators.
249
 Usually, suicide 
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bombers wear explosive vests and can therefore not survive detonation.
250
 This makes it 
impossible for such offenders to be arraigned before a court. Although the leadership of the 
group can be traced, nobody can be held directly liable for executing a suicide bombing. 
Homicide without determining culpability as required under law enforcement has therefore 
become a trend with terroristic conflicts.
251
  
Delays in the judicial process also give terrorists the opportunity to plot and execute future 
attacks.
252
 The judicial process involves finding and adducing evidence which can then be 
rebutted by the accused. Sometimes, an accused person is acquitted, not because he or she has 
been proved innocent of the charges, but because a prosecutor is unable to gather sufficient 
evidence to warrant a guilty verdict.
253
 Worse still, in some jurisdictions a dismissed 
allegation cannot be revisited by the criminal courts so as to guide against double jeopardy.
254
 
The criminal justice system in several jurisdictions is designed in such a way that potentially 
dangerous culprits may be allowed to move about freely until their guilt is proven; only after 
this, or if they are convicted of a different crime, can sentence be dispensed. With such an 
advantage, terrorists are able to commit more atrocities at will, thereby endangering more 
lives in future attacks.  
 
In addition, the requirement of fair trial of terrorists suggests that suspected perpetrators are 
within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authorities in the victim state, so that arrest can 
be easily facilitated. However, arrest is difficult since terrorists usually reside outside the 
victim states and cannot be apprehended without the active assistance and support of the state 
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in which the terrorists reside.
255
 It is possible for both states to have conflicting interests, 
especially if the host state is either unwilling to facilitate the arrest of a suspect, or incapable 
of doing so because its indigenous laws do not permit the arrest.  
 
It is noteworthy that the law enforcement model offers punitive rather than preventative 
measures. Individuals are tried for offences they allegedly commit. However, the main 
objective of states is to completely eliminate terrorism and prevent future attacks, rather than 
convict perpetrators after an incident. Prevention is better achieved by apprehending those 
plotting and preparing the attacks before they can be launched. On this basis, the fundamental 
requirement of fair trial under the law-enforcement model is ineffective and a more proactive 
method is best suited to dealing with terrorism.  
 
Even the law enforcement regime recognises that under some pressing circumstances, an 
individual or group may need to abandon the requirement of fair trial and employ the use of 
‘force’. This is the right of self-defence of Article 51 UN Charter. However, the exercise of 
this right is not without challenges when it relates to terroristic conflicts.  
 
  
2.5.2. How Article 51 UN Charter relates to Terroristic conflicts 
 
As earlier noted, this right to exercise self-defence is applicable ‘if an armed attack occurs’ 
against a victim.
256
  There had to be a departure from a literal interpretation of this provision 
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because  it is impossible for anyone whose life has been taken to exercise the right to self-
defence under  Article 51 of the UN Charter.
257
 Thus, the literature generally adopts a 
combined interpretation of the Caroline case and Article 51, when deciding whether an attack 
in self-defence was lawfully carried out. The Caroline case (as detailed in 1.2.3 of chapter 
one) holds that attacks in self-defence can be made against imminent and visibly advancing 
attacks. It must leave no moment of deliberation and no immediate alternative means of 
prevention or option of arrest, but to apply proportionate force against the attacker.
258
 Thus, 
for targeted killing to be lawful, it must be aimed at preventing visibly advancing and lethal 
threats from terrorists .
259
 Anything short of this; every suspected terrorist should be arrested 
and tried before guilt is established.
260
 Regardless, this relevance of the imminent threat 
doctrine is still being questioned  in discussions relating to terroristic conflict. Victims will 
find it very difficult to prevent attacks from terrorists that were designed to be unexpected.  It 
would take a victim who is already aware of a terrorist’s plot to contemplate an action in self-
defence.  Thus as far as terrorism is concerned, some critics conclude that targeted killing in 
self-defence should also be in response to ‘hearsay threats’ like terrorists propaganda videos 
which boast of future attacks.
 261
   
  
The provision of human rights law, appearing to permit killing in self-defence within the 
above stated limited parameters are underdeveloped and the legality of targeted killing is 
therefore debateable. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case pointed out that because “the issue of the 
lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised … the 
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Court expresses no view on the issue.”262 In the absence of directives on the right to use lethal 
force in self-defence against terrorists, U.S and Israel choose to broadly construe their right to 
kill them in self-defence.
263
  
   
2.6.3 Current Study: Can existing laws regulate terroristic conflict? 
The legal doctrines have already implied that targeted killing is illegal.
264
 This chapter argues 
that targeted killing is illegal simply because it falls short of recognition under international 
law. Targeted killing seems to offer a more practicable counterterrorism strategy over the 
prescribed limits of international law.
265
 Existing laws only need to adopt targeted killing or 
similar strategies that are practicable.   
 
The US and Israel are ahead of international law. Both states have adjusted their state 
counterterrorism laws to fit with the reality of terrorism operations: They regard terrorists as 
combatants, civilian territories as battlefields, and the premeditated ‘kill list’ replaces the 
traditional method of distinction through uniforms, tags or emblems.
266
 The US use of drones 
is also the means to carrying the otherwise impossible tasks of distinguishing terrorists from 
civilian territories.
267
   Such approaches are practical in dealing with terrorism and in their 
decisive ways of complying with the LOAC. In order to legalise targeted killing and avoid 
the risk of international scrutiny, the US and Israel have called for its recognition under 
international law.  
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International organisations are however be mindful of a law that will confer combatant status 
on all terrorists. By recognising them as state actors, except the reforms specifically states 
otherwise, terrorists will be able to access certain privileges that states have , including the 
rights to sanction, or the rights to form state allies.  
 
Conferring combatant rights on terrorists only puts terrorists at an advantage. There is 
nothing to suggest that terrorists intend to be bound by LOAC especially if such obligations 
do not favour them. In fact, Islamic terrorism is in itself a protest against western laws.
268
 
When legislators consider reforming international law, consideration should be given to the 
uniqueness of terrorists and their actions. The approach must be practical but also guide 
against abuse. This new approach must also be effective in achieving the counterterrorism 
goals sought by the states. This may or may not include targeted killings but targeted killing 
is a contender amongst other possible counterterrorism strategies to be explored latr in this 
thesis. One way it will do this is by assessing the impact targeted killing has on terrorist 
organisations in general.  If targeted killing does not deter terrorism then its effectiveness is 
in question. A hermeneutic study of various schools of thought in the following chapter is a 
starting point to discovering the ideologies that drive terroristic conflict. This provides insight 
into what parties want to achieve in order to negotiate an end to the conflict.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter put into context, controversial issues, dilemmas and legal interpretations 
surrounding targeted killings. The aim of the chapter was to clarify and explore the extent to 
which transnational targeted killings of suspected terrorists compromise their human rights 
and whether such action can be legitimised under the rule of international law; to evaluate the 
validity of the defence that targeted killing is a legitimate self-defence tactic and to explore 
the concept of an acceptable legal compromise that balances the rights of the perpetrators and 
victims of targeted killings. The chapter contained a critical appraisal of the legal doctrines 
(laws in books) that regulate conflict and particularly those that regulate the use of lethal 
force. The contents of the legal doctrines were then contrasted with what obtains in terroristic 
conflicts (law in action) in order to specifically determine the legality of targeted killing 
strategy. Then a critical analysis of the social, political, cultural and legal defences adduced 
by the states was conducted in order to clarify the contribution of targeted killings in pursuit 
of a practical and legitimate counterterrorism strategy.  By a critical analysis of targeted 
killings, this chapter distinguished between traditional warfare and contemporary terroristic 
conflict, to emphasise the changes in warfare or warfare like conflicts (law in action).  
 
The current LOAC evolved at a time when nation fought against nation, and when political 
boundaries and uniforms gave scope and shape to conflict. However, terroristic conflicts 
differ significantly from the LOAC paradigm.  With the 21st Century global terroristic 
conflict has come the rise of non-state actor involvement; a development that has already 
drastically changed the face of warfare. Contemporarily, the world is faced with fewer 
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occurrences of traditional types of warfare and a lot more of the terroristic type of conflict 
that are not directly covered by the LOAC. Likewise the law enforcement paradigm is also 
weak because it insists that in certain circumstances, a terrorist should be tried rather than 
targeted. Alternatively, if it appears that there is imminent threat to justify targeting, law 
enforcement allows for targeting in self-defence from immediate threats, without due process. 
However, states find this difficult to prove because the laws that permit force to be applied in 
self-defence do not apply to the new form of attacks, where terrorists perpetrate surprise 
attacks against civilians. Rather, it is often predicted, (based on past behaviour), that at some 
future date, there may be a recurrent attack from the same source. Analysis of the legal 
doctrine has however shown that there is no case for the defence of imminent threat arising 
from the later circumstance. The only option open to states will be to arrest suspected terrorist 
culprits, this being difficult to achieve owing to the international nature of terroristic conflict. 
It seems however that any self-defence counterterrorism strategies must be ‘proactive’ to be 
effective. This automatically rules out the law enforcement model because of its ‘reactive’, 
and time consuming due process requirements. Targeted killing has continued based on this 
notion but regardless of the sympathy the strategy evokes, as long as international law fails to 
recognise terrorists as combatants, targeted killing of terrorists will always be illegal.  
 
This thesis does not condemn the use of targeted killings done in the name of warfare. This 
chapter has argued that terroristic conflict between a state and a non-state organization is an 
area not covered but worthy of regulation by the Geneva Conventions. Because non-state 
organizations are capable of inflicting grave hostility on the population of other states, 
potential victim states retain the moral right of self-defence against them. The incompetence 
of law enforcement of human rights in the regions in which these organizations operate 
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leaves the state with no other option but military action, which fulfils the necessity 
requirement of jus ad bellum. Once engaged in armed conflict, the right against arbitrary 
deprivation of life for participants in the conflict is reinterpreted through the lens of the 
LOAC. Thus, targeted killing is not a violation of human rights if the persons targeted can be 
classified as combatants in armed conflict. However, to make terroristic conflict fit perfectly 
under the LOAC, terrorists should be awarded a form of status that allows states to lawfully 
target them.  It may be necessary to disregard the DPH rule that considers non-uniformed 
personnel as combatants for such time as they remain a threat, according to Additional 
Protocol I.  
 
This chapter takes cognisance of the concerns that a thorough legal analysis will always 
regard targeted killing and the mechanisms used as illegal. It is in consideration of the 
compelling argument in favour of targeted killings that recommendations for reforms on 
current laws are made in this thesis. Perhaps, out of empathy for the states which justifiably 
feel the need to practically defend themselves from terrorist attacks, a legal recognition of 
targeted killing may be invoked. However, such compelling arguments in favour of the 
practicality of targeted killing do not steal focus of this thesis which, in the end, is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of targeted killing strategy. It is only upon a conviction of the effectiveness 
of targeted killing that recommendation of new law reforms that consider targeted killing will 
be made in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGIES BEHIND THE 
TERRORISM VS TARGETED KILLING CONFLICT AND DEBATES: THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE LIBERAL COSMOPOLITAN, REALIST AND 
PRAGMATIST SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT.  
           
3.1. Introduction 
There is conflict between scholars on the legality of the counter-terrorism strategy adopted by 
the US and Israel. This chapter comprises a literature review, examining issues that have 
become a source of debate around the research topic. The hermeneutical analysis of views in 
literature also highlights aspects in need of further study on the subject of targeted killings. 
There are a number of schools of thought in international relations on the law in action 
regarding terrorism and counterterrorism strategies.  
Firstly, the chapter highlights changes in the character of warfare in recent years. It does this 
by differentiating modern warfare from traditional warfare in terms of the applicability of the 
current laws that regulate the general use of force. Secondly, the chapter lays out the relevant 
historical background to the study area by using facts to analyse and appreciate the changes 
in the character of conflicts in general. Thirdly, the chapter adopts a Hermeneutical 
methodology to analyse the ideological perspectives from three different schools of thought 
believed to be representations of parties that debate contemporary terrorism and 
counterterrorism strategies, and particularly targeted killing. These schools are:  the legal 
realist, the liberal cosmopolitan and the pragmatic schools of thought. These schools present 
alternative views on several legislative ambiguities and dilemmas identified in Chapter Two.  
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The war against terror is argued to be an ideological one, in which the parties involved fight 
for what they believe in. A thesis that analyses terroristic warfare must therefore study the 
ideological background of the debates representing the different parties to the conflict. 
Discoveries made from analysing these philosophical perspectives will facilitate the structure 
of legal frameworks, because it offers insights on how to compose regulations that 
realistically induce compliance by the parties to the conflict. Fourthly, the ethical debates 
over the use of drones by representatives of the above schools of thought are reviewed. The 
drone mechanism used for carrying out most of the killings by the US is analysed.  The aim 
of assessing the legal debates is to clarify aspects of the laws regulating weapon control that 
require amendment.  Fifthly, the gaps in international policies that generally regulate 
conflicts, in the literature discussion over targeted killing, the gaps this thesis aims to fill, 
and the scope of this thesis are listed and explained. Sixthly, the game theory as a discipline 
is briefly introduced and defined. This chapter explains ‘what’ game theory is and ‘why’ it is 
used in this thesis. However, it is the next chapter that extensively explains ‘how’ the game 
theory method is applicable to this thesis. The chapter makes an exposition into the historical 
rationales and conclusions of researches that adopt the use of game theory methodical 
approach in the literature. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the Pragmatic rationale 
for the justification of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy.  
 
3.2. Objectives of the Literature Review: 
Reviewing the literature helps to identify the extent of research on targeted killings. It also 
highlights challenges arising from a comprehensive application of existing law to 
contemporary targeted killing. Divergent scholarly opinion is useful in assessing varied 
interpretations of the justification for states’ use of force in self-defence. This allows the 
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researcher to distinguish and verify the line between self-defence as propounded by the states 
and unjust killings as alleged by the victims and some commentators. This chapter is not 
meant to be an exhaustive review of the literature; instead, the main aim of the review is to 
put into perspective the normative values of various stake holders in the terrorism vs. targeted 
killing conflicts. The knowledge gained about the values that drive the ‘war against terror’ 
would hopefully lend insight into suggestions that can resolve them. A significant starting 
point will be to appreciate the differences between past era ‘traditional warfare’ that were 
merely political in nature and ‘modern terroristic warfare’ that are now philosophically 
driven. 
 
3.3.The Changing Character of Warfare:  
Carl Schmitt’s in his ‘Nomos of the Earth,’ is generally applauded for the recognition of the 
changes in the world order that occurred in the seventeenth and again in the twentieth 
century.
 269
  Schmitt invites us to accept that humanized wars of the current European states’ 
system represent not only in practice but also in theory, an advance of the ‘just wars’ that 
preceded them and the humanitarian wars that followed them. Irrespective of the background, 
the current trend in armed conflict involving terrorism and counterterrorism suggests that all 
parties involved fight to express deep rooted belief systems or mandates. While acts of 
terrorism continue because they propose some form of reward for their perpetrators, targeted 
killings purportedly preserve the power of national sovereignty and protects citizens’ right to 
life. As long as terrorism persists, the fight to annihilate it continues in the name of warfare. 
However, this is not akin to the traditional understanding of the intent and purpose of 
engaging in armed conflict. There was always a perceived end to traditional wars specifically 
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by peace treaties. According to Schmitt, the model of war which operates today is one of 
‘total war’ or ‘absolute war’. It is no longer enough to defeat the enemy, instead, one has to 
eliminate him.
270
 Schmitt also noted that theologians define the enemy as something which 
must be annihilated.
271
  Those who fight the so called ‘war against terror’ use this reasoning. 
Their intention is not merely to combat terrorism but to eliminate it. In subsequent 
paragraphs, an assessment of the motivation, methods and ideologies behind contemporary 
conflict leads to the recognition that contemporary warfare is by nature very different from 
traditional warfare. This examination begins with closely assessing the disparity between the 
US and Israel’s’ targeted killing programmes and the jus ad bellum (justification for engaging 
in war) and jus in bello (justification of the conducts and mechanisms used during warfare) 
just war principles, upon which the laws of war, otherwise known as Laws of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) are predicated. 
 
3.4. Traditional warfare vs. Modern warfare: 
Israel has vehemently pursued a policy of targeted killing since the second intifada in 
September 2000. The Israelis have identified, located and killed alleged Palestinian terrorists 
with helicopter gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks, car bombs, booby traps and guns.
272
 For the 
past fourteen years, the US has employed drone missiles to combat Al-Qaeda and other 
transnational terrorist threats, framing the issue as a Global War on Terror (GWOT). These 
two states, which practice targeted killing, believe they are fighting a war against terror and, 
thus, engage their military forces to hunt down and kill terrorists who have been 
predetermined for elimination on a ‘kill list.’ Former US President George Bush declared 
‘war on terror’ after the 9/11, al-Qaeda, ‘Twin Tower’ attack on the US. Later, the Obama 
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administration and the western media began to use the term to legally justify the response of 
targeted killing of terrorists under the laws regulating warfare. This ideology of modern 
warfare is what the proponents of human rights and fundamental freedom, liberal democracy 
and the rule of law against targeted killing struggle to accept.
273
 Even more disconcerting is 
the manner in which the GWOT is expressed. There is a significant difference between the 
manner in which this so called war against terror is carried out and traditional warfare that 
has been the norm for many years.  
 
There has obviously been a major shift in methods of targeted killings during warfare. The 
close quarter, ‘man to man hand delivered killing’ which is known to be the traditional way 
of engaging in warfare has changed.
274
 The means and ends of mass mobilization and state-
centred approaches, which were the hallmark of traditional warfare have been by-passed. The 
mechanism, the setting in terms of boundaries and the status criteria in terms of the eligibility 
for participating are different from the old norms of warfare. Remotely controlled drones are 
now used to deliver missiles against previously determined civilian targets found within 
civilian territories.
275
  
 
Some scholars attempt to support the US and Israel’s legal justification for targeted killings 
conducted in the war against terror’ on the grounds that the LOAC permits pre-emptive 
strikes against the enemies of a state. What they fail to bear in mind is the fact that, in 
terroristic warfare, the enemies of the states are not states themselves but civilians who carry 
out hostilities and who must therefore not be targeted unless certain criteria are met.  After 
the Second World War, the laws regulating warfare were updated to give more regard to the 
                                                          
273
 K.E. Lunday, et al ‘Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III 
National Security Court.’ [2008]39 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. P87. 
274
 Ibid 
275
 M. K. Wells, ‘Tribal Warfare: The Society of Modern Airmen.’ (2015) AIR UNIN MAXWELL AFB 
Airforce Research Institute; https://humanrightsinvestigations.org/the-laws-of-war/  [Accessed on 14/12/19] 
 84 
 
needs of civilians. The laws of war codified in 1945 were not designed for non-military 
participants, neither was it envisaged that civilian territories would be the battlefields. The 
laws of war recognise conflict as existing between states and lethal force should only be 
applied against combatants who constitute the military force of a state. Combatants are 
prohibited from deliberately targeting civilians or their properties unless they are found 
directly participating in hostilities against those targeting them. To this end, enemy 
combatants where restricted to conducting hostilities in battle-zones that were not proximate 
to civilian terrain. The aim was to distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians, 
thereby reducing the risk of harm to innocent civilians during warfare. Instead, what seems to 
obtain today is that civilian involvement far outweighs military participation in terroristic 
warfare.
276
 The main victims of terrorism are civilians;, even the terrorists are themselves 
civilians because international law does not recognise them as state actors.
277
 It suffices to 
add that the only real military participants in the ‘war against terror’ are combatants from the 
states carrying out targeted killings. In the view of many scholars, this novel idea of warfare 
that expands the chances of collateral damage and human rights violations needs to be 
explored properly in terms of the justification for its use. 
 
3.5. The Novelty of Targeted killing. 
The term ‘targeted killing’ has no general definition under international law. The United 
Nations (UN) has however recognised that in recent years, the U.S and Israel have implicitly 
and openly adopted policies of targeted killings, including within the territories of other 
states.
278
  Military combatants have implied duties that include targeting and killing enemy 
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combatants under guided parameters during armed conflicts.
279
 In contrast however, when the 
UN and scholars , mention ‘targeted killing,’ it is usually with reference to the ‘intentional, 
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force by states or their agents, acting under colour of 
law, or by an organised armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is 
not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.’280 The phrase ‘acting under the colour of law’ 
suggests that the UN regards targeted killings as practised by the states to be illegal.  The 
common factors present in the contextual definition of targeted killings is that lethal force is 
intentionally and deliberately applied, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual 
or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator.  Some commentators 
opine that the terrorist incidence of 9/11 exposed the vulnerability of the US and other 
western nations, demonstrating the need to be expeditious and pro-active in response to 
terroristic threats to national security.
281 
This rationale has given rise to the endorsement of 
targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy by many of the western states who do not 
accept the more restrictive approach of human rights agents. Over the past two decades, the 
counterterrorism strategy of the US and Israel has continually featured
 
targeted killing.
282
  
 
The aim of a targeted killing operation is to use lethal force to eliminate persons considered 
as national threats, alleged to have committed or to intend to commit violent crimes against a 
state.
283
 For instance, once the US intelligence service is aware of an individual’s 
involvement in a terrorist organisation, such person becomes a ‘person of interest’ and his/her 
name is included in a ‘kill list’ of those to be targeted on a future date. The targeting process 
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usually involves entering into civilian territory in other states, using remotely controlled 
drones equipped with targeting cameras and missiles, to kill suspected terrorists. The whole 
process distinguishes targeted killings from unintentional, accidental killings, or killings as a 
last resort. The general debate over the tactic includes concerns that targeted killings violate 
all existing laws that regulate the use of force. This includes the laws of war which states use 
to justify targeted killing. This is because it is incompatible with traditional warfare norms. 
Moreover, the targets are not recognised as combatants under the LOAC, but as civilians 
under international law. It means that Due Process of criminal law enforcement must be 
followed and the guilt of all suspected terrorists judicially determined as would that of other 
civilians.
284
 However, the following paragraphs demonstrates how the law enforcement is 
inapplicable to targeted killing and terrorism.  
 
3.6. How applicable is Due Process under Law Enforcement of Human Rights? 
Targeted killing can be distinguished from law enforcement operations that may include 
killing out of necessity in self-defence, for instance against a suspected suicide bomber. 
Under such circumstances, it may be legal for law enforcement personnel to apply lethal 
force based on the imminence of the threat, but the original goal of the operation should not 
be to apply lethal force.
285
 Law enforcement requires the guilt of a culprit to be proved before 
punishment. However, on occasions when terrorists do not reside in the same state as those 
targeting them, there are no guarantees that a thorough judicial intervention is achievable. For 
example, there might be insufficient evidence to negotiate the arrest and extradition of 
suspected terrorists that do not reside in the investigating state.
286
 Moreover, due process is 
not only time-consuming; it is also merely punitive and not preventative. The real solution 
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sought from anti-terror measures is to prevent attacks and not to only punish culprits. 287  This 
is why some states consider the ‘due process’ of prosecuting criminals before civilian courts 
to be inadequate for averting serious threats from terrorists.  
 
However, in the eyes of many human rights commentators, the system of law enforcement 
does not demonstrate any such inadequacy: terrorism is usually dangerous, but it does not call 
for a significant departure from how liberal states deal with crime. Rather, it requires better 
coordinated and more effective law-enforcement efforts.
 288
  On the other hand, the quest for 
more effective law enforcement efforts by these commentators only buttresses the claim that 
the human rights law enforcement regime is not suitable for dealing with terroristic conflicts. 
As will be shown below, many scholars argue that the laws regulating warfare should take 
precedence over human rights laws. This is because military forces are better skilled in 
dealing with large scale conflicts. They are also equipped with assorted ammunitions for 
dealing with opponents during warfare than are policemen equipped.   Otherwise, like the law 
enforcement of human rights regime, the laws of war are just as inapplicable to terroristic 
conflicts. 
3.7. What makes the Laws of war inapplicable? 
The aim of international armed conflicts is to weaken opposing military targets. That is why 
all operations are to be directed only against military objectives.
 289
 For this to be practically 
and factually possible, military objectives have to be clear, in contrast to civilian objectives. 
For combatants to be distinguished from civilians, they must wear uniforms or emblems. For 
belligerent civilians to be distinguished from innocent ones, they must be directly 
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participating in hostilities. Targeted killing must therefore be conducted at the time that the 
targets are engaging in hostilities.  
Distinction is a fundamental principle under the laws of armed conflict.
290
 Although terrorist 
organisations acknowledge that they are at war with western states, terrorists do not comply 
with the laws of war. They deliberately do not wear uniforms, emblems or tags that identify 
them. They also limit their movements to civilian territories, making it difficult to distinguish 
them from other civilians. This is why some states complain of being disadvantaged by the 
laws that they are expected to comply with when engaging terrorists in conflict. Their 
chances of targeting ‘the real culprits’ are limited to moments when there is full clarity about 
the legitimacy of the targets. To avoid keeping a dangerous person alive, states target the 
suspect anyway, even when uncertain of their legitimacy. Any mistaken identities or 
accidental attacks are regarded as collateral damage. This action is criticised by humanitarian 
commentators, who insist that the best option in situations of uncertainty is to refrain from 
targeting, even at the risk of harm from the dangerous culprits kept alive. 
 
On the other hand, terrorists prefer to exploit the laws of war to their advantage. They portray 
themselves as civilians with vested rights to immunity under Art 3 of the GC of the LOAC. 
This aims to limit the states pre-emptive rights to attack them. However, research shows that 
terrorists are not inhibited by the laws of war and do not exercise restraint when attacking 
civilians within their territories. It comes as no surprise that it is difficult to apply the laws of 
war to terroristic conflicts, if the parties involved in the conflict have little or no regard for 
the laws of war principles. The question is why do parties to terroristic warfare have little 
regard for the laws of war principles? It appears that disobeying the law is a matter of choice 
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on the part of terrorists. However, subsequent analysis clarifies whether the US and Israel 
deliberately disregard the principles of war or whether the laws are just impossible to comply 
with when engaging in terroristic warfare. These questions cannot be answered without 
exploring the historical and ideological background upon which the war against terror is 
predicated. These explain normative justifications on grounds of self-preservation and 
autonomy despite the risk of disregarding the laws of war in the ongoing war against terror.  
 
3.8. Historical Review of Targeted Killing Strategy (the US and Israel):   
Since 2000 and 2001 respectively, Israel and the US have actively utilised targeted killings, 
whilst both legally endorsing it as their countries main 21
st
 century counterterrorism 
strategy.
291
 However, both countries have a history of resorting to targeted killing strategy 
when attacking those they regard as threats to their national sovereignties.  
3.8.1. Targeted killing by US 
The US current pursuit of targeted killings is not the first of its kind. Tal Tovy
292
 provides the 
most detailed analysis of the US historical targeted killing programme. Starting with what 
was tagged the ‘Phoenix programme,’ the US planned to pursue an intensive targeted killing 
programme against guerrilla terrorists during the Vietnam War in 1960.  Tovy assessed the 
development, implementation and effectiveness  of the programme.
293
 The findings suggest 
that the programme was largely influenced by the American insights.
294
  The programme was 
founded as a result of the intentional collaboration of military, political and social science 
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experts, sponsored by the CIA and implemented by US special forces and their Vietnamese 
trainees.
295
 The aim was to capture and/or kill members of the Viet Cong (VC) who had been 
identified by Vietnamese indigenes.
296
 The programme disrupted the effectiveness and 
operational scope of VC activities, resulting in about 81,740 VC killed between 1968 and 
1972.
297
 
There was much debate over the relative merits or legality of targeted killings. For example, 
several plots to kill foreign political leaders were hatched by the CIA between 1950 and 
1970.
298
 These resulted in deliberations and hearings by the Church Committee of the US 
Senate between 1975 and 1976. This committee was set up in 1975 and charged with the duty 
to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.
299
 The observations 
of the Committee indicated the need to curb killings not authorised by the state.  This led to 
the implementation of Executive Order 12,333 which signified a ban on assassinations by the 
then US President, Gerald Ford, and which was un-rescinded by his successors.
300
  The 
policy has continued to control US decisions on targeting certain persons.
 301
  However, the 
US has increasingly signed death warrants for leaders deemed as threats to humanity. For 
instance, the Second Gulf War led to adjustments in the US anti-assassination view. It even 
instigated the murder trial and eventual execution of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, in 2006, as a 
punishment for his brutality towards humanity.
302
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As noted above, the ‘white paper’ released by the US Justice Department in 2011 is the first 
official document that lawfully endorses modern ‘targeted killings’ as legitimate acts of war, 
authorising the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists including non-state actors and 
active members of the al-Qaeda group.
303
  From the US perspective, there is a parallel 
between lawful killings of enemy combatants during armed conflicts and the targeting of 
active members of terrorist organisations who harbour plans to wage war on states.
304
 
Whether the state is permitted under any law to disregard the provisions of international law 
in the event of terrorism based conflict is a question yet unanswered in the current literature. 
In order to fill the gap, this research  assesses the justification for these actions through the 
socio-legal research methodology.  In a bid to assess the US programme, this thesis focuses 
on attacks on the al-Qaeda group in Yemen and Pakistan.
305
 
 
3.8.2. Targeted Killings by Israel 
Israel has traditionally resorted to targeted killings in reaction to the increasing wave of 
Palestinian terror activity. The first series of transnational attacks by the Palestinians occurred 
in the 1960s, and included aircraft hijackings and the murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the 
1972 Munich Olympics. These attacks resulted in serious civilian casualties, leaving Israeli 
society in disarray.
 306
 During the Intifada, many Palestinians were administratively detained, 
while others were put on trial or deported.  The current conflict has been characterized by a 
more hostile operational response, largely due to the Palestinian terrorist groups’ decision to 
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attack civilians with suicide bombs during the first intifada.
307
 Since the infrastructure of 
Palestinian terror groups was located mainly in host Arab countries which were technically at 
war with Israel, extradition or other forms of coordinated legal action against the terrorists 
were not possible. The only way to react was by targeting the perpetrators and 
masterminds.
308
  
 
Assessments of the Israeli programme have served as prelude to most normative or legal 
arguments on targeted killings. These works include those by MJ Boyle,
309
 Ben-
Naftali,
310
Alexander Beck and Cohen, Shanny, Mikko and Avi.
311
 Like the US, the Israeli 
government found targeted killings as a means of exercising the right to self-defence against 
terrorism.
312
  A few notable scholars, including David, Tovy and Fernandez
313
 have assessed 
specific historical cases and programmes.  
 
Firstly, David found that such practices were employed in medieval times by secret groups 
like the Hagana.
314
 Secondly, the groups that conducted targeted killings used biblical cases 
of targeted killings to justify their actions against their opponents.
315
 Thirdly, the Israelis have 
targeted the British army, Arabs, Nazi followers residing in Israel when the territory was a 
                                                          
307
 I.J. Bickerton, C.L. Klausner., ‘A History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict.’ [Routledge, 2018, 8th ed] P.17 
308
 Ibid  
309
 Ibid P15 
310
 O. Ben-Naftali, ‘We must not make a scarecrow of the law: A legal analysis of the Israeli Policy of targeted 
killings.’ [2003] 36 Cornell International Law Journal, P1. 
311
 A. Cohen, Y. Shany, ‘A development of modest proportion: The application of proportionality in the targeted 
killing case.’ [2007] 5 (2) Journal of International Criminal Justice, P310; F. Klor et al ‘Counter-suicide-
terrorism: Evidence from the house of demolitions.’ [2015] 77(1) The Journal of Politics, P27; J. Mikko ‘Death 
comes knocking on the roof.’ Thanaopolitics of Ethical killing During Operation Protective Edge in Gaza’ 
[2015] Antipode; K. Avi ‘From Heroic to Post-Heroic Warfare Israel’s Way of War in Asymmetrical Conflicts.’ 
[2015] 41 (1) Armed Forces and Society, P96. 
312
 J.N. Kendall, ‘Israeli counter-terrorism: Targeted killings under international law.’ [2001] 80 NCL Rev, 
P1069. 
313
 G. Palmer-Fernandez, ‘Justifying political assassination: Michael Collins and the Cairo gang.’ [2000] 31(2), 
Journal of Social Philosophy, P160.  
314
 S. David, ‘Fatal choices: Israeli policy of targeted killing.’ [2003] 2 (3) Review of International Affairs, 
P138. 
315
 Ibid  
 93 
 
British protectorate, and some Jews.
316
 Fourthly, Israel has continued to conduct targeted 
killings since its independence.
 317
 Fifthly, the Israeli army has employed several weapons 
including helicopter gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks, booby traps and bombs for the 
killings.
318
 However, they usually refer to their tactics as ‘interceptions’ or ‘target 
thwarting.’319 Sixthly, Israeli targeted killings increased after the start of the second intifada 
in 2000.
320
 Seventhly, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that targeted killings are lawful 
under its domestic law.
321
 Lastly, research shows that Israel carried out 213 targeted killing 
strikes in the Palestinian territory between 2000 and 2010, killing 239 people. Between 2000 
and 2014, 
322
  a total of 8,166 died in the conflict, 7,065 of which were Palestinian and 1,101 
Israelis. This means 87 percent of deaths have been Palestinians and only 13 percent Israeli.
 
323
 Israel negotiated with Hamas and other Palestinian groups to stop targeted killings of 
Palestinian leaders and activists in return for an end to the 2014 Israel Gaza conflict.
324
 
However, the Israeli government continues to employ targeted killing tactics against 
Palestinian terrorists, because the latter have not desisted from terrorising Israeli civilians.
325
 
Even after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had pledged to cease all military activities 
against all Palestinians everywhere including the Gaza strip, research suggests that neither 
Israeli forces nor Palestinian terrorists complied with this peace agreement.
326
 Some Israeli 
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soldiers are reported to have initiated an exchange of fire with some Palestinian targets only 
two months after the pledge, and Palestinians have responded in the same vein.  
 
There are recent incidents of Palestinian ‘lone wolves’ encroaching into Jerusalem to attack 
and kill Israeli civilians with a variety of weapons including butcher knives, guns and 
vehicles.
327
  Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of Palestinian terrorist attacks 
in the West Bank, several of which were thwarted.
328
 On June 30, 2015, Yoram Cohen, head 
of Israel’s General Security Service (GSS), reported to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee that since 2012 there had been a 50 percent annual increase in “popular” 
terror attacks (683 in 2012 compared to 1,834 in 2014).
 329
 The highest number of attacks 
occurred during Operation Protective Edge in which Hamas launched 4,594 rockets and 
mortars against Israel in 2014.
330
 After an intervention from the US and UK government, 
Israel and Hamas reached a truce and agreed on a ceasefire.
331
 However, few days after the 
ceasefire, the war between Israel and Hamas resurrected. Palestinian militant suicide bombers 
emerged at Gaza strip and detonated a bomb in an attempt to stop Israel military from 
destroying a Hamas tunnel.  Israel launched a revenge attack and the conflict and hostility 
between both entities continued.
332
    Attacks by some 130 terror cells (mostly belonging to 
                                                          
327
 O. Falk, et al, ‘Minimizing Unintended Deaths Enhanced the Effectiveness of Targeted Killing in the Israeli–
Palestinian Conflict.’ [2017]Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, P17. 
328
 ibid 
329
 K. Michael, et al, ‘The “Double Game” in the Palestinian Arena: A Platform for Increased Terrorism’ [2015] 
INSS Insight No.720 Available at https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-double-game-in-the-palestinian-arena-
a-platform-for-increased-terrorism/ [Accessed on 12/05/2020]. 
330
 ‘Rockets Fired from Gaza Into Southern Israel, No Casualties Reported.’ The Jerusalem Post, Available at 
https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Rocket-fired-from-Gaza-into-southern-Israel-no-casualties-reported-
522580  [Accessed on 18/05/18]  
331
 S. Raghavan, et al, ‘How a 72 Hour Truce in Gaza Fell Apart in Less than 2 Hours.’ (2014) The Washington 
Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-hamas-agree-to-72-hour-humanitarian-cease-
fire/2014/08/01/059f1ff8-194e-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a4d22cc73ff6 
[Accessed on 18/05/2018] 
332
 Ibid 
 95 
 
Hamas) and by some 60 cells, were prevented in 2014 and 2015 respectively.
333 
However, 
between January 1 and November 6, 2017, Israeli security forces killed 62 Palestinians, 
including 14 children, and injured at least 3,494 Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and 
Israel. Those killed included protesters, suspected assailants or members of armed groups, 
and bystanders. Palestinians killed at least 15 Israelis during this same time, including 10 
security officers, and injured 129 in conflict-related incidents in the West Bank and Israel.
334
 
The persistent terror attacks have spurred Israeli forces to intensify their targeted killings of 
suspected Hamas terrorists.
 335Likewise, Israel’s persistence on targeted killings seems to 
have initiated more acts of terror from Palestinians. 
Tracing the history of targeted killings makes it easy to appreciate the difference between 
modern and traditional armed conflicts. Even more important is the need to critically analyse 
philosophical debates and ideologies around the perceived legality of targeted killings.  This 
should help us better understand the motivations for changes in the character of armed 
conflicts in general and warfare in particular. 
 
3.9. Ideological Analysis of Terrorism and Targeted Killings 
Ideological debates including Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan, and the media, identify 
the global war on terror as a battle of ideologies based on religious concepts.
336
 This is 
because those who engage in this type of warfare do not pursue a ‘win or lose’ situation that 
determines which army is more powerful. Instead, they proceed from a belief system that 
either imposes religious mandates, or refuses this imposition and protects national 
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sovereignty.
 337
   Even the former British Prime Minister, David Cameron , realised this as he 
made the following comments: 
‘…What we face now is a radical ideology that is not just subversive but 
can seem exciting… One that has often sucked people in from a state of 
non-violence to violence… that is overpowering moderate voices within the 
debate… Such conflict of ideologies is what should be taken seriously.’338  
 
It is important to explore the basis for terrorism and targeted killings so as to constructively 
devise ways of tackling terroristic conflicts. An understanding of ideologies and stake-
holders’ values give better insight when considering the applicability of reforms of current 
policies. 
  
The broader goals of terrorist groups are rarely mentioned but the main assumption of 
terrorist attacks is connected to the Islamic ideology.
339
 For Al-Qaeda terrorists, the ultimate 
goal is an independent state or caliphate, ruled by Sharia law and established and defended by 
holy war or “jihad.”340 This is a perceived divine mandate backed by specific Quran 
injunctions that includes a kind of ‘irregular warfare’ through acts of terrorism.341  The 
mandate is achieved by using various strategies including suicide bombings, random knife 
attacks, and even mowing down of pedestrians with vehicles.
342
 For Al-Qaeda, Alshabab and 
some other terrorist organisations and lone wolves engaged in the jihadi conflict, dying in the 
                                                          
337K. Avi ‘From Heoric to Post –Heoric Warfare. Israel’s Way of War in Asymmetrical Conflicts.’ [2015] 41 (1) 
Armed Forces & Society, P96. 
338
 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech [Accessed on 02/02/18] 
339
 J. Goodwin, ‘What do we really know about (suicide) terrorism?’ [2006]  21(2) Sociological Forum, P315. 
340
 C. Blanchard, ‘Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.’ (2007) CRS, Congress Research Service. 
Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf at P17, [accessed on 12/05/2020]] 
341
 Ibid 
342
 CNN Library, ‘Terrorists Attacks by Vehicles Fast Facts.’ Available at: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/world/terrorist-attacks-by-vehicle-fast-facts/index.html [Accessed on 
18/05/18] 
 97 
 
process of carrying out Gods mandate is gain because God highly rewards such acts of 
bravery.
343
 This is why it is not uncommon for terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda to accept 
the terminable implications of adopting the strategy of suicide bombing.
344
    The general 
perception by Islamic terrorists is that Islam is under attack. This is owing to the refusal of 
western states to accept its practise norms and values. A fundamental aspect of terrorism is 
the presence of a political objective (e.g., ousting the United States from the Persian Gulf 
states) that the terrorist acts are designed to achieve. These terrorist acts would include 
extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. In extremism it is used to promote values that are 
extremely incompatible with human rights norms.
345
 In terrorism it is used to promote 
violence, and in radicalisation it is used to exploit vulnerable people and recruit them to the 
cause. This mandate sufficiently encompasses populations all over the world, both local and 
international conflicts, and to oppose domestic and foreign policies. 
346
 
2 The use of extraordinary violence or brutality is an attempt by terrorists to capture news 
headlines or media attention.  While al-Qaeda relentlessly imposes Sharia standards on 
western states, the latter, spearheaded by the US, fight back using ‘irregular tactics of 
targeted killings’ through drones to stop the impositions.347  
 
In the Torah,
348
 there is a seminal passage in Deuteronomy that mandates Israel to expel non-
Jewish inhabitants from the promised land of Canaan(currently Israel and Palestinian 
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territory) that God has given them as an inheritance.
 349
 However, the Palestinians also lay 
claim to parts of this land and use terrorism to prevent the Israelis from fully actualising their 
claim.
350
 U.S and Israel claim self-defence against terror as a justification for utilizing 
targeted killings.
351
  
 
This research analyses three schools of thought on the lawfulness of applying force. They 
include the Liberal Cosmopolitan School, reliant upon Kantian ethics,
352
 the Realist school of 
Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt,
 353
 and the Pragmatism school of philosophy attributed to 
William James, John Dewey and Charles Peirce.
354
 The rationale for this selection is that 
scholars debating the legality of targeted killings and the relevance of law enforcement model 
or laws of war regime, express views that associate them implicitly with at least one of these 
schools. 
 
 
3.9.1. The Liberal Cosmopolitan Rationale 
The first proponents of the liberal cosmopolitan school include Immanuel Kant, who is 
considered the central figure of enlightenment rationalism and moral law; John Locke and 
Aristotle and more contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Jurgen Habermas and 
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Ronald Dworkin. Immanuel Kant and John Locke proposed that each person has a “natural 
right” to life, liberty and property. The state must not exercise authority over individuals and 
governments must not violate human rights, for that would go against the social contract.  
 
Liberalists generally oppose traditional conservatism and seek to replace government 
absolutism with representative democracy and the rule of one universal law.
355
 They believe 
that terrorism and targeted killings should be strictly regulated by the due process law 
enforcement regime of a state. In their view, targeted killing policies contravene the well-
established rule of law that guarantees a fair hearing to everyone suspected of a crime 
regardless of the consequences.
356
 Here, the moral worth of an action is determined only by 
its resulting outcome.  Liberalists clamour for liberty, equality and justice, holding that the 
ultimate value is to vindicate the rule of law through legality and equal rights.
357
 
 
Liberalists who have contributed to this debate include Philip Alston, David Luban and 
Samuel Estreicher. This research makes a distinction between ‘hard liberals’, (sometimes 
referred to as restrictionists) and ‘soft liberals’ (otherwise known as counter-restrictionists,) 
due to a slight difference in their motivation for advocating the applicable law enforcement 
regime. The ‘hard liberals’ include scholars such as Philip Alston and Andrew Altman, who 
argue that terrorism is not an ‘act of war’.358 In their view, terrorists should undergo public 
trial and due process vindication in civilian courts. They should also have the right to a fair 
hearing and competent legal counsel.
359
 In contrast, ‘soft liberals,’ including scholars such as 
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Jeff McMahan and Jeremy Waldron, who recognise targeted killing as ‘moral’ in certain 
circumstances, make exceptions for notorious terrorists who may be challenging to capture 
and arrest.
 360
 McMahan and Jeremy Waldron argue that domestic law-enforcement agencies 
should cooperate in criminal enforcement, but where this proves difficult, targeted killings 
pursuant to the law of war or new policies may be required.
361
   
The liberal cosmopolitan school generally recognises the need for self-defence against an 
armed attack as allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
362 
Otherwise every authority is 
under a moral and legal obligation to arrest rather than target and kill a suspected terrorist 
unless in self-defence from impending attack.
363
 Targeted killing launched in self-defence 
must also pass the ‘Caroline test’ for it to be regarded as lawful under customary international 
law.
364
 As noted in the last chapter, this test was first derived from an early diplomatic 
incident between the United Kingdom and U.S over the killing of a US citizen involved in an 
attack against Canada, then a British Colony. The Caroline case
365
 which was eventually 
resolved by a diplomatic letter between both countries, establishing the ‘imminent threat 
doctrine explained in chapter two.’366 The doctrine is accepted as an accurate description of 
the customary right of self-defence.
367
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When attempting to justify targeted killings under the ‘imminent threat clause’, The US and 
Israel argue that it is impractical for the language of the Article to expressly limit the exercise 
of self-defence only to the circumstance in which an armed attack has occurred. Rather, it is 
important for international law to also recognise the need to exercise the right of pre-emptive 
self defence. The strongest rationale for pre-emptive self-defence attacks like targeted killing 
is that terrorist attacks, especially suicide bombings, are never preceded by warning and 
victims are not usually presented with the opportunity to defend themselves before such 
attacks occur.  Many suicide bombings have ended in numerous fatalities that could have 
been prevented only by taking proactive steps in self-defence.
368
 In order to successfully 
prevent future terrorist attacks and avoid the consequences, an approach that allows a state to 
proactively find and kill notorious suspected terrorists should be considered under 
international law.   
The impracticality of the criteria of visibly anticipating terrorist attacks before defending 
against them has led to the US view that verbal threats from terrorists, their propaganda to 
promote further attacks and their past conducts give the anticipation and fear that danger is 
imminent. In their view, terrorists’ state of activity against them is sufficient proof of 
imminent threat.  The need for international law of self-defence to progress from its current 
concept of imminent threat to one that puts terroristic attacks into perspective, has become 
very glaring. In the absence of such progress, legal documents that discuss self-defence have 
broadly construed ‘imminent threat’ to include ‘high suspicion of threat before an armed 
attack occurs.’369 In fact, former US President Obama has defined ‘imminent’ to mean that 
there are sixty days to find and kill a suspected terrorist. The White House spokesman, 
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Carney, defended the US white paper’s definition of ‘imminent threat’, saying, “What we 
have in general with al-Qaeda is a continuing process of plotting against the US and 
American citizens. I think that’s fairly irrefutable.”370 This interpretation fills the gap in 
international law on self-defence.
371
 However, as a result of the gap, the language of the 
Charter seems to admit both interpretations on the permissibility of self-defence when under 
imminent threat.
 372
 
The doctrine presages the notion intended by Article 51 of the UN Charter, but evokes a 
discussion between the restrictionist and counter-restrictionist notions of ‘anticipatory self-
defence’. 373  Counter-restrictionists do not think it is possible for victims to defend against 
lethal attacks that have taken place so they broadly construe ‘imminent threat’ to include 
‘anticipatory threat before an armed attack occurs.’374 The second interpretation, proffered by 
what the literature sometimes refer to as the restrictionist perspective. These scholars believe 
that Article 51 is aimed at confining the use of force in self-defence to circumstances in 
which an armed attack has actually occurred. Thus, it would be unlawful to engage in any 
kind of pre-emptive action. A would be victim has to first be an actual victim before being 
able to use military force in self-defence.
375
  
Counter-restrictionists on the other hand, reject this interpretation as illogical.
376
 In their 
opinion, the Charter did not intend to restrict the pre-existing customary right of anticipatory 
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self-defence. The counter-restrictionists’ reference to an ‘inherent right’ under Article 51 
indicates that the Charter’s drafters aimed to continue the broad pre-UN Charter customary 
right of anticipatory self-defence.
377
 To them, it is acceptable for the occurrence of an ‘armed 
attack’ to empower an aggrieved state to subsequently act in pre-emptive self-defence.378 The 
ICJ judge, Stephen Schwebel, noted in his dissent in Nicaragua v. U.S., that Article 51 does 
not say “if, and only if, an armed attack occurs.” It does not expressly limit the use of force in 
self-defence only to a situation in which an armed attack has actually occurred.
379
  
 
Counter-restrictionists, who welcome a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
have however not identified specific circumstances in which international law may permit 
killing in self-defence against unforeseen impending attack. The scope of threats under 
customary international law is currently limited to the ‘imminent threat’ criteria. Whereas the 
unforeseeable nature of terrorist attacks is an indication that it is time to revise the imminent 
threat doctrine to consider pre-emptive actions in self-defence against unforeseeable attacks. 
Otherwise, opportunities may continue to exist for more acts of terrorism. This thesis 
identifies the need for new policies that accommodate reasonable cases of targeted killing in 
self-defence. Putting the covert nature of terrorist plots into perspective, it considers the 
extent to which terrorist threats should be anticipated to warrant killing in self-defence. 
However this thesis does not suggest new policies in relation to Article 51.  Rather, it focuses 
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on prescribing amendments to the Laws of Armed Conflict, which is an alternative regime 
preferred by the Realist school of thought to regulate terroristic conflicts.
 380
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3.9.2The Realist Rationale for Targeted Killings 
The realist school, including Nieburh, the most influential 20
th
 century realist Morgenthau, 
Carl Schmitt, Brian Schmidt, Long, and Carr, filter a nation’s interests from moralistic and 
legalistic viewpoints and advocate the ‘laws of war model’ in dealing with conflict.381 The 
first Realist to challenge the liberal ideology was Nieburh in 1932.
382
 His central argument is 
that liberals overestimate the ability of humans to work collectively in a way that is truly 
moral. A list of universally applicable moral principles can never be accomplished because 
human beings are unalterably selfish in nature and thus, every individual is more concerned 
about his/her own benefits and opportunities to gain power over others.
383
 Even though 
statesmen may have the capacity to be good, this is “always in conflict with the sinful 
acquisitive and aggressive drive present in human nature.”384 Niebuhr’s morality argument 
has been used to explain how international cooperation is unachievable due to the vagaries of 
human nature.
385
 Instead of international bodies seeking to impose unfeasible universal 
liberal standards, the Realists prefer to self-determine how they relate with other states.
386
  
 
Realist scholars all enunciate the importance of state power and autonomy as the only way to 
eliminate most conflicts and ensure security in an anarchic world. They define power as the 
ability to apply coercive tactics to either accomplish or avoid something detrimental to the 
national interest. Power is achieved when a state possesses material and military resources 
necessary to induce harm or coerce other states (to fight and win wars). Morgenthau 
emphasises the need for a state to decide for itself what is right or wrong. He points out that 
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the minimum goal of any state is the battle for survival and only a powerful state can fight to 
survive enemy attacks.
387
  
Realists regard international regimes and universal rules aimed at eliminating conflict and 
promoting unity of purpose as unrealistic and unachievable. Carl Schmitt believes that 
“conflict is what characterizes the human condition and one of the primary tasks of politics is 
to make conflict endure rather than to abolish it.” 388  The central argument in his political 
theory is that “all social realms are based on particular distinctions; the realm of the political 
is based on the distinction between friend and enemy.”389 He suggests that, rather than focus 
on the insurmountable goal of avoiding world conflict, imposing world peace and promoting 
universal unity, a more realistic approach would be to generate standards for dealing with 
conflict because it is inevitable.  
Schmitt condemns international regimes and organisations so celebrated by liberal 
institutionalism.
390
 The rationale for his conclusion is that most liberal principles and norms 
of international law are inchoate, ambiguous and not well thought through.  Schmitt argues 
that humans have variable perspectives when deciding between right and wrong. It is 
therefore impractical to assert that liberal universal principles are generally applicable to all 
humans. He dismisses attempts by liberal states to regulate international warfare through the 
just war theory and legal globalism. According to him, the just war theory and legal 
globalism in general are the very expression of the powerlessness and abstractness of legal 
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principles. He believes the liberal school lacks reference to a concrete institutional order and 
a substantive idea of justice.
391
   
Schmitt also criticizes the utopianism that forms the basis of liberal politics. In his work, ‘The 
Concept of the Political,’ Schmitt observes the absence of reality in democratically regulated 
liberal principles, the problems with legalism and its inability to give contemporary war a 
legal answer.
392
  He argues that “politics is defined by the distinction between friend and 
enemy. This distinction denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or dissociation.”393  
 
The most significant modern example of the realist approach is the Cold War, (1947-1991), 
characterised by military and political opposition between the Western Bloc (The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation referred to as NATO which was led by the US) versus the 
Eastern Bloc, (The Warsaw Pact headed by the USSR). Each side kept increasing its military 
and economic power in order to counterbalance the other.
394
  From the realist point of view, 
this decision, (particularly the possession of nuclear weapons by both side provided a nuclear 
deterrent against attack). For this reason the world had stability during those years.
395
  
 
The realist perspective considers how any policy affects the power and interests of a state. 
War must be declared against any entity that threatens its sovereignty. In this way, a state 
effectively protects its national interests.
396
 Realists argue that this approach would probably 
have prevented Hitler from killing six million Jews during the Second World War. They also 
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adopt the utilitarian concept of dealing with harmful opposition by opting for effective 
methods of ending conflict, even if such methods are unlawful. While the Utilitarian school 
and the Realist school have similar approaches regarding the use of targeted killing, it is 
possible to differentiate one from the other. Realists are mainly guided by a practical 
approach to reasoning and decision making, while the Utilitarian school is guided by the 
opinion of ‘a majority.’ The utilitarian ideology proposed by classical scholars such as 
Jeremy Bentham,
397
 and John Stuart Mill applaud a quantitative and reductionist kind of 
approach to ethics.
398
 According to them, the value or rightness of an action rests on how well 
it promotes the welfare of those affected by it; aiming for 'the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number'.
399
  
 
The Utilitarian school opines that this is the measure of right or wrong.
400
 Thus, if the greatest 
happiness is realised through targeted killings of those who through terrorism affect  national 
security, then a utilitarian would regard this to be morally justifiable.
401
 Mill has opined that 
even the killing of a sovereign for the common good was legally justifiable and in some 
instances, even noble.
402
  His opinion was echoed by public figures, including Abraham 
Lincoln and the Italian thinker Alberico Gentili. In fact, the latter believed that it makes no 
difference whether you kill an enemy on the field of battle or in his camp.
403
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Likewise, scholars arguing over the legality of targeted killings under this category, including 
Mark Maxwell,
404
 Anna Leander,
405
 David Ohlin,
406
 Sacsha Bachmann
407
 and Daniel 
Statman,
408
 are more concerned with determining the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
strategies than determining its legality. They conclude that ‘warfare’ is an equally 
proportionate response to the massive destructive attacks of terrorists.
409
  They consider the 
fact that Targeted killing is not expressly prohibited by the laws of war, arguing that this 
gives states and international organisations the right to use this tactic during warfare.
410
 They 
consider terrorism to be an ‘act of war’ and targeted killings to be a lawful military tactic.411 
This is not only because the quantitative capacity of terrorist groups bears similarities with 
the military forces of states, but also because of the involvement of NATO, the UNSC and 
international military cooperation in targeted killing operations.
412
  In their view, it is 
reasonable to engage terrorists in warfare within civilian territories when they deliberately 
refuse to separate themselves from the civilian populace. States utilize targeted killings 
because it allows them to effectively annihilate specifically selected threats from al-Qaeda 
and other terrorist groups.
413
  
 
From a realist perspective, the strategy of targeted killings benefits the US and Israel’s 
national interests. Scholars have demonstrated that the Israeli targeted killing tactic  has so 
impaired Hamas that it decreased the frequency of its attacks in the mid-term and has 
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prompted its remaining leaders to negotiate.
414
 This suggests that the objectives of targeted 
killings have been partly fulfilled. The targeted killing approach is yet to achieve a total 
elimination of terrorism or to coerce terrorists into refraining from terrorism. Moreover, it 
reaffirms the Realist hypothesis that ‘constant elimination of their leaders leave terrorist 
organizations in a state of confusion and disarray.’ To them, the targeted killing strategy has 
also obviated the need for other more costly means of subduing Hamas.
415
 
Arguing from a realist point of view, Maxwell, Bachmann, Ohlin, Leander and Statman 
believe that the US rightly abandoned the law-enforcement model in the wake of 9/11 in 
favour of the armed conflict model. However, they all point out that the current law offers 
terrorist organizations a critical advantage over states attempting to target them. The law of 
armed conflict allows terrorists to exploit its basic principle of distinction. Under this 
principle, combatants in armed conflict are legally permitted to kill combatants of opposing 
forces, but not to intentionally kill civilians. This means that combatants have a legal 
obligation to publicly and clearly distinguish themselves from civilians.  The traditional way 
to accomplish this obligation is for combatants to wear uniforms or emblems and carry arms 
openly, among other things. However, terrorists deliberately disregard the provision of law 
mandating combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians. For this reason, Maxwell 
argues that terrorists cannot be regarded as combatants under the LOAC. Instead under 
international law, they can be regarded as civilians who directly partake in hostilities, giving 
them partial immunity. Terrorists are targetable only for such a time as they partake in 
hostilities under LOAC and if they cease Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH), even if 
only temporarily, they regain civilian immunity. The problem with the DPH provision is that 
legal status fluctuates between ‘now immune, now not immune’. Some scholars refer to this 
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as ‘the revolving door of immunity.’416  
Maxwell compares terrorists to the moles in the children’s game ‘Whack a Mole’: The moles 
can be hit with a mallet but only when they come out of their underground homes; they 
regain their safety as soon as they duck back down into their burrows. A deliberately tactful 
mole is difficult to whack and so is a clever terrorist who claims to be a civilian and who 
aspires to stay immune and unnoticed even while participating in hostilities. Maxwell 
suggests that the laws of armed conflict be revised so that states can deal more effectively 
with threats posed by terrorist groups. He argues that terrorists who are members of an armed 
group should forfeit their civilian immunity the moment their “pattern of conduct” shows that 
they are contributing to the military function of the group.
417
  However, Maxwell’s 
description is vague in describing where to draw the line between conducts that contribute to 
the military function of a group and those that are not contributory. 
 
Bachmann believes that targeted killing operations form part of NATO’s418 operational 
practice: depending on the circumstances, targeted killing represents just another option of 
the lawful use of force in an armed conflict or assimilated situations.
 419
 Consequently, his 
argument favours the concept that the terrorism vs. targeted killing conflict is admissible 
warfare. Thus, targeted killing can be regarded as a warfare tactic, since International Law 
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does not expressly impose a ban on the lethal neutralization of certain persons during armed 
conflict.
420
 This position is justified on the ground that the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 1373 which permits states to take ‘necessary steps’ to prevent future 
terrorist attacks, did not dismiss the use of targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy.
421
 
Ohlin and Statman argue that targeted killing is not only a matter of how states should 
address terrorist threats but more generally, it is a question of how states should deal with 
threats posed by irregular forces in asymmetrical conflicts.
422
  
Despite irregularities that occur within contemporary terroristic conflicts, the realists regard 
the conflict as warfare and targeted killings as a military tactic. Carl Schmitt is one of few 
realists who have attempted to explain ways in which terroristic conflicts can be regarded as 
warfare and the parties can be regarded as combatants under the LOAC. Schmitt believes the 
terrorism and counterterrorism strategies of the US and Israel present a ‘partisan’ type of 
warfare that is permissible but not specifically recognised by the Laws of war. He elucidated 
the concept of ‘partisan warfare’ in his, ‘Theory of the Partisan.’423 His political theory on 
war and enmity is based on the progressive changes in warfare. According to him, the word 
‘partisan’ is derived from ‘party’ and refers to the tie to a fighting, belligerent, or politically 
active party or group.
424
  
Schmitt identifies four specific characteristics of the partisan. Firstly, the partisan is an 
irregular fighter, whose actual target may or may not be the regular soldier in uniform.
425
 
The armed partisan is always dependent on cooperation with a regular organization; he does 
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not exist in a political no-man’s-land.426  Partisans are driven by intense political commitment 
or extreme religious fervour. Such an unselfish characteristic sets the partisan apart from a 
bandit or pirate. Secondly, they usually fight a defensive type of warfare, (telluric) and the 
aim is always to repel a foreign invader and not necessarily to determine a winning team. 
Thirdly fighters are mobile, able to quickly attack and retreat from different areas of the 
enemy, even fighting behind enemy lines. Initially they existed connected to a regular army 
for supplies and orders but subsequently they became independent of a regular army. 
Fourthly, they might be driven to defend their own land, (although subsequently religious and 
political ideologies have become another driver).
427
 
In the global political context, partisan fighters may be employed by a government; however 
they are more motivated to pursue their own interests. Although the partisan may have a duty 
to act on behalf of a state and cease to be essentially defensive, such duties may easily be 
overridden by his/her personal interests.
428
    
 
Both sides of the conflict between states and terrorists show the third and fourth 
characteristics: mobility and principled (national or religious) defence. However, the main 
difference is that terrorists predominantly target civilians rather than uniformed combatants. 
This disruptive pattern of warfare is different from regular warfare in that terrorists have no 
status in any conventions of war. Terrorists strike out against the enemy in an irregular 
manner: in different places, at different times with varying impact, as do states. 
429
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Realist philosophers argue that suspected and known terrorists must be treated as enemy 
combatants who violate the principles of war. The threat they pose should therefore be met in 
large measure by military means, as a matter of collective and/or personal self-defence, on 
the basis of laws applicable during armed conflict.
430
 The discussion of targeted killings 
under the realist school of thought does not usually consider the need for creation of new 
policies. To them, “acts of terrorism against a country by non-state sponsored organizations 
like al-Qaeda or individuals need to be considered more than just criminal acts. Instead, they 
should be considered acts of war against the victim nation.”431 
They do not acknowledge the absence of a battlefield in the war on terror. In their view, there 
is a ‘battlefield’ but it is global, and targeting can be done wherever the terrorist may be 
identified, even in civilian territories. However, others believe that the realist concept of a 
global battle-field is flawed. This is because, unlike the liberalist or pragmatist approach, the 
realist approach does not prioritise the LOAC principle of distinction which aims to limit 
risks of harm to innocent civilians by limiting warfare to war-zones. 
 
3.9.3The Pragmatic Rationale for a ‘Guided’ use of Targeted Killings 
As will emerge, this thesis agrees with the pragmatic school which adopts a different 
perspective to both the realist and liberal schools of thought. Pragmatism is not a single 
philosophy. General reference to pragmatism would be to a style or way of thinking and 
doing things.
 432
  However, the consolidation of the concepts termed ‘Pragmatism’ is a late 
19th Century and early 20th Century innovation. Proponents of the pragmatic school include 
Charles Sanders Pierce of the 19
th
 Century, William James and John Dewy both of the 20
th
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century.
433
 The pragmatic ideology considers practical consequences or real effects to be vital 
components of both meaning and truth. At its simplest, something is true only insofar as it 
works.
434
 The Pragmatic ideology also asserts that any theory that proves itself more 
successful in predicting and controlling our world than its rivals can be considered to be 
nearer the truth. It argues that the meaning of any concept can be equated with the 
conceivable operational or practical consequences of whatever the concept portrays.
435
 This 
school prioritises actual experience of critical issues over fixed principles and non-
experimental reasoning.
436
  To a pragmatist, interpretations of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ are not 
defined in terms of ‘beliefs’, ‘logic’ or ‘correspondence’.  In contrast, a pragmatist approach 
evaluates theories or beliefs in terms of the success of their practical application. Pragmatism 
generally holds that ‘truth’ is to be found in the process of ‘verification.’  Thus, the true 
interpretation of an idea is the successful working out of that idea.
437
  
Since knowledge is socially constructed and validated, Peirce holds his scientific method, 
guided by ‘the social impulse,’ to be the only way of establishing valid beliefs.438 To him, the 
process of verifying the implication of an idea is to have it tested by societal factors. This is 
because the methods of tenacity, authority, and a priori, which liberal and realist 
philosophers adopt, do not include guiding principles for how to reason, and may thus 
contribute equally to maintain true and false beliefs.
439
 Pierce compares other non-practical 
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philosophical approaches to the behaviour of an ostrich which tends to stick its head in the 
sand while ignoring the risk of being stifled.
 440
  In support of Pierce submission, James 
warns against upholding habitual beliefs and overlooking information that can challenge 
them.
441
 In general, Pragmatists submit that it is better to turn away from generalization and 
insufficiency, verbal solutions, bad a priori reasons, closed systems, fixed principles, and 
pretended absolutes and origins: but turn towards concreteness and adequacy, facts and 
action.
442
  
Legal pragmatists such as Claire Finklestin,
443
 Daniel Farber,
444
 Thomas Grey,
 445
 and 
Richard Posner
446
 believe that liberal views are severely flawed. The legal pragmatist thinks 
that the classical view is overly legalistic, naively rationalistic and based upon 
misunderstandings of legal institutions. As opposed to the self-imposed limitations entailed 
by the classical view of legislations, legal pragmatists emphasise the eclectic nature and the 
diverse aims of the law. A legal Pragmatist would favour socio-legal research approaches that 
consider the implications of laws in action. The pragmatic concept of law is also forward-
looking, which is a significant contrast to strict liberal rules that do not evolve in order to be 
made practically applicable to real life issues. More specifically, legal pragmatists largely 
agree upon four main aspects of a pragmatist version of the classical laws: (1) the importance 
of context; (2) the lack of foundations; (3) the instrumental nature of law; and (4) the 
unavoidable presence of alternate perspectives.
447
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Modern legal pragmatic philosophers debating over targeted killings believe that neither the 
LOAC nor the Law enforcement models are applicable to terrorism.
448
 Anthony Clarke 
Arend,
449
 Colonel David Cavaleri
450
 and Paul Sikkema
451
  believe that current international 
policies should be updated to adapt to the modern context in which conflict occurs. Their 
allegiance to pragmatism is based on its willingness to weigh the legal implications of 
targeted killings and terrorism against standards that make up traditional warfare or law 
enforcement.
452
  
Pragmatists believe that it is not warfare when there is no identifiable combatant, battlefield 
or anticipation of an end to a conflict. It is also not a matter of law enforcement since arrest, 
due process and determining the guilt of suspected terrorists is time wasting and problematic, 
whilst an effective defence against terrorism is a matter of urgency.
 
Legal pragmatists reason 
that there is no system that is one hundred percent liberal or realistic. The decision of the 
greatest good of the greatest number may sometimes overlap with legality and at other times 
it may not.
453
  
The stance of the law in action towards contemporary targeted killing suggests that not every 
international conflict can be resolved in accordance with the liberal belief system of due 
process. Liberalists believe that terrorists are entitled to due process and fair trial simply 
because it will be more lawful to do so, i.e, the LOAC does not regard terrorists as 
combatants, therefore they possess civilian status and civilians suspected of committing 
crimes are entitled to a fair trial. Liberalists involved in legal debates over terroristic warfare 
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do not consider the need to deviate from upholding what is lawful to what is unlawful but 
more practical.
454
  Some states with a realist view have found it necessary to disregard liberal 
standards in their response to terrorism. They are in favour of a more active realist approach 
that prioritises sovereign protection over any legal consequences.
455
  
 
Research suggests that targeted killing counterterrorism tactic has helped reduce the 
frequency of terrorist attacks. Like Israel, the US, an otherwise liberal state, is a major 
perpetrator of targeted killings. Like other liberalists, the US has in the past criticized Israel’s 
targeted killing policy. The US expressed its discontent with the practice by dismissing it as 
extrajudicial and morally unjustifiable. The official position of the Bush administration as 
conveyed by both White House and State Department spokesmen has been for Israel to 
understand that targeted killings of Palestinians does not end the violence, but are only 
inflaming an already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm.
456
 
 
The US maintained this position until the al-Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001, which 
claimed the lives of over three thousand US citizens.
457
 It became imperative to decide how 
future terroristic acts could be prevented and determine how the perpetrators of 9/11 would 
be penalised. It became clear that military intervention would be most effective in combating 
large terrorist entities such as al-Qaeda. It also became clear how impractical it would be to 
attempt to determine the guilt of every suspected terrorist on a case-by-case basis.  The 
pragmatists have acknowledged that it would constitute a great risk to the national 
sovereignty of states to depend on time-consuming due process of law enforcement to 
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guarantee their safety.
458
 These guarantees only go as far as being punitive, but are not 
proactive in guaranteeing the safety of those vulnerable to future terrorist attacks. On the 
other hand, legal pragmatists also acknowledge that targeted killing is not a legal warfare 
tactic.
459
 As explained above, there are three reasons for this: Terrorist culprits are not 
recognised as combatants under the LOAC; Although states can target civilians who directly 
take part in hostilities against them, the civilians must be physically ‘found’  carrying out acts 
of hostilities; military combatants of states fighting terrorism find it very difficult to comply 
with their LOAC mandatory obligation to distinguish terrorists from innocent civilians 
because the former fail to wear distinctive tags, uniforms or emblems.  
 
Legal Pragmatic scholars like Finklestein, Arend and Sikemma argue that owing to the 
uniqueness of terroristic force, international law should devise a new and pre-emptive way of 
regarding terrorists other than as criminals; punishable under the domestic law enforcement 
regime of the state whose civilians are attacked, and, only if there is sufficient evidence to 
prove their guilt.
460
 Like realists, pragmatists believe it is more practical for the US to 
respond commensurately and pre-emptively to the 9/11 attack with military intervention 
rather than a less effective approach of ‘due process.’  
 
This position is analogous to a utilitarian rationale for dealing with conflict.
461
 The position 
held by utilitarian proponents such as Jeremy Bentham is also based on practicality.
462
 
Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question “What ought a person 
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to do?” The answer is that a person ought to act so as to produce the best consequences 
possible. To a utilitarian, the utility of a particular action in providing the greatest amount of 
happiness or pleasure to sentient beings is both necessary and sufficient to establish its moral 
worth.
463
  
By contrast however, rather than merely establishing the moral worth of an action, a 
pragmatist would establish its normative truth value. The judgment of a pragmatist is not 
guided by moral evaluation; instead, it merely asks whether an ideology or proposition works 
successfully.
464
 The answer to that question is considered sufficient to establish such idea or 
proposal as true; meaning is found only in the practical consequences of accepting a notion. 
For example, in Finkelstein’s view of the realities of modern warfare, “… the practise of 
targeted killing departs from the traditional battlefield form of combat, and hence, from the 
core justification for killing in war.”465  She points that the process of identifying individuals 
by name before killing them and even the use of drones to take out the individuals that have 
been identified are practices that are alien to traditional laws of war. Regardless, she argues 
that these practises can be considered as attempts to minimise the risks that the target will 
cooperate with alternative approaches like surrendering or detention. It can also generally be 
seen as an attempt to minimise civilian casualties.
466
 
 
Drawn to its logical conclusion, impractical ideas are necessarily rejected by pragmatists, not 
out of any strict moral code, but merely because they fail to satisfactorily guide the inquiry of 
knowledge.
467
 If it can be verified that an attack can only be alleviated by the use of targeted 
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killings, then a pragmatist would consider it ‘necessary’.468 It is noteworthy that a pragmatist 
may consider an approach to be ‘necessary’ but this does not mean they think it is ‘lawful’. 
Drawing from what is inferred above, a Pragmatist is apt to acknowledge targeted killing as 
unlawful under international law, in order to make recommendations upon law reforms that 
would contemplate regarding it as lawful. This is in contrast to the Realist tendency to defend 
targeted killing at all cost, on the grounds of technicality under the LOAC, even when it is 
glaring that the LOAC does not support targeted killing.   
 
Pragmatists may consider the ‘partisan warfare’ through drone mechanisms as a practical 
approach for dealing with terrorism, if it proves to be effective in eliminating terrorist threats.  
They would also consider the drone mechanism to be effective if it can be proved that it 
complies with applicable laws.
469
 For example, if the US and Israel are engaged in the ‘war 
against terror’ a pragmatist would question whether the mechanisms used during warfare are 
designed and able to target only specifically selected combatants, such that the risk of 
harming civilians in the process is minimised.
470
 Anything short of these types of 
expectations may be proof to a pragmatist that the drone programme is an impractical 
approach, in that, it fails to achieve the goal it purports to achieve.  
 
This thesis resonates with the pragmatist ideology because it aims to evaluate the viability of 
targeted killing tactics. In order to achieve this and to add a new form of analytical approach 
to existing literature on targeted killing counterterrorism strategy, this thesis adopts an 
economic/mathematical approach, in the form of game theory. This approach aims to 
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generate more accurately quantifiable results on the effectiveness of targeted killing than the 
opinion based approach predominant in the literature. Thus, the game theory semi-
quantitative method for critically analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing tactic is used 
as a verification tool in this thesis. The results extracted from the study would help formulate 
a practical and general compromise standard for judging the effectiveness of targeted 
killings.
471
  
 
As noted above, Sikkemma, Leander and many other pragmatists are responsive to the need 
to address terrorism more intensively and actively. They have determined the fight against 
terrorism through targeted killings;  firstly, as a unique type of armed conflict between a state 
and non-state actor that has not been addressed by international treaties and so requires 
separate, distinct international law agreements. This new agreement should verify terrorists’ 
combatant status under international law and determine if, and how they can be better 
identified as combatants. It has been argued that a significant reason why states are unwilling 
to grant the status of combatants to insurgents and other non-state actors is because doing so 
would not only afford them an element of legitimacy, but would mean that they enjoy the two 
‘privileges’ of combatants – immunity from criminal liability for fighting, and prisoner-of-
war status when apprehended.
472
 However, terrorists already assume these rights that are 
guaranteed under LOAC with or without state sanction. Moreover, it will be in the state’s 
interest to formally recognise terrorists as combatants, as they will no longer be limited by the 
DPH principle when targeting terrorists.  Secondly, according to the current law of armed 
                                                          
471
 J. T. Richardson. 'The sociology of religious freedom: A structural and socio-legal analysis' [2006] 67(3) 
Sociology of religion P271; W.Hong Chui and M. McConville,. 'Research Methods for law. [Edinburg 
University Press, 2007].  P3' 
472
 D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of 
Defence?’ [2005] 16(2) European Journal of International Law, P197. 
 
 123 
 
conflict, terrorists taking part in hostilities against civilians or non-combatants can be targeted 
and killed. However, this is only after their combatant status has been verified by their direct 
and persistent acts in hostilities.   
 
The impracticality of determining terrorist combat status is due to the ambiguity of the term, 
“direct participation in hostilities.” This and the problem of distinguishing between active 
participants who do not wear emblems or uniforms from innocent persons, are major grounds 
for the pragmatist argument for reform of the law. They clamour for the narrowing of the 
definition of a lawful civilian target who ‘maintains direct participation in hostilities’ against 
a state, by referring to specific acts which enable a line to be drawn between direct and 
indirect participation in hostilities.  These scholars also argue for a more expedient way of 
fighting the unique war on terrorism; one which protects civilians whilst at the same time 
avoiding the reward to a notorious participant who refuses to distinguish himself from 
innocent civilians.
473
  Because of the tendency for terrorists to intermingle with civilians, 
civilian territories are defacto the battlefield for the global war on terrorism. Thus, the 
proposals put forward by pragmatist scholars include the consideration that targeted killing 
launched within civilian territories should be legally acceptable on the condition that a 
mechanism is devised to avoid mistaken identities.
474
 The ability of the US drone 
mechanisms to avoid mistaken identities, is currently debated by the Pragmatism, Realism 
and Liberalism schools of thought. Questions arise as to whether, generally, drones have the 
ability to comply with the jus in bello principles of war. 
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3.10. Ethical Concerns by the Three Schools over the Use of Drones  
Liberalists, realists and pragmatists have made conclusions on the legal implications of the 
use of drones.
475
 Should targeted killing be legalised under international law? The Liberal 
Cosmopolitan and Pragmatic schools of thought ask this question; when they do, they also 
intend to consider whether the drone mechanism should be prohibited under international 
law. In order to answer this question, it is important to consider whether or not drones can be 
relied upon to carry out targeted killings in compliance with the law. This is realisable by first 
assessing the legal debates by these two schools over the use of drones. The aim of this 
assessment is  to highlight specific concerns over the targeting process. Both the Liberal and 
Pragmatic schools criticise the use of drones as a self-defence or warfare tactic. While the 
Liberalists scrutinise the legality of the drone programme, the Pragmatists scrutinise its legal 
efficiency and the Realists defend the tactic. 
3.10.1. Drone Debate: The Liberalist Perspective 
Firstly, liberalists are concerned that drone missiles are remotely launched by US military 
agents against terrorists, even if the latter are found in the midst of civilians. This suggests 
that the US ‘knowingly’ put the lives and property of innocent civilians at risk of harm.476 
The increasing rate
477
 of war crimes (under the assumption that a state of war actually exists 
between terrorist organisations and the US) from each drone attack is suggestive of the fact 
that drone combatants accord little regard to the LOAC principle of distinction. It appears 
that operators do not ensure that the targets are in isolation of innocent civilian bystanders. 
The principle of distinction obligates every combatant in armed conflict to at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
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military objectives. Accordingly, operations are to be directed only against military 
objectives.
478
 This rule aims at ensuring respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects. Concerns arise as to whether the drone is capable of complying with the 
LOAC discrimination and proportionality principles.
479
  
Another contentious issue is the tendency for the drone mechanism to deviate from the 
standard mode of combat intended by the LOAC. To the liberalists, this requires an even 
representation of parties to a conflict on a battle-field, in order to promote fairness and 
equality during armed conflict. Instead, there is an asymmetrical type of conflict where one 
party has an obvious functional advantage over the other. In situations like this, the risk in 
collateral damage to the party being attacked is higher than that suffered by the attacking 
party, who is “remotely fighting the war” by drone with little risk. Scholars emphasize the 
urgency of addressing the use of lethal force in combating terrorism in order to re-install the 
standard combat mode, curb human rights violations and reduce collateral damage during 
armed conflicts.  In the absence of such guidance, the use of drones remains unrestricted and 
the race to own such weapons may have only just begun.  
 
Gregoire Chamayou,
480
 Addie Wagenknecht,
481
 Jordan Paust, 
482
Laurie Blank,
483
 Philip 
Alston
484
 and a host of other scholars have analysed the use of drones through the liberalist 
lens by maintaining a legalistic view on the US drone programme. Their objective is to 
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preserve the rule of law in any given situation.
485
 From their perspective which is founded on 
human rights, targeted killing is an extreme measure that violates the general international 
rule of law, especially as the culprits are neither tried nor given an opportunity for fair 
hearing.
486
 They argue that drones should be prohibited weapons due to the collateral damage 
they are likely to cause. Even if drones are regulated to target with precision, they argue that 
its use poses potential risk to the development and interpretation of the law in ways that could 
endanger the central goal of protecting civilians and conducting hostilities in a lawful 
manner.  
 
Chamayou’s Drone Theory prose and Wagenknecht’s artistic presentation of ‘drone violence’ 
describe drones as the most sophisticated tool of man-hunting yet. Chamayou presents an 
idealistic dismissal of the practice of modern drone warfare. He argues that drone warfare 
needs to be understood as a form of one-sided killing, since the drone–as a technology of 
remote killing–removes the very possibility for “reciprocity.” If war has been historically 
based on a mutual and shared risk of death (i.e. a “duel”), then the modern drone violence 
does not simply “transform” war; it bypasses the logic of conflict altogether, becoming the 
unilateral delivery of death. 
487
  In her series Black Hawk Paint, started in 2007, 
Wagenknecht uses remote-controlled toy drones to smear and splatter black or hot pink paint 
across white canvas or vellum.
488
 She also uses viscous black acrylic paint to create two thick 
horizontal lines across the lower portion of the canvas. The two lines end in a swirling 
outburst that appears to have flung paint towards the outer extremities of the canvas.  
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Wagenknecht’s art has insidious connotations because the paint marks in this painting look 
similar to that of blood splatter surrounding a viciously killed murder victim. It looks as 
though Wagenknecht’s drone fired at some target on the canvas, causing it to violently 
explode across the surface of the painting. The aim of this Painting is to cause viewers to 
come face-to-face with an actual scene of a drone strike.
489
 The artistically simulated drone 
strike portrays psychical distance in such a way that it causes viewers to simultaneously 
comprehend the beauty of the art, but more so, the violence of the scene depicted.   
 
The U.S. use of drones in Pakistan and Yemen is interpreted by these liberalists as instances 
of indiscriminate use of lethal force, resulting in incidental loss of lives and harm to civilians 
and their properties.
490
 These drones are used as weapons of warfare against suspected 
terrorists in other states.  This policy disregards the direct prohibition from ICJ decision in 
Nicaragua Vs. The United States
491
, against the use of such lethal force on another state.
492
  
These drones are unmanned aerial vehicles, armed with missiles and bombs but controlled by 
the US intelligence agencies on the ground.
493
 The missiles from drones are used to target 
oblivious, suspected terrorist members of al-Qaeda groups in Yemen and Pakistan.
494
 
Following this process, missiles are fired intentionally from the drones to destroy vehicles or 
houses containing the terrorist targets.
495
 These pattern is sufficient to raise concern and 
demonstrate the need for greater caution. For these reasons, liberal scholars are sceptical 
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about whether the use of drones complies with the LOAC principle of distinction and 
proportionality.   
 
A major concern however lies in the drone tendency to remove some of the deterrent effects 
of traditional warfare that requires an elementary paradigm of co-equal belligerents who meet 
at the war zone and run the reciprocal risk of killing and getting killed.
496
 Since drone strikes 
can be controlled from afar without risk to military personnel, authorities and commanders 
can be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed and under what 
circumstances too broadly.
 497
  What then is the legal fate of the American military drone 
operators who partake in armed conflict without personally appearing on the battle-zone to be 
equally involved in the risk of killing and getting killed?  
 
There is the concern that the absence of drone combatants and remoteness of inflictions and 
injuries from incidences that occur on an actual battlefield robs the drone combatants of the 
moral responsibility to target with due care and compliance with the just war principles and 
anticipate an end to the war. The drone debate is thus narrowly focused on the legal question; 
do remotely controlled drones have the capacity to distinguish between innocent civilians and 
suspected terrorists who hide amongst them in order to avoid detection? This question can be 
explored by analysing the literature debate on each LOAC principle, starting with the criteria 
for complying with the principle of distinction.  
 
The Liberalists resonate the principle of distinction under the LOAC; a lawful targeted 
killing is one that is directed against a legitimate military target.
498
 They are of the view that 
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only uniformed combatants on a battlefield are lawful targets.
 499
 Moreover, the reliability of 
the information available to drone operators is questioned by liberalists. Is the information 
first hand or 100% accurate?
500
  Operational forces on the ground are more often than not 
uncertain about the combat position of targeted individuals and thus, it is highly likely that 
civilians and otherwise unlawful targets may also be killed in drone strikes.  For example, 
there were several drone attempts by American and Yemeni intelligence to target and kill al-
Awlaki, an alleged senior officer of the al-Qaeda group. This lasted two years and resulted in 
several targeted killings of people mistakenly identified.  Eventually, he and another Yemeni 
commando, (who can be referred to as collateral damage) were killed in September 2011 via 
drone attack.
501
  
 
Further, the nature of drone strikes means that authorities and commanders can be tempted to 
interpret the legal limitations on who can be killed and under what circumstances too broadly.
 
502
  What can then be said to be their legal fate when they partake in armed conflict without 
the traditional opportunity for combat? Quinta’s article metaphorically compares the use of 
drones to a ‘play station mentality.’. 503  Since drone technology permits soldiers to “kill by 
remote control,” which is synonymous to playing a video game, they may become lax in their 
moral restraint to kill. The article concludes that parties using drone mechanism can no 
longer be called soldiers as we know it. 
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One of the major liberalist criticisms against the U.S targeted killing practice is that it is 
usually covert. Moreover, reports on death statistics are inconsistent and there are 
deficiencies in accountability.
504
 This makes it difficult to discern whether a party has 
complied with the distinction principle to the letter. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
records 323 drone strikes between 2004 -July 2016, resulting in known deaths of 424-966 
civilians in Pakistan. Other critics proffer rather lower numbers.
505
 A study carried out by the 
Columbia Law School estimates that 35 percent of the victims of drone strikes in 2011 were 
civilians.
506
 On the one hand, American counterterrorism officials account civilian casualties 
as low as 2.5 percent.
507
  On the other hand the Bureau of Investigative Journalism presents 
the number as high as 26.5 percent.
 508
  Appendix 2 shows a bar graph of the annual drone 
strikes in Pakistan and Appendix 3 shows the annual civilian death rate compared with deaths 
of militants.
509
  
 
It is hardly possible to resolve these differences. Realists and pragmatists reckon that 
problems of data precision are because drone strikes usually occur in areas that are 
inaccessible to independent eyewitnesses and the data is drawn from unreliable local officials 
and local media.
510
 However, liberal critics believe that the fact that the US is known to hoard 
data on these attacks buttresses questions over its obligatory duty of accountability.
511
  Does 
the US have the right to hoard data on attacks? This hidden data prevents accurate records of 
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civilians killed from being presented as evidence. This data is necessary to assess collateral 
damage and inform relatives.
 512
  
 
Current records of civilian casualties weaken the argument that the drone can actually comply 
with the principle of distinction to target with precision when the missiles hit the ground. A 
recent report shows that in 2012, there was a reduction in collateral damage, in terms of 
civilian deaths, from drone strikes (see Appendix 3).
513
 According to John Brennan, the then 
US National Deputy Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism: “there 
has not been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the 
capabilities we have been able to develop.”514 However, his testimony cannot be corroborated 
due to the fact that, in September 2012 the so called “smaller missile on drone” killed the 
target and 13 Yemeni civilians.
515
 It is thus difficult to attribute the reduction in collateral 
damage to the newly designed “smaller drones” that is alleged to have been created to launch 
missiles with more precision.    
  
 3.10.2 Drone Debate: The Realist Perspective 
Michael Schmitt, Gary Solis, Anna Leander, Pierre Bourdieu, Michael Coleman and David 
Gray have approached the subject of drones from a realist perspective.
516
  Anna Leander’s 
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Socio-legal analysis observes that drones have ‘agency’, (under the control of an agent), in 
the ‘field’ of legal expertise and also within the drone program. This agency impacts on how 
to interpret the law for both drones and the drone program i.e co-constitution. With this 
perspective, scholars are redrawing the boundaries of legal expertise, by making associations 
to new forms of expertise and by generating technological expert roles.
517
   
The sociological research approach by Anna Leander and Pierre Bourdieu argues that where 
the appropriate battlefield law on precision, obligation and expertise is obeyed, the drone 
programme can be legally regulated.
518
 The realists support of the drone programme is not 
isolated. Commentators like President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen, who was 
inaugurated in February 2012 has acknowledged the importance of the drone strikes in 
Yemen. He argued, “They pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know 
what target you are aiming at.”519  In an attempt to clear the ‘fog of law,’ Michael Schmidt 
points out that the ‘fog’ surrounding the operation of drones stem mainly from 
misunderstandings over the weapon system. It may also be as a result of the refusal of the 
drone agents to comply with the law of ‘distinction’ and failure to limit targeting to instances 
where terrorists are isolated from innocent civilians.
520
 Otherwise, the drone cameras are 
specifically configured to zero in to launch missiles on specific targets.
521
 
 
Schmidt asserts that the use of drones may in some cases enhance protections to which 
various persons and objects are entitled under the LOAC. Thus, there may be no reason to 
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treat drone weapon as distinct from other weapons simply because they are contemporary.
522
 
Gary Solis argues that drones and their missiles are traditionally lawful weapons that bear 
great similarity to artillery, naval gunfire or close air support by manned aircraft.
 
Even when 
the targeting is done by the drone operators with precision, mistakes are bound to be made 
which would result in civilians killed. He argues that this consequence is the true reality of 
war that ought to be expected.
523
  Interestingly, segments of the Pakistani media have also 
affirmed the benefit, precision and justification for the use of drones.
524
 However, due to the 
reality of war on terrorism, in which the enemy combatants do not identify themselves, 
identifying lawful drone targets is what the liberalists regard as problematic. 
 
In spite of the liberalist concern that the drone programme cannot be easily regulated to 
comply with the distinction and proportionality principle under the LOAC, the realists have 
argued that drones are capable of targeting with precision. They have demonstrated that 
drones offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with the LOAC 
‘proportionality’ principle. 525 However, liberalists  would contend with this claim on grounds 
of technicality. The reliability of the information available to drone operators is in doubt, 
particularly whether such information is first hand or 100% accurate.
526
  At any rate there 
really is no proof from past events that drone missiles are capable of targeting only 
combatants when fired into civilian territories.   
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Statman has warned that even regular warfare incurs collateral damage, and leads to deaths 
and destruction of some civilians and their properties.
527
  Statman has observed that under the 
just war theory, the use of targeted killing of the enemy is permitted in war. Targeted killings 
through the use of drones, even in civilian territories are simply another military tactic used 
pursuant to that end. The fact that the enemy may intentionally choose to mingle in civilian 
territories does not suddenly strip a combatant of the right to hunt down and eliminate the 
threat posed.  In spite of the liberalist view that drone warfare leads to unnecessary civilian 
harm, realist commentators and scholars evidence the civilian casualties as accidental loss 
and consequences of war that cannot constitute war crime.  
 
Realists do not believe that drones contravene the principle of distinction, because the 
machine itself has been designed with the intention to distinguish and the capacity to target 
only specifically selected individuals. U.S officials argue that the drone programme and the 
process of ‘premeditatedly identifying a terrorist by name’ (personality strikes), before 
targeting, allows for easier compliance with the LOAC principle of distinction.  
 
The Realist argument in favour of the drone programme is not isolated And as noted earlier, 
has reeived support from Yemen’s President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi.528  Gary Solis 
supports the drone programme, maintaining that that even when the targeting is done by 
drone operators with precision, mistakes are bound to be made. Furthermore, civilians are 
also killed in warfare that does not involve the use of drones. He argues that this consequence 
is the true reality of war that ought to be expected.
529
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3.10.3. Drones Debate: The Pragmatist Perspective and the Researchers Reflection  
In contrast to the Liberalist and Realist views, Pragmatists require full proof that the drones 
have the potential to target with precision. Mistaken identities may occur; to a pragmatist, a 
mechanism is ineffective if it does not meet its required goal. Likewise, the drone targeted 
killing mechanism is ineffective if it does not succeed in targeting the real culprits intended.  
While liberalists maintain that drones should be prohibited under International law, 
pragmatists consider that it is the manner of use that should be addressed under guiding 
principles of laws regulating international force. This envisages new methods of allowing 
states to use targeted killing while avoiding indiscriminate attacks and, as much as possible, 
eliminating the risk of civilian casualties. 
 
Pragmatists acknowledge that drone strikes launched from afar are intended to reduce risks to 
life or limb of US military personnel.
530
 However, they seek to verify these claims by asking: 
Firstly, is there any certainty that missiles fired from drones would hit only its target without 
incurring collateral damage?  Secondly, how practical or safe is it to continue to regard 
civilian areas as battlefields? Thirdly, can drones be assessed on their capacity to target with 
precision? Fourthly, is it possible to utilize drones without violating the distinction, military 
necessity and proportionality principles under the LOAC?  Fifthly, how effective is the drone 
mechanism in dealing with terrorism? Sixthly, should targeted killing through drones be 
legally endorsed?
531
 
     
To answer these questions, it must be recognized that there is a fundamental difference 
between IHRL (Law enforcement) and LOAC regarding civilian casualties. Both legal 
paradigms prohibit the intentional and premeditated killing of innocent civilians. However, 
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while under the IHRL there is an absolute prohibition on killing civilians, the LOAC does not 
regard all civilian casualties as war crimes.
532
 This distinction is one of the reasons why 
commentators consider the LOAC to be better applicable to terrorism than Law Enforcement 
of IHRLs.  For example, when carrying out targeted killing, collateral damage can result from 
errors and accidents, such as a technical malfunction. This would result in targeting of 
civilians whom the drone operators did not anticipate would be in close proximity. In order to 
strike a balance between the principles of humanity and military necessity, the proportionality 
principle seeks to minimize civilian casualties by requiring that the amount of casualties is 
not ‘excessive’ in relation to the military advantage sought. The ‘expected’ civilian casualties 
and ‘anticipated’ military advantage should be assessed based on the information available 
and the circumstances at the time of the attack, and not in hindsight. A breach of this 
fundamental principle constitutes a war crime under the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.
533
  
 
The principle of proportionality aims at minimizing collateral damage and ensuring that 
civilians are not deliberate objects of combatant attacks.
 534
 The later principle weakens the 
claim that the LOAC is applicable to terroristic conflict owing to civilian status of the 
terrorist targets and innocent bystanders. It may be argued that drones offer the advantage for 
compliance with the principle of proportionality. As noted above, drones are capable of 
collecting specific information about a target, the civilian population in the vicinity around 
the target, and the possible civilian casualties that may result from a targeting process.
535
 This 
opportunity to observe the target and the possible strike arena(s) for protracted periods of 
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time, offer the opportunity of striking only when the chances of minimizing collateral 
damage is at its highest. In many cases, this process should significantly improve the 
accuracy of the attack. Drones should make it possible to observe more effectively the 
principle of proportionality.
536
 However, it is the principle of distinction that the drone agents 
struggle to comply with. The problems posed by the use of drones may thus be more intricate 
than concerns about its efficiency. Perhaps, it is the drone agents that should be schooled on 
how to comply with the principles of the LOAC when using drones.  
The literature debate regards serious legal issues and interpretive contexts. The use of 
armed drones poses challenges to the interpretation of the principle of proportionality. How 
can one begin to define ‘expected’ collateral damages? How ‘military’ should be the 
advantage? How can civilian harm and military advantage be compared in different combat 
situations, for example with regard to terrorism, and across cultures? Moving forward, should 
parties to warfare be evenly represented by drones on a battle-field? Answers to these new 
questions on how to use drones during warfare should clear the ambiguities about their 
applicability and ease the uproar. 
 
 At any rate, the pragmatic approach would be to regard the new precision capabilities 
of drones as significant to legal debates on contexts and categories. Here, the legal 
interpretation of civilian casualties could be altered. It becomes obvious that there should be a 
shift from ‘no excessive casualties’ as a proportionality criterion to ‘no casualties at all’ during 
armed conflicts involving the use of drones.  However, a zero casualty principle could be 
difficult to achieve, unless all persons in the battle zone are considered legitimate targets.   
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Compliance with these principles during armed conflict usually requires absolute awareness 
and empathy towards humans and their rights, whether they are parties to the conflict or 
not.  The central question parties from all three schools of thought struggle to answer is 
whether in the nearest future, armed robots will possess the ability to empathise and 
exercise discretion during warfare. For example, a screen-operated armed robot can be 
helpful to an operator because of its highly sophisticated sensors, but does it have the 
ability to withdraw from targeting an enemy combatant who at the last minute surrenders 
his/her arms? Some scientific philosophers doubt that this will ever be possible, because of 
the dynamic and complex battle environments in which the autonomous armed robots will 
have to operate.
537
 
 
Scholars have identified the need for a broad international debate on the development of 
military robotics technology. This must consider the responsibilities of governments, 
industry, lawyers, the scientific community, non-governmental organisations and other 
stakeholders.
538
 Such a debate has not occurred due to the rapid development of military 
robotics in recent times. A first attempt at discussing the use of lethal autonomous weapons 
systems (LAWS) otherwise known as “killer robots,” was made at an informal meeting of 
experts at the United Nations in Geneva in May 2014
539
  
A Top UN official in Geneva charged diplomats present at the LAWS meeting, categorically 
stating that: “You have the opportunity to take pre-emptive action and ensure that the 
ultimate decision to end life remains firmly under human control.”540 The discussions focused 
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on ethical and sociological questions that arise from the development and deployment of 
contemporary autonomous technological weapons. The meeting included discussions on the 
competence and legal challenges such weapons pose to international law and their possible 
impact on military operations.
541
 The experts sought to answer the following questions: “Is it 
morally permissible to delegate decisions about the use of lethal force to such systems? Who 
would be legally liable if the use results in war crime or serious human rights violation? If 
responsibility cannot be ascertained as required by international humanitarian and human 
rights law, is it ethical or legal to deploy such systems?” While the extent of the development 
of these autonomous weapons as a military technology remains unclear, and uncertain, 
discussion upon instituting contexts and  objectives for purposes of establishing a Convention 
that regulates the use of LAWS has commenced effectively”542  
The second lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) meeting in 2015 entertained two broad 
views on the matter. One side was of the opinion that LAWS should be put in the same 
category as biological and chemical weapons and comprehensively and pre-emptively 
banned. The other view suggests that LAWS should be put in the same category as precision-
guided weapons and regulated.
543
 In April 2016 however, the experts appeared to favour the 
liberalist argument that the use of autonomous weapons systems be restricted due to a high 
tendency for rapid proliferation and perhaps a new arms race. Moreover, LOAC cannot be 
guaranteed for the interaction of autonomous weapons systems. It is important to pass an 
international legally binding treaty that has a strong focus on ensuring that human control is 
meaningfully involved in all application of violent force. 
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Not all developments in military robotics can be qualified by many scholars as ethical. It is 
therefore important that all stakeholders enter into debate on how to supplement the use of 
drones with more meaningfully active weapons of war against terror. It is important to bear 
in mind that the US only considers targeted killing through drones to be the best weapon of 
warfare in civilian territories. Drones allow their users to remotely identify and specifically 
target the enemies deliberately intermingling within civilian domain to avoid detection. One 
argument in favour of using drones is to guide against the chaos that can be caused through 
constant entry of the US Infantry into Pakistani and Yemeni civilian territories that harbour 
terrorists. The premise of this argument is weak considering that those who experience 
drone invasions regard it to be extremely chaotic. However, in line with the pragmatic 
rationale, this thesis is not mainly arguing the need to reduce the use of drones applied in 
contemporary killings. Instead it expresses the need for an international legal framework to 
explicitly prescribe the use of force, that includes guidelines for the use of drones in 
transnational warfare involving non-state actors, for the purpose of accountability.  
 
3.10.4. The Rationale for Exploring the Liberal, Realist and Pragmatist Perspectives  
is an in-depth approach that identifies areas for further study on the subject of targeted 
killings. Insight gained by analyzing differing philosophical perspectives facilitates the 
formulation of a theoretical framework for dealing with terroristic conflicts, which effectively 
balances the conflicting values of involved stake-holders. This includes a thorough evaluation 
of the claim that targeted killing effectively counters terrorism where other approaches fail. A 
number of authors have clarified the effectiveness of targeted killing, using different 
approaches to the novel approach of game theory adopted in this thesis.  
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3.11. The Effectiveness of Targeted killing: Current Literature Analysis  
Targeted killing has often been judged to be effective, if states succeed in eliminating the 
terrorists that they consider too dangerous to keep alive.
544
 The common approach is to 
determine how many notorious terrorists have been successfully eliminated. However, this 
thesis opines that this approach would yield unrealistic results. What makes a person 
notorious is when he/she has carried out or spearheaded acts of violence. This does not take 
into consideration the culprits that may be equally dangerous but are ‘unknown’ simply 
because they are yet to execute their first attacks. More than anything, it emphasizes the 
punitive nature of targeted killing. It may be true that targeted killing succeeds only to an 
extent in punishing terrorist culprits for acts of violence previously committed. However, the 
question is whether the targeted killings of ‘known’ culprits mean that terrorism is effectively 
dealt with? The literature has a variety of opinions on how the effectiveness of Israeli and US 
targeted killing counterterrorism activities are measured.  
3.11.1. Israel’s Practice 
On 14 December 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that targeted killing is a legitimate 
form of self-defence against terrorists. The court also outlined several conditions for its 
use.
545
 These include preventing imminent attacks when there is no discernible means of 
foiling it or making an arrest by other methods.
546
 Targeted killing of Palestinian terrorists 
has been actively practised by Israel ever since then.
547
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The effectiveness of Israel’s targeted killing practices have been evaluated by several authors 
including Hepworth, Neumann and Wilner in a study of Taliban leaders in Afghanistan.
548
 
The authors maintained that if the policy is selective, it is potentially able to ‘degrade an 
organization's overall capability to plan, coordinate and carry out acts of violence.’549 Thus, 
overall violence in the middle east increased after the targeted killings of several terrorist 
leaders, but the use of more sophisticated tactics, like that of suicide bombing, decreased by 
more than 30%.
550
  
Wilner ,et al concluded that a larger shift in operational abilities from terrorist organisations 
in the Middle East occurred at this time, which led the organisations to participate in more 
frequent, but less sophisticated, types of terrorism. Hepworth's study yielded few significant 
changes in the type of attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda groups after the US drones killed four 
important leaders, save for a small decrease in average fatalities.
551
 He concluded that groups 
may have already been “maxed out” on motivation, and the death of one more leader would 
not have caused any more backlash than already present.
552
  
Zussman and Zussman maintain that terrorism is a form of “economic warfare.”553 The 
authors investigated the role of 159 Israeli targeted killing attempts on stock market trends 
from September 2000 to April 2004. Basing target seniority on three criteria and an expert 
ranking, they determined that the stock market (both Israeli and Palestinian) experienced 
decline after the deaths of senior political leaders. The opposite was true of military leaders; 
in other words, the Israeli stock market reacted positively to these types of targeted killings. 
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The authors concluded that their findings are indicative of market perceptions and that the 
targeted killings of political leaders are viewed as counterproductive. However, the deaths of 
military leaders would demonstrate targeted killing as an effective counterterrorism strategy.  
Similarly, Hafez and Hatfield assessed Israeli targeted killings on rates of Palestinian 
violence from September 2000 to June 2004, during the Al-Aqsa uprising.
554
 The authors 
found that targeted killings yielded a null effect on both long-term and short-term violence 
perpetrated by Palestinians. They noted that target hardening strategies like security 
checkpoints and the separation wall may have been responsible for the decrease in Palestinian 
violence, rather than the actual killings. Terrorism has not abated and terrorist organisations 
do not seem to struggle with recruiting members to replace the ones who have been targeted 
and killed.  
3.11.2.The U.S. Practice: 
Based on the expansion of US Public Law 107–40, Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
in 2001, targeted killings are justified by the US as a “necessary and appropriate force… in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the US by such nations, 
organizations, or persons.”555 The intention to ‘prevent’ future terrorist attacks is suggestive 
of the goal of using targeted killing strategy to completely apprehend future terrorist attacks. 
Several scholars have applied a set of robust qualitative methods to address similar deficits in 
terrorism and counterterrorism literature.
556
 However, there is little empirical evidence to 
verify whether the use of targeted killing strategy effectively meets its said goal.  
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The US targeted killing programme is deemed effective if all or most of the prominent 
(known) leaders of terrorist organisations have been killed.
557
 The rationale for this is that 
terroristic threats would abate once the main perpetrators have been executed.
558
 However, 
this rationale does not take into consideration the future of recruits who would possess similar 
notoriety. The effectiveness of the US practise of targeted killing from the standpoint of 
leadership decapitation has been approached in a related line of research including those 
concluded by Johnston, Jordan, Mannes, Price and Clifford.
559
  
The conclusions of Clifford, Mannes and the US government are that it is an advantage when 
the targeting of terrorists culprits lowers the morale of terrorist groups, reduces their 
cumulative operational capabilities and increases the morale of the attacker’s.  However, 
these conclusions do not take into account the fact that Islamic terrorism is global.  Research 
shows that new and active perpetrators have been easily instated to replace those who have 
been killed.
560
 Arguably, targeted killing is ineffective if it only serves to postpone terrorist 
activities, pending the reinstatement of new leaders. It may be inaccurate to conclude that so 
far, targeted killing strategy is most reliable for adequately combating terrorism.   
Recent history is replete with often brazen attacks from Jihadi ‘lone wolves’ scattered around 
the globe.
561
 The successful elimination of specific targets resident in Pakistan,Yemen and 
Somalia does not guarantee an end to terrorism. Instead, it may only help in eliminating the 
threats from those specific targets.  Furthermore, previous incidents of suicide bombings 
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show how terrorists place little value on life. They are not afraid to get killed, but usually 
ensure they pass on the mandate to others to guarantee a continuation of their cause.
562
  
Therefore, the chances that many of the deceased terrorists would have new terrorist trainees 
who would carry on with atrocities are high.
 
Price acknowledges this When he examined the 
rate of mortality among 207 terrorist groups from 1970 through 2008.
563
 His conclusion bears 
some similarity to that in this thesis, in that, both consider it highly probable that targeted 
killing has started to become less effective just as the rate of terrorist movement increases 
around the world. However, the significant difference between Prices work and this thesis is 
that both use different methods to clarify the effectiveness of targeted killing. Whilst Price 
adopts the empirical approach, making a critical appraisal of the effectiveness of targeted 
killings, this thesis makes use of socio-legal, semi-quantitative deductions to make explicit 
conclusions about the effectiveness of targeted killing on a case by case basis.    
Price argued that leadership removal should be effective at motivating organisational 
desistance, given that such organisations are secretive, violent and ideologically motivated.
564
 
This is why this thesis argues that more than anything, it is the very ideology which spurs the 
acts of terror that needs to be addressed. This is the rationale for assessing the ideological 
perspectives of the schools of thought mentioned above. Price was probably accurate to have 
concluded that targeted killing of specific leaders of terrorist organisations would “most 
likely increase the group's chances of organisational death, but not nearly at the rate it would 
had it occurred during the group's early years.”565 Other authors like Jordan and Mannes have 
noted that the US compilation of the ‘kill list’ containing important information about who to 
target involves much planning and processing. The pace of such process cannot effectively 
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prevent the overwhelming impact of the widespread violence instigating Jihadi movement.
 566
 
However, they both conclude that targeted killing is ‘adequately effective’ even if it only 
temporarily eliminates threats from those targeted, until future insurrections from new 
terrorist recruits. They both also believe it may be unrealistic to expect that all terrorist 
perpetrators can be apprehended. If the execution of some targets means that some threats 
have been eliminated, then targeted killing is effective. 
567
  
Even states using targeted killings believe that they can indefinitely postpone terrorist plots 
by continuously pursuing, targeting and killing those presumed to be plotting attacks, thus 
preventing the plots from materialising. Clifford also concludes that targeted killing is 
effective, even if it only succeeds in serving as a reprisal to terrorist attacks.
568
 Although, its 
rationale can be considered to be realistic, given that terrorism is far from abating, this thesis 
argues that the shortcomings of targeted killing is indications that a change in strategy is 
required. The continued threats posed by terrorist lone wolves require a reassessment of the 
effectiveness of targeted killing, to clarify whether it is imminently necessary for the US and 
Israel to contemplate new and better strategies.  
 
3.11.3. Justification for Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Killing  
The prevalent incidents of terror have made it that much more vital to assess whether the 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy effectively deals with the problem. Only very few 
authors have assessed the effectiveness of targeted killing. Even then, there is scarcity in 
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research that explicitly and empirically assesses whether targeted killing is effective in 
relation to the objective aim of a complete annihilation of terrorism.
 569
   
 
Perhaps the targeted killing of terrorist leaders has led to the increase in more dangerous 
spontaneous attacks from vengeful lone wolves.  Notwithstanding, this thesis does not put off 
the self-defence claims made to justify targeted killing. This thesis initially set out to 
thoroughly assess the justification for targeted killings by analysing the legal debates and 
weighing the ideological perspectives of those who uphold the tactic against those that 
counter it. The effectiveness of targeted killing is assessed in this thesis to verify the realist 
argument that no other approach can effectively counter terrorism, and the pragmatic school 
which asks for a verification of the realist claim,.  The semi-quantitative Game Theory 
method, under the Socio-legal methodology, gives insight into several less-known aspects, 
which arise in situations of conflicting interests. As would be enunciated in the following 
chapters, the Peace, War type of game theory is specifically adopted in this thesis because it 
serves as a method of arriving at a more objective conclusion on the effectiveness of targeted 
killing. The approach considers whether targeted killing is effective, in relation to set goals. It 
is however necessary to have a basic understanding of the concept of game theory. 
 
3.11.4. Introduction to the use of Game Theory  
3.11.4.1. What is a game?  
The scope of game theory as covered in this thesis is based on definitions of game theory as a 
discipline of mathematics and economics, as well as  other definitions by proponents and 
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scholars based on their analytical experiences from using game theory.John Von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern in ‘The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour’ have urged us to 
regard ‘games’ as the competitive or conflicting situational disposition between parties, in 
which they must make decisions on all of the following: 
570
 
1. Rules, which govern conduct of the players 
2. Pay-offs, such as win, lose or draw 
3. Strategies, which influence the decision making process. 
3.11.4.2. What is Game Theory? 
Game Theory is an economic analytical tool that has been applied in academic groups to 
study possible strategies in competitions and conflict situations.
571
  It is simply defined as a 
set of tools and a language for describing and predicting strategic behaviour.
572
 To 
Economists, ‘Game’ is defined as an activity between two or more persons as per a set of 
rules at the end of which each person gets some benefit or bears loss. The set of rules and 
procedures defines the game..
573
 The theory has become a part of the thinking in several 
academic disciplines, including economics, mathematics, social and behavioural sciences. It 
has now become an interdisciplinary methodology that can be used for the study of human 
behaviour.
574
 
 
Game theory offers a semi-quantitative approach for studying how parties to a conflict or in a 
competition make strategic decisions, in relation to their goals, and how they struggle to use 
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the strategies they chose to derive optimum outcomes for themselves.
575
 In other words, game 
theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with the analysis of strategies used for dealing 
with competitive situations, where the outcome of a participant's choice of action depends 
critically on the actions of other participants.
576
 Osborne espouses that ‘game theory’ is a bag 
of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when 
decision-makers interact.  
Game theory does not decide how a ‘game’ must be played, but it tells the process and 
principles by which a particular action should be chosen.
577
 In other words, game theory 
describes the conclusions gained from studying how the move choices of all the ‘players’(in 
this case, the game theory analysts representing parties of the ‘war against terror) collectively 
determine the possible outcomes of the ‘game’(strategies used). A reference to game theory 
analysis is in actual fact a reference to the study that provides information about the potential 
effects of strategies for dealing with conflicts or competitions.
578
  
 
The point worthy of note in this chapter is that game theory is a decision theory; helpful in 
observing conflict and competitive situations. ‘What’ the game theory does is to help a party 
to a conflict (or a person making analysis on behalf of a party) predict the process and 
outcome leading to the resolution of complex negotiations or potentially coercive situations, 
including the possibility that they end with agreement, breakdown, or eventuate in the use of 
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force.
579
 ‘How’ the game theory does this is to rely on logic and facts (evidence) to anticipate 
future outcomes of human activity.
580
 The answer to the question, ‘why’ people feel the need 
to predict the future and why game theory significantly serves this purpose in this thesis is 
simple. The urge to predict future behaviour has long been an interest of humankind.
581
 
Whether by studying sheep entrails, star gazing, palm reading, or consulting oracles, people 
have wanted to find the means to discover the future.
582
  
 
From early times, mathematicians and scientists have offered alternatives to divination, seers, 
and prophesy. They used logic for example, to describe the area of any triangle, past, present 
or future, to discern when a body immersed in a fluid will experience an up-thrust, or the 
limits of number series, again whether in the present, the past or the future.
583
  In the 17th 
century, the urge to predict pushed deductive theorists such as Hobbes and experimentalists 
such as Boyle to attempt to discover the laws governing physical phenomena. These were 
laws that could be used to predict the future state of the world and analyse the activities of 
past states.
584
 Isaac Newton also propelled science forward by identifying laws governing 
motion – and the means through calculus to measure change – that could be used to project 
the location of heavenly bodies into the distant future. Indeed, Newton’s logic was used in the 
nineteenth century to discover Neptune, purely from mathematical logic.
585
 Today, the urge 
to predict through science has motivated the development of numerous tools, including game 
theory, that rely on logic and evidence to anticipate outcomes of human activity into the 
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future.
586
 These tools include evolutionary theory, computational models, probability theory, 
classical statistics and Bayesian estimation techniques, game theory, and many other 
modelling strategies. These have all proven to be of value through countless applications. 
This is why Game Theory is inculcated into this thesis to conduct a predictive inquiry into the 
future implications of the continued use of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy.  
 
The game theory concept was discovered by the great mathematician John von Neumann.
587
 
His novel idea provides a decision theory in which one's alternative action is determined after 
taking into consideration all possible alternatives available to an opponent playing the same 
game, rather than just by the possibilities of various outcome results.
588
 As would be shown 
in subsequent chapters, game theory analysis can make use of numeric and diagrammatic 
illustrations to demonstrate strategic decisions that parties make when trying to decide what 
action to take, in order to optimise their expectations in conflicts.
589
  This allows for more 
logical and disciplined analysis of strategic decision making.
590
 The game theory offers this 
thesis an opportunity to precisely confront strategic issues in order to derive more 
constructive details that could otherwise be overlooked by non-empirical socio-legal 
reviews.
591
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Economists rely on game theory to help a party in a conflict or competition develop 
frameworks for strategic decision making. This is especially in situations where parties do not 
communicate their strategic choices to opponents, and where interdependence of parties is 
involved.
 592
 In other words, parties’ decision to use certain strategies in conflicts or 
competitions is largely what they consider to be appropriate responses to an opponent’s 
strategic approach for dealing with the same conflict or competition. The predictive element 
that game theory offers is that it proactively and calculatedly allows a party to map out (write 
down), ahead of time, the responses anticipated from its use of a particular strategy. This is a 
way of engineering the outcomes it desires from the conflict interaction.
593
  
Game theory is mathematical and economic because it involves the process of quantifying 
past or anticipated outcomes in figures which is a ‘matter of fact’ approach that proposes a 
more dynamic method of assessing the effectiveness of targeted killings. One advantage of 
this is that the approach prompts ‘players’ to reassess issues relating to the strategic choices 
they make. This is why Game Theory is referred to in economics and statistics as a basis for 
promoting and improving rational decision making process.
594
  
Game theory does not decide how a game must be played, it tells the process and principles 
by which a particular action should be chosen.
595
 In other words, Game theory describes the 
conclusions gained from studying how the move choices of all the ‘players’(in this case, the 
‘parties’ to terroristic conflicts) collectively determine the possible outcomes of the 
‘game’(strategies used). A reference to game theory analysis is in actual fact a reference to 
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the study that provides information about the potential effects of strategies for dealing with 
conflicts or competitions.
596
  
The critical analysis of strategic values using the Peace War type of game theory approach in 
the following chapters illustrates how prior methodological approaches to measuring the 
effectiveness of targeted killing may lead to inaccurate conclusions. However, the following 
paragraphs offer a brief review of where the literature is up to with using game theory to 
study terrorism. 
3.11.5. Previous Economics and Game Theory Researches. 
Critical analysis using game theory methods has been applied to contexts in war, business 
and biology.
597
 Economics methodologies that include game theory are typically well-suited 
to provide insights over and beyond those from a political science approach, which has 
stressed definitions, institutional factors, and case studies in an inductive framework.
598
 
Economics analysis can account for the strategic interactions amongst opposing interests, i.e, 
the terrorists and the states.
599
   
 
Game theory application in the literature evolved with authors like Aumann, Sandler, De 
Mesquita, Russell, Wright, Ullmann-Margalit's and a host of others, using the method to 
make analogies. Several researchers such as Drezner, Bueno, De Mesquita, and Downs have 
used the game theory approach to assess political issues, including the evolving study of war 
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and peace. They believe that the methodology offers not only analytic insights, but also 
practically accessible policy guidance to decision making.
600
  
 
As disciplines, law and economics evolved on a strong foundation of classical 
microeconomics.
601
 Individual decision-makers maximized utility or profits subject to 
constraints. These individuals were perfectly informed and treated either as price-takers in 
competitive settings, or price-setters in monopolies. A sizable and largely successful 
academic legal literature grew out of taking first derivatives and ruthlessly applying the 
discipline of the micro-economist’s marginal analysis to a vast array of legal problems.602  
 
The application of an economics methodology to the legal study relating to terrorism began 
with Landes, who applied the economics of crime and punishment to the study of skyjackings 
in the United States.
603
  Sandler’s and Ender demonstrates how economic analysis can be 
used to aid enlightened policy making on issues relating to transnational terrorism.
604
  It 
concludes that rational-choice models that include game theory and other micro-economic 
principles can be applied to ascertain how terrorists are able to respond to policy-induced 
changes.
605
  Their theoretical study that included the use of game theory and utility 
maximizing models, was used to put modern-day terrorism into perspective and suggest 
policy reforms. They suggest that the same methods can be used to study how governments 
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react to terrorist induced changes to their policymaking.
606
 These led them to suggest policy 
insights ranging from hostage negotiations to the installation of technological barriers (e.g., 
metal detectors and embassy fortification).  
Russell and Wright have suggested that the danger in conflicts can be minimised by assessing 
interactions between ‘players’ to discern what contributes to the risk of war.607 Their joint 
research demonstrates how revolutions in game theory technology and political economy 
modelling are currently helping to advance such goals.
608
 This can be attested to by the fact 
that game theory's development accelerated at a record pace during World War two.. It has 
now become common wisdom that in the late 1940s and 1950s, game theory strongly 
influenced thinking on nuclear strategy.
609
 Though it was intended for economics, both the 
US and Soviet Union quickly saw its value in forming war strategies during the Cold War.
610
  
Nye and Lynn-Jones noted that as the field of strategic studies was developing around East-
West problems, ‘deterrence theory and game theory provided a powerful unifying framework 
for those central issues.
611
  These point to the fact that the early study of the Post War Soviet-
American arms race was dominated by game theory and strategic rational-actor approaches.’  
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3.11.6. Derivations on Morality Using Game Theory 
The Prisoners Dilemma game theory approach has been used to identify the function of 
morality.
612
 It describes the problem(s) that can occur with decision making processes that do 
not consider moral implications of decisions made. Inferences about the remedial or 
ameliorative function of morality are drawn from this description. Consequently, game theory 
has proved to be relevant to ethics and political philosophy in a variety of ways.
613
  A good 
example is Ullmann-Margalit's The Emergence of Norms, in which she argues that moral 
norms enable agents to cooperate and coordinate their actions in situations where the pursuit 
of self-interest prevents this.
614
  Her classic example is that of two artillery men who are 
faced with two choices: to flee from the advancing enemy or to stay and operate their gun. 
Their gun is located in a strategically important pass. If both stay, they have a significant 
chance of being injured, but it is certain that the advance of the enemy will be halted. If both 
flee, the enemy will be able to take the mountain pass, overtake and capture them. If just one 
of them stays while the other flees, the brave artillerist will die in battle, but the other gunner 
will have just enough time to escape safely.  
Supposing that both try to survive this ordeal, preferably unhurt, each soldier has reason to 
flee. The reason for this is that they are engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma.615 Each gunner has 
to choose between fleeing or staying to fight. This choice is represented in the rows for 
gunner 1 and the columns for gunner 2. Each cell in the matrix represents the outcome of 
each possible pair of choices. Each cell has a pair of numbers. The number in the lower left 
corner of each cell represents how gunner 1 ranks this outcome, relative to the other possible 
outcomes—ranks represented by “utility” numbers. The number in the upper right corner 
represents the ranking of this outcome by 2.  
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616
 
Firstly, the game play considers the case for 1. If 2 decides to stay and fight, then1 is best off 
by fleeing. He will likely survive without getting hurt. In the formal representation of the 
matrix, he will secure a higher ranking (3 rather than 2). Suppose 2 decides to flee, again, 1 
does best by fleeing. He will survive the battle, although he will be imprisoned for the 
duration of the war. If he were to stay and fight, it is highly likely that he would die; by 
fleeing he will secure a higher ranking (1 rather than 0). Gunner 2 is in the same position as 
1: for him as for gunner 1, whatever the other does, he fares best by fleeing.  
 
In short, each individual gunner would be better off fleeing, regardless of what the other does. 
However, it can also be argued that each would be better off if they both stood their ground. 
The outcome of individually rational action is uncertain (Pareto-inefficient or sub-optimal) 
outcomes. In the event that both understand the structure of their predicament and see that 
each has good reasons to flee, they could try to rule out this possibility. For example, they 
could chain each other to the gun, thus preventing flight.  
Ullmann-Margalit argues that the situation of the gunners (i.e., the prisoner's dilemma) is 
structurally equivalent to many everyday interactions governed by morality, in which the 
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mutual chaining commits the gunners to stay and fight.
617
 The moral and ethical issues that 
the parties to terroristic conflicts face, which is discussed in chapter 5, can influence the 
strategic decision making.  However, the norm in game theory is for players to choose 
strategies that enable them to secure the best outcome for themselves. Again, decisions made 
out of selfish interest are a bit of a gamble in that they may not always result in the outcomes 
anticipated. This is why many experienced game theory analysts often conclude that after 
repeated cycles of violence, opponents achieve better and stable outcomes when they co-
operate together to negotiate the conflict.
618
 Using the Peace War Game theory approach in 
this thesis allows the researcher to derive answers to questions on policy effectiveness, from 
studying strategic decision making interactions between parties to current terroristic conflicts.   
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3.12. The Gaps in the Literature  
A few scholars have researched the tactics used to kill targets, but most historical works 
have dwelt instead on the killing of popular political leaders.  For instance, the works of 
Harris Lentz and Laucella
619
 observe the killing of political figures from 1865 to 1986.
620
 
As earlier shown, Tal Tovy has expanded the scope in the literature on historical events by 
studying ‘the US phoenix programme’ that involved the killing of members of the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFL or Viet Cong).
 621
 When targeted killings evolved 
as a counterterrorism strategy, several academic works studied historical cases of 
assassination and compared them to targeted killings. The authors felt the need to 
distinguish this strategy from assassination.
 622
  
Few scholars judge the effectiveness of targeted killings of only notorious terrorist leaders.
623
 
Their general notion is that targeting terrorist leaders paralyses the groups and so eliminates 
the major threats. Arguably, this type of research is inconclusive and dated; this is because 
the states that do the targeting are now motivated to target ordinary members of terrorist 
organisations and lone wolves, who contribute maximally toward the ‘jihadi movement.’624 
An assessment of the effectiveness of a strategy is based on whether the strategy is able to 
counter a problem. This thesis does not limit the assessment to terrorist leaders alone. This 
thesis considers whether targeted killing has so far been able to adequately obstruct terrorist 
plots and eliminate future threats. Various researchers define ‘effectiveness’ in different 
ways, using different criteria to measure success or failure. For example, Amos N. Giora 
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suggests a conceptual definition that “Effective counterterrorism causes the terrorist 
infrastructure to suffer serious damage–including damage to finances, intelligence, resources, 
or personnel–thereby preventing a particular, planned attack from going forth and/or 
postponing or impacting plans for future attacks while minimizing collateral damage, 
exercising fiscal responsibility, and preserving civil liberties.”625 However, this thesis argues 
that for targeted killing to be effective, it should be measured against its capability of 
producing a desired result. Simply put, when something is deemed effective, it means it has 
achieved an intended outcome. This is a better approach than regarding effectiveness to be 
the extent of damage caused by each case of targeted killing. The latter approach is faulty 
because it does not guarantee an end to terrorism. It does not clarify whether the threat of 
targeted killing forces surviving terrorists to refrain from terrorism.  In the context of this 
study it is important to determine how targeted killing strategy achieves an end to terrorism. 
Previous paragraphs have hinted on the gaps that are present in the literature.  However, for 
the sake of clarity, the gaps in the academic literature and conflict regulatory policies are as 
follows:   
3.12.1A deficit in empirical socio-legal research 
Empirical and socio-legal based analysis via the application of, for example, empirical 
observation and other social science approaches are scarce in the literature of targeted 
killings. There is no critical and empirical research based analysis in the literature that leads 
to the proposal of realistic self-defence mechanisms against terrorism under law enforcement 
regime. Whereas, Empirical and Socio-legal studies complement doctrinal analysis and 
promote a more critical analysis of the practicalities of laws and acts of targeted killings and 
terrorism. The initial basis for the studies of targeted killing in the current literature was to 
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determine its legality.
626
 Hence, there is an increasing debate over the legality of targeted 
killings.  
The studies that focus on determining the legality of targeted killings seem to have ended up 
concluding that targeted killings are illegal. This is true because no existent law supports 
targeted killing. However, this one-sided conclusion has evolved as a result of a singular 
approach of doctrinal analysis of legislations.  A more empirical based approach will 
conclude that although the new tactic of targeted killing is not currently recognised under 
international law, it may be more practical in dealing with terrorism. An empirically based 
research would contemplate ways in which targeted killing may be adopted under the laws 
that regulate the use of force.
 627
  A singular approach to research through the doctrinal 
analysis does not expose discrepancies between laws in writing and laws in action.  
 
3.12.2 A gap in holistic analysis of the Philosophical/Ideological backgrounds that 
inform the legal debate over the war against terror. 
Very few authors have assessed the ideological basis of terrorism, none has thoroughly 
assessed the ideological basis for targeted killing, and none has assessed the ideological 
viewpoints of scholars involved in legal debates over targeted killings. Authors like Reich,
628
 
Freeman
629
 and Cronin
630
 have assessed the ideological perspectives of terrorists from 
different angles, offering extremely insightful conclusions about terrorist traits. Reich 
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conducted a psychological assessment of terrorists, Freeman analysed certain traits in terrorist 
leadership that serve as inspiration to members and Cronin assessed the emotional cycles of 
terrorists. 
631
 
Reich attempts to understand the motivation and actions of terrorist individuals and groups, 
so his conclusion lends insight into the moral logic behind terrorism.
632
 While he admits that 
the general motivation for terrorism cannot be narrowed down to one particular detail, he 
succeeded to an extent, in determining certain characteristic traits about terrorists. He 
recognised the fact that terrorists may or may not be intelligent about their ends and tools, but 
they can change them. When they do, it is presumably because they believe there are benefits 
in doing so.
633
 This informs the literature that terrorists are by no means rigid in their tactical 
approaches for dealing with conflicts. This suggests that however difficult it may be, it is not 
impossible to negotiate diplomatic measures with them, unless these are beset with 
aggression. Further, Reich echoes the points made earlier in this chapter when he argues that 
ideological terrorism does not emerge from a vacuum or from an inexplicable urge on the 
part of some radicals to go berserk. Rather, it is the psycho-political product of a profound 
process of indoctrination, that a large number of people undergo in relation to an established 
social and political order.
634
 In sum, Reich warns about the severity of terrorism, stating that 
‘ideological terrorism is the simulation of revolution of the isolated few.’  
On the other hand, Freeman observes the effect that targeted killing of terrorist leaders have 
on the latters’ organisation. His aim was to determine circumstances in which targeting 
terrorist leaders are effective in terms of destabilising terrorist activities and when they are 
not. He argues that it is only the targeted killing of a leader who provides inspiration and/or 
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operational direction to a group that destabilises terrorist activities. To Freeman, the 
effectiveness of targeted killing varies.  
Cronin has aptly determined the right moment when negotiations with terrorists should 
commence.
635
 He did not study state use of violence; instead, he limited his study to the 
phenomenon of terrorism by non-state actors. He acknowledges that government 
policymakers understandably respond with righteous anger and determination after a horrible 
terrorist attack. The priority is to prop up the safety of the population, stabilize the state, 
avoid legitimising the group that attacked, punish those responsible and remove incentives 
for future attacks by demonstrating that terrorism is wrong. Under some conditions, other 
counterterrorism approaches such as military patrolling, policing, targeted killings, arrest, 
reform movements, or marginalization may be ineffective. Such actions may be insufficient 
on their own to end a campaign, or may even incur more acts of terror. Even the violence 
necessary to obliterate a terrorist campaign may be so bloody and indiscriminate that it also 
kills innocent people, violates the laws of war, destabilises a state, and is just as morally 
repulsive as the initial terrorist acts. Cronin warns that the solution may be worse than the 
problem. He points out that if the goal is to end terrorist attacks, history demonstrates that 
there are situations where there may be no viable alternative to entering negotiations. The 
hallmark of Cronin’s work was to suggest that negotiations are best initiated when both sides 
sense that they have reached a situation where further violence is counterproductive. 
Important as these authors’ conclusions are to the literature, it must be pointed out that their 
researches are narrowly focused on understanding terrorists’ ideologies and are not balanced 
by a thorough assessment of states ideological incentives for using targeted killing.  
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3.12.3 Suggestions of cogent reforms of some policies: 
There is no adequate contextual analysis, policy consensus, common legal standard, or a 
single cohesive vision promoting action for reform in the literature.
636
 Although the empirical 
studies of Morehouse utilized both qualitative and quantitative research methods to examine 
the US programme, he concluded that targeted killings against terrorists are innovative tactics 
of warfare that can be justifiably used against an equally innovative enemy.
 637
 Thus, he 
recognized the need for revision of the laws of war that redefine ‘the battlefield’ and 
‘acceptable tactics’ in the war against terror.638 However, Morehouse and other scholars have 
not proffered suggestions on how terrorists can be regarded under international; law.
639
 
Apparently, neither targeted killings by the US and Israel, nor terrorists’ status and activities 
are consistent with the character of conflict defined by the laws of war.  
 
Combatants in uniforms and emblems defined the character of traditional conflict, regulated 
under the auspices of the Geneva Convention. Now, states are unexpectedly confronted by 
armed attacks from terrorists who are not state-actors identifiable by uniform or emblem; 
they usually operate in civilian territories.
640
 Academic scholars who assess the ‘war like’ 
nature of terroristic conflicts propose that the laws that regulate warfare must be made 
applicable to targeted killings and terrorism. On the other hand, research reveals that the 
transnational nature of terrorist activities limits law enforcement attempts to arrest culprits, 
leaving terrorised civilians open to recurrent attack. So, what part of the literature has shied 
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away from the realities that the armed conflict regulatory laws of war and human rights 
enforcement laws cannot properly regulate terroristic warfare. Others that acknowledge these 
gaps have identified aspects of both laws that require reform, but have failed to provide 
adequate suggestions on how they can be tweaked to make them more relevant to terroristic 
conflicts. Both laws are lacking in suggestions that consider the following:   
i. Suggestions on the ‘pattern of behaviour’ that is suggestive of active 
contribution to the military function of a group, in order to kill participants 
with more certainty by following the principle of distinction. The ‘pattern of 
behavior,’ should distinguish a terrorist civilian who may be targeted under the 
LOAC from the civilians genuinely entitled to immunity.  
ii. As shown above, acts of terror are spontaneously carried out by lone wolves 
against unsuspecting civilians, whilst they go about their day to day activities. 
How can victims of this type of attack invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter, in 
the absence of war and against terroristic plots, if the extent to which the right 
to exercise self-defence is only against foreseeable threats.
641
 In other words, 
what is the catalyst for victims of terrorism - who do not have an 
overwhelming imminent threat experience - to enable them to mount an 
effective defence?  This is in consideration of the fact that terroristic plots are 
usually covertly planned and executed instantaneously.  
iii. Assuming terroristic conflicts are clarified as warfare under international law, 
how can states fulfil the condition under the laws of armed conflict, of finding 
terrorists engaged in the act of hostilities, in order to fulfil the present criteria 
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for ‘lawful targeting processes’ when  terrorists covertly plot and execute 
attacks.?  
 
This thesis identifies the above grey areas that future researchers on the subject of modern 
conflict involving terrorism might wish to explore. It is limited in scope, due to word count 
constraint. It does not fill all the gaps in the literature and the laws identified above. For 
instance, it does not propose to identify a cluster of situations that can prove active 
functionality of terrorists in terrorist organisations under the laws of armed conflict. Instead, 
this thesis fills three of the gaps detailed below.  
 
3.13.The Scope of this thesis and the Gaps it intends to fill. 
This thesis only fills the first, second, and number one of the third gap mentioned above. 
They specifically include the following: 
 
In terms of policy amendments 
Existing international law provisions (Human Rights Laws and the Laws of Armed Conflict), 
appearing to permit killing in self-defence and as an ‘act of war’ respectively, within limited 
parameters, are underdeveloped. The legality of targeted killing is therefore debateable. 
However, suggestions on policy reforms in this thesis are limited to the Laws of Armed 
conflict. The suggestions aim to strike a balance between protecting the civilian rights of 
those adversely affected by targeted killings and those who perpetrate it. This is done by 
reconsidering alternative counterterrorism solutions, if targeted killing fails the evaluative test 
of effectiveness under the game theory assessment test. If the test finds targeted killing to be 
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relevant, the suggestions on reforms will consider when it is necessary to use it and when 
other strategies including verbal or written negotiations are more appropriate.  
 
In terms of research analysis  
Whilst several researchers have extensively analyzed issues relating to terrorism and targeted 
killings, this thesis covers two gaps that have existed in research practice, as follows:  
i. This thesis unprecedentedly studies the ideological perspectives of those engaged in 
legal debate over terrorism and targeted killings. It is original and different to other critical 
analysis found in the literature. This is because while many critical analyses of legal 
debates over targeted killing and terrorism are simply evidence based, only a few have 
gone in-depth to put the ideological debates into perspective. Those found to have made 
ideological assessments have done so only in relation to terrorism.  This thesis includes 
targeted killing under the scope of ideological analysis, using Hermeneutics Analysis 
methodology. Moreover, it associates Liberal Cosmopolitan, Realist, and Pragmatist 
schools of thoughts with the three main points of view (those disheartened by the use of 
targeted killing counterterrorism strategy, those who argue in favour of targeted killing 
counterterrorism strategy and those who believe that the strategy should be used under 
strict guidelines, respectively) that dominate the legal debates over terrorism and targeted 
killing. The main aim of normative assessments is to lend more insight into the 
motivations for terrorism and targeted killing, because the knowledge will serve as a guide 
to deciding what can be done to quell both practices as well as pacify parties to terroristic 
conflicts.  
ii. This thesis also fills the gap in the literature analysis of the effectiveness of targeted 
killings, by adopting the interdisciplinary, semi-quantitative game theory method of socio-
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legal enquiry. Current literature is lacking in more empirical approaches to deriving 
explicit answers to questions on the effectiveness of targeted killing counterterrorism 
strategy. Whereas, Game theory ought to be tested for its ability to cover the gap in the 
formation of empirically guided data. The overall aim is to derive a more accurate 
standard for judging targeted killings and alternative strategies than those offered by 
merely critical approaches. 
 
 
 
3.14.                                 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified gaps which the research attempts to fill with new insights, 
grounded in critical analysis of the philosophical debates over targeted killings. This thesis 
aligns diverse perspectives from the Liberal Cosmopolitan, Realist and Pragmatic Schools 
of thought, in order to deduce practical theories. Therefore, as an original contribution to the 
literature, this chapter has made a comprehensive assessment of the philosophies that 
underpin transnational terrorism and the use of targeted killings. The rationale for doing so 
was to enable a thorough assessment of the US and Israel’s legal and ideological reasons for 
adopting targeted killings. Without this, it would be difficult to understand why they 
continue to use the tactic amidst intense criticism. A thorough assessment of the ideological 
perspectives that justify the use of targeted killing has been made. This thesis considers the 
proactively pre-emptive use of targeted killing under guided parameters, supported by the 
Pragmatic schools of thought. The aim is to provide a more realistic and practical counter-
terrorism approach than the passively reactive one offered by the liberal school. The 
grievous consequences of terrorist violence are something to be avoided, so a set of liberal 
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human right standards that place more significance on ‘being right’ than ‘being safe’ goes 
against reasonable expectations of what is fair.  
 
 States may be justified to devise ways to exercise their inherent right of self-defence. It is on 
the basis of these arguments that this thesis does not condemn targeted killing as a practical 
solution for engaging in contemporary warfare. Instead, it contemplates suggestions on 
reforms on the laws of war that may consider the need to uphold the use of targeted killing. 
However, before a constructive framework for policy reforms that may include targeted 
killing is made, it is important to first run an evaluative test on the effectiveness of the 
strategy against alternatives. By clarifying and establishing the status of targeted killing as a 
viable long-term counterterrorism strategy, the stage is set for a re-evaluation of its practice 
under the LOAC. As has been explained in the previous chapter, this avoids the difficulties 
and confusion often associated with the application of either the LOAC or Law Enforcement 
norms to targeted killing. It is by assessing the practice and implementation of targeted 
killing that questions on its suitability and practicability can be answered. This thesis is 
limited to assessing only a little fraction of controversial debates about the deficits in the law 
and literature on targeted killings. However, rather than accord the status of perfection to 
current international laws that regulate the use of force, such assessment permits more 
suggestions on both theoretical and practical reforms.  
 
Following in a progressive fashion, the next chapter proceeds to explain the methodology 
adopted and how it facilitates the resolution of the research aims. Overall, it is argued that 
new policies that address modern warfare and explores various targeted killing scenarios 
should be considered. 
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3.Appendix  
i. Black Hawk artistic description of drone violence: 
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    CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES AND THEORETICAL UNDERPININGS 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter details the research methodologies used in this thesis and how they have guided 
data collection, analysis and interpretation of the phenomenon explored. This thesis mainly 
makes use of three methodologies: the Doctrinal Analysis in chapter two; the Hermeneutical 
approach to reviewing the literature in chapter three; and the Socio-legal methodology, using 
the semi-quantitative Peace War Game Theory method in chapters five and six. The doctrinal 
analysis employed in chapter one and two of this thesis and the hermeneutical methodology 
applied in chapter three is not given in detail. This allows for an elaborate discuss of the 
interdisciplinary game theory method adopted in this thesis as a novel alternative to analysis 
in the field of law. 
642
 
As part of a socio-legal inquiry into the ‘law in action’ regarding targeted killings, the semi-
quantitative Peace War Game Theory interdisciplinary methodology is applied in chapters 
four and five of this thesis, and detailed in the third and last section of this chapter. Game 
theory attempts to mathematically and logically determine the actions that “players” should 
take to secure the best outcomes for themselves in a wide array of “games”(in conflicts, 
contracts or competitions).
643
  The approach is also employed to assess how terrorists would 
respond to targeted killings. This is aimed at further clarifying whether targeted killing is 
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effective or counter-productive. This thesis assesses the effectiveness of targeted killing 
counterterrorism strategy using the Peace War Game theory approach.  
 
The application of game theory in this thesis is reliant on conclusions from the hermeneutic 
analysis. Without an understanding of the values and inclinations of parties, it will have been 
difficult to correctly narrow down the strategic options available to each party in a game 
theory matrix. For example, from a hermeneutical analysis, the paradox of terrorist parties 
feeling religiously rewarded and exonerated by carrying out attacks using self destructive 
means is better understood. This informs the researcher of the need to refrain from 
generalizing the impact of death, or the values each party places on human lives, when 
applying game theory to the study of terroristic conflict. 
 
The rationale for adopting each method, the preliminary report and the process of data 
analysis are also explored in the last section of this chapter.  However, this chapter does not 
offer a detailed assessment of the risks and limitations of the ‘game theory’ methodology. 
Owing to the elaborate caveat when relying on a game theory forecast, this chapter does not 
discuss the limitations of the game theory method, or how these are experienced or overcome 
in this thesis. These are detailed in chapter six, which follows the game theory analysis 
chapter.  
The adoption of mixed methodologies aims to achieve three things: Firstly, it broadens the 
insight into targeted killing in the literature. Secondly; it offers the knowledge needed to 
facilitate the formulation of international legal framework regarding terroristic conflict in 
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general and targeted killing strategy in particular. Thirdly, the scope of readers is broadened 
beyond the purview of legal inquiry to include the socio-science context. 
4.2. Research aims and objectives 
The application of the doctrinal, hermeneutical and Peace war game theory analytical 
approaches entail a systematic stage by stage analysis of the following research aims:   
4.2.1.Research Aims  
Briefly stated, the aims of this research are: 
1. To clarify the current legal interpretation of targeted killings.  
2. To critically evaluate the relevance of the laws of war and conflict in relation to 
targeted killings. 
3. To critically evaluate the impact of terrorism and targeted killings on the human rights 
of victims.  
4. To explore and clarify the contribution of targeted killings in the pursuance of a 
legitimate counter-terrorism strategy. 
5. To enhance and supplement the international legal framework, by identifying a range 
of standards by which states can effectively defend themselves against terrorists. 
 
4.3. Overview of the Doctrinal Analysis 
The methodological approach of doctrinal analysis in chapters one and two allowed for a 
detailed and highly technical commentary and methodical exposition of the legal doctrine 
surrounding the rights to use lethal force.
644
 This analysis culminated in identifying the 
failure of current armed conflict laws to explicitly widen their provisions to encompass 
terroristic vs. targeted killing conflicts. The doctrinal approach also shows breaches of laws 
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(including human rights) by both terrorists and states practicing targeted killing. The legal 
arguments used to justify targeted killing and the rebutting arguments were examined, along 
with their legal implications under the doctrines of law that regulate the use of force.  
 
4.4. Overview of the  Hermeneutical Analysis made. 
Hermeneutical analysis is applied in this thesis as a methodology for exploring the founding 
philosophies, mandates and doctrines of parties to terroristic conflicts, or those who debate 
the conflicts. These regard the ideologies behind the al-Qaeda jihadi movement and other 
terrorist groups under study. The directive prohibiting Palestinians from invading the 
‘promise land’ of Israel is also studied and interpreted.  Hermeneutic Analysis was also 
applied to investigate, interpret, and analyse contents found in religious and constitutional 
texts including the Israeli Torah, the Islamic propaganda materials and the US ‘White Paper’. 
These all bear the fundamental philosophies that underpin the so called ‘war against terror.’ 
Inferences drawn from these materials further enhanced a critical assessment of the defences 
used by authors, commentators and stake-holders, to justify and rebut terrorism and targeted 
killings.  
4.5. Empirical Socio-Legal Methodology 
4.5.1 Overview:  
Socio-legal studies can be defined as an interdisciplinary approach to analysing law, legal 
phenomena and relationships between the law and society at large. Both theoretical and 
empirical work is included, so perspectives and methodologies are derived from the social 
sciences.
645
 The socio-legal approach is the study of both qualitative and quantitative law in 
action, as opposed to the restricted study of the law in books, which characterizes the 
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doctrinal (black-letter) approach.
646
 The peace war game theory defined and explained in the 
next paragraph, is the socio-legal method employed in this thesis. By employing this method, 
this research studies the implementation and execution of targeted killings by states. Thus, 
there is no limitation on theory as envisaged under statutory law. Rather emphasis is placed 
on targeted killing ‘in action.’ The main reason for using the peace war game theory socio-
legal methodology is to expose discrepancies between laws in books and laws in action.
647 
Generally, socio-legal research addresses what appears to be actually taking place in the light 
of today’s reality. It also investigates the impact of law in action and the role played by 
ideological factors, including public policy.
648
  
The socio-legal approach fills the gap between two extremes of a methodological spectrum. 
A strict doctrinal approach relies predominantly on self-informed analysis of legislation and 
judicial decisions from the superior courts.
649
 On the other hand, socio-legal approaches such 
as critical legal studies and economic analysis of law, are responsive to the concerns, theories 
and informants of external perspectives.
650
 Apart from determining the strict legality of 
targeted killings through doctrinal enquiry, this research is balanced by also assessing the 
impact targeted killings has on terrorist organisations. This allows the researcher to determine 
the effectiveness of targeted killing. 
 
The previous chapter has defined game theory and explored the current literature over its 
application to research practice. The next chapter applies the peace war game theory to the 
analysis of terroristic conflict. However, the next paragraph explores its concept. This enables 
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the reader to understand what is to be derived from applying the game theory method in this 
thesis. 
4.3.4 The concept of Interdisciplinary Game Theory Method 
In this thesis, game theory serves as a new lens for assessing the effectiveness of targeted 
killing tactic and determining the long-term outcome from utilizing targeted killings.  Game 
theory is also the analysis of how decision makers interact to take into account reactions and 
choices of the other decision makers.
651
  
International conflict and other phenomena in international relations occur as a result of 
decisions made by people.
652
 These may be leaders of states, members of the legislature or 
military, members of nongovernmental organizations, or citizens of a country. Given the 
central importance of decisions, many scholars argue that to explain international conflict, 
one needs to focus on exploring decision choices.
653
 But how are such decisions explained? 
Game theory offers a systematic approach to exploring what triggers strategic decision 
making processes, and the effect of the decisions made.  
 
Game theory is therefore the theory of independent and interdependent strategic decision 
making in organisations, where the outcome depends on the decision of two or more 
autonomous players, one of which may be nature itself, and where no single decision maker 
has full control over the outcomes.
654
 The aim of game theory is to find optimal solutions to 
situations of conflict and co-operation under the assumption that players are instrumentally 
rational and act in their own self interests. In some cases, solutions can be found. In others, 
although attempts at solution may fail, the analytical synthesis may illuminate different facets 
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of the problem in question. Either way, game theory offers an interesting perspective of the 
nature of strategic selection in familiar and unfamiliar circumstances.
655
 In this thesis, it 
illuminates the main interests and weaknesses of parties to terroristic warfare, in order to 
determine what is realistically achievable in terms of the goals parties seek for engaging in 
the conflict. For example, it is clear that the US and Israel still seek to pursue an end to 
terrorism by using targeted killing strategy.
656
 It is also clear that terrorists still thrive on 
spontaneous attacks as their optimal strategy for pursuing several purposes, including seeking 
religious reliefs and securing territories.
657
 Game theory allows the researcher to explore and 
exploit the ‘breaking points’ of each party; this includes what each party needs the other to do 
in order to each get the outcomes they want.
658
 Game theory systematically allows the 
researcher to explore the questions: What optimal strategies can parties adapt to enable them 
engineer the outcomes they want for themselves? 
659
 If targeted killing is not achieving the 
desired outcomes, what better alternatives exist?   
 
While in search of a better strategy, one can begin to extrapolate the extent to which targeted 
killing is helpful. This thesis also compares the outcomes of targeted killings with other non-
violent alternative approaches. When a party compares outcomes in order to determine the 
best strategy, one party’s outcome is not compared with an opponent’s outcome. Instead, a 
party (or researcher) compares the outcomes of two or more strategies he has previously used 
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or intends to use in order to determine which of them offers the best outcome.
660
 The aim is 
primarily to determine the potential implications for choosing to use a strategy for dealing 
with the conflict.  
 
Game theory is preferred to other socio-legal approaches such as semi-structured interviews 
with commentators who may offer biased opinions. Such opinions may also be difficult to 
consolidate to form a single theory, making the empirical data unreliable.  Although game 
theory suffers similar limitations as other socio-legal inquiries, the approach is subject to the 
researcher’s willingness to objectively make conclusions. Its method of closely reflecting on 
the potential implications of using a strategy allows the researcher to narrowly identify the 
risks or benefits associated with the use of targeted killings; such information may not be 
detailed in interviews. As the main proponents of game theory intended, the approach is most 
relevant to the study of uncertainties in competitive markets and arms control negotiations, as 
well as in conflicts like terroristic warfare. It is intended to be a more substantive way of 
clarifying the contribution of targeted killings to an effective and legitimate counter-terrorism 
strategy, than the varied opinions of commentators.  
4.3.4.1How Game Theory Works. 
Research shows that the economic discipline of game theory is not the study of how to win a 
game, neither is it a study of how to play a game. Often, game theory does not remotely relate 
to what is commonly considered to be a game.
661
 At its most basic level, game theory is the 
study of how people, companies or nations (referred to as agents or players) determine 
strategies in different situations in the face of competing or conflicting strategies acted out by 
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other agents or players.
662
  This theory aims at providing a systematic approach to business 
decision making of organizations or decision making on conflict strategies. It is applied to 
evaluate situations where individuals and organizations have contradictory objectives.
663
 
Game theory helps organizations by increasing the probability of earning maximum profit 
and reducing the probability of losses.  
 
For example, in a war between two states, every state tries to get the settlement in its favour 
only during peace meetings/negotiations. In such a case, game theory helps in solving the 
problem and arriving at a common consensus.
 664
   The essence of a game is the 
interdependence of player strategies. The overall purpose of game theory is to detect the best 
strategies for resolving particular problems.
665
  
 
The game theory analysis can make use of numeric and diagrammatic illustrations to 
demonstrate strategic decisions parties make when trying to decide what line of action can be 
taken to optimise their expectations in conflicts.
666
  Such techniques allow for more 
substantiated and disciplined analysis of strategic decision making.
667
 The aim is that game 
theory offers an opportunity to precisely confront the strategic choices that the parties to the 
‘war against terror’ have chosen to use in order to derive more constructive quantitative 
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results that could otherwise have been overlooked by other non-empirical socio-legal 
reviews. The following section highlights the basic assumptions in game theory. 
 
4.3.4.2 Basic Assumptions and Terminologies in Game Theory  
When deciding upon the best strategy for dealing with conflict or competition; parties make 
rational decisions at all times, to improve their outcome.
 668
 In game theory, a person’s 
behaviour is rational if it is in his best interests, given his information.
669
 This assumption is 
highly debatable especially in regard to terrorists. It may seem inappropriate to regard 
subversive Islamic extremism as rational, because of the extremely subversive and irrational 
ideologies that drive them. However, what passes for irrational behaviour by most of society 
(a build-up of nuclear weapon for instance) may be considered to be rational by game theory 
standards.
 670
  When making a game theory analysis, even seemingly irrational actions are 
rational in some way.
 671
   
 
Aumann, a notable game theory analyst, warns that it is wrong to dismiss all the evils of the 
world as irrational. He claims for instance, that suicide bombers are very rational. They are 
not rational because of their decision to kill and injure others.  Contrarily, their decision to 
commit acts of terror is generally abhorred by all, except those in support of terrorism.  
However, in game theory, every player is motivated by maximizing his own payoff 
(outcome). Rationality in a stricter sense implies that every player (party) always maximizes 
his utility, thus being able to accurately calculate the probabilistic result of every action.
672
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For example, when terrorists plot attacks, their goal is to maximise the number of their 
victims.  Thus, they favour spontaneous strategies such as suicide bombings, air-craft 
hijackings, and random decapitations, using vehicles to run down pedestrians and knifing 
unsuspecting civilians from the rear; making it easier to achieve their goal.
 673
 Like the US 
and Israel, terrorists strategically make decisions on how to achieve the goals they set for 
themselves. This makes terrorists rational to game theorists, but only on the basis that they 
have committed themselves to a cause and have devised a strategy for achieving their goals. 
This is the measuring standard for rationality under game theory; which is why Aumman 
stresses that only by facing up to such realistic rationales for assessing wars and other forms 
of violence can the right strategies for dealing with them be developed.
674
 Given, that the acts 
of terror are to the radical Muslims, rational expressions of Islamic religious obligations, the 
game theory approach is an impartial method for critically assessing terrorists’ strategies, as 
well as targeted killing strategy used by the US and Israel. Detailed insights into what both 
parties are strategically inclined to commit to will help determine factors that may persuade 
them to co-operate with one another in order to resolve the conflict.
 
 
Players in the game are aware of the game rules as well as outcomes of other players. Players 
in a game know every possible action that the other players can make. They also know all 
possible outcomes. All players have preferences regarding these possible outcomes, and as 
players, they know not only their own preferences but also those of the other players.
675
 This 
offers parties the opportunities to anticipate and mount favourable defences, or competent 
competition against their opponents. For instance, both parties in the ‘war against terror’ are 
aware of each other’s favoured strategies and preferred scene of attacks, albeit imprecisely. It 
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is common knowledge that whilst states using targeted killing are prompted by a 
premeditated list to go after terrorists in their home land, terrorists on the other hand are 
known to spontaneously execute attacks in public places.  
A game is any scenario in which the number of players or competitors is finite. Usually, two 
players strategically conflict with or compete against one another, and the strategy chosen by 
one player will affect the actions of the other player. One-player games, such as solitaire are 
not considered by game theorists to be games, because they do not require strategic 
interaction between two players.
676
 Outcomes can be measured (by the person assessing), by 
the amount of utility, or value, a player derives. If a player prefers to reach point A in order to 
reach point B, then point A has higher utility. Knowing that a player values A over B, and B 
over C means that a player can anticipate the other players’ actions and plan strategies that 
account for such actions.
677
 
If no player can reach a better outcome by switching strategies, the game reaches an impasse 
called the ‘Nash Equilibrium.’ Essentially, this boils down to players keeping their current 
strategies (even if they do not have the highest preference) because switching would not 
accomplish anything.
 678
 For instance, targeted killing is Nash Equilibrium if, regardless of 
whether terrorists change their strategy, an alternative strategy does not facilitate an end to 
terrorism.
 679
 Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would 
lead that player to earn less than if it remained with its current strategy. So ‘Nash 
equilibrium’, named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no 
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player has an incentive to change its action.
680
 For games in which players randomize (mixed 
strategies) the expected or average payoff must be at least as large as that obtainable by any 
other strategy. This equilibrium is sufficiently general to allow for the analysis of non-
cooperative games in addition to cooperative ones.
681
 A decision giving a good outcome for 
one, whatever the enemy decides, is called a ‘dominant’ decision. Strategic decisions that 
yield in Nash Equilibrium are known as the ‘dominant’ decisions. 682 A player can also adopt 
multiple strategies for solving a problem.
683
 
With game theory, the measure for determining the best outcome of a player is not to 
compare both players’ outcomes. In other words, a party does not evaluate its result against 
that of its opponent. Instead, a player evaluates the results gained from its use of several 
strategies. The player retrospectively makes a personal assessment to determine which, of all 
strategies he has used, has yielded the best outcome.
684
  This is done by comparing the 
outcome gained from using one strategy with the outcome achieved from using other 
strategies during the same conflict. This game theory’s design is so that a player (party) can 
choose strategies that optimise its outcomes during conflicts or competitions.
685
  It is a stable 
outcome where both sides are pleased with the outcome.
686
  
If opponents could communicate with one another, they could agree the best outcome for 
both parties.
687
 In some game types (conflict situations) however, no form of communication 
of intended strategies exists between parties. In game theory, this is referred to as a game of 
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‘incomplete information.’688 A typical example is an auction, in which each player knows its 
own valuation of an item, but does not know how other players have valued the item. 
Similarly, in games such as Prisoners’ Dilemma, peace war and even terroristic conflicts, 
players (parties) do not possess full information about their opponents.  
 
The attack vs. counter attack interaction between terrorists and states using targeted killing 
has some features of a game of incomplete information, where opponents can make decisions 
on strategy based on actions of opponents. These interactions may not follow a predefined 
order. In this situation it becomes a game of incomplete information because on these 
occasions, neither party can see or anticipate the opponents attack in order to modify theirs.
689
 
This is partly because some attacks occur instantaneously. In essence, each player has to 
consider what response choice will lead to the best outcome for themselves, bearing in mind 
the other parties likely choices. One player’s action can therefore influence the other’s choice 
of response.
690
 In such cases, a player does whatever will result in its largest payoff. For 
example, in terroristic conflicts, the spontaneous/surprise attack’ strategy offers terrorists 
larger payoffs than attacks which can be anticipated and so proportionately defended 
against.
691
 
 
4.3.4.3 The ‘Game’ in Game Theory  
Game theory is the fourth in a sequence of paradigms below, explaining how people attempt 
to achieve goals; these may be referred to as type I, II, III, and IV rationales: in type I 
rationale, the question is whether a goal can be met.  In type II rationale, the decision maker, 
satisfied that the goal can be met, tries to meet this goal in the most effective way, (at 
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minimal cost); alternatively, having decided that the goal cannot be met, the decision maker 
tries to come as close as possible to meeting the goal by choosing the best strategy possible. 
In type III rationale, the decision maker realizes he is faced not by nature, but by other 
decision makers he can influence.
692
 He therefore tries to influence them so that, (acting 
according to type II rationale) they will carry out actions helpful to him. In type IV rationale, 
the decision maker realizes that he is faced by other individuals whose actions can affect him, 
and who in turn are trying to influence his actions.
693
 Thus, he is generally faced with the 
decisions of either to outsmart the others or to cooperate with some or all of them; ultimately 
seeking and attempting to eradicate the impediments that hinder him from getting what he 
wants. It is this last type which represents game theory.
694
 
Generally, games may be non-cooperative or co-operative. A co-operative game is one in 
which players, through their iterated interaction, are able to make enforceable contracts. 
These are not games in which players actually do cooperate, but as games in which any 
cooperation is enforceable by an outside party (e.g., a judge, police, etc.).
695
 Such 
opportunities for cooperation are usually possible in iterated games (conflict or competitions) 
like in peace war games, where repeated interactions through violence between players can 
eventually lead to co-operation.
696
 In non-cooperative games, an analyst is mainly interested 
in the initial strategies chosen by each player. In the co-operative case, an analyst is interested 
in the process of bargaining and coalition formation. Games may also have complete or 
incomplete information. When information is incomplete, the interest is in the process of 
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learning, as players elicit information during the play of a game.
697
 The co-operative, iterative 
peace war game is relevant to this thesis and will be explained in detail in following sections. 
Essentially however, game theory tries to answer the following questions:
698
 
(a)What strategies should each player use? 
(b)Where there are gains to be made from co-operation, how should the players bargain? 
(c)Where there are many players, what coalitions should form? 
(d)What information can be deduced from the actions of other players? 
 
By applying the same analogy to the ‘game’ regarding ‘terroristic conflict’, game theory 
analysis of the US targeted killing programme, of which other states using targeted killing 
can make reference to, tries to answer the following questions: 
(a) What strategies should be used to tackle terrorism? 
(b) What are the gains to be made from co-operating with the demands from terrorist 
organisations, and how should both parties to the conflict bargain to each achieve what 
they want? Or would ‘targeted killing’ suffice? 
(c) In order for opposing parties to achieve their goals, do the US and Israel need to choose 
the strategy of cooperation with terrorists, (i.e. ‘peace’ through negotiated settlement), 
rather than the defect strategy (war)? Is this achievable? If so, then, to what extent?  
(d) Are terrorists acting in a way that suggests that they are ready to co-operate? Are they 
currently determined to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict that sees an end to 
terrorism? If yes, then targeted killing may have been a strong lever in this. It would then 
be a good time for the US and Israel to stop targeted killing to encourage dialogue. If there 
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is no sign of terrorist capitulation, targeted killing may not be capable of achieving its 
main goal. In that case, what is the best strategy that can achieve the cessation of 
terrorism? 
 
Game theory analysis made on behalf of terrorist organisations will, in the same vein, 
consider answering the following questions: 
(a) What strategy is best for introducing an Islamic style state to the western world? 
(b) Where there are gains to be made from ‘co-operation,’ how should terrorists bargain in 
such a way that they get what they want while also giving western states what they want? 
(c) To what extent should both parties negotiate a middle ground? 
(d) Are the states acting as if they want to co-operate by meeting the demands for an Islamic 
style state? If not what is the next best strategy if terrorism is not achieving this goal. 
Proponents have shown how based on the above underlining principles, game theory can be 
used to analyse activities such as legal and political strategies and economic behaviour. 
Proponents of game theory including Newmann, Mogerstern, Aumann, Schelling, Neymann, 
De-Mesquita, Scheve, Osborne and Ullmann-Margalit, have espoused how ‘it can help us 
understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact. They have also 
shown how long-term interactions in violence induce conflicts, such as terroristic conflicts, 
can lead to co-operation and negotiations between parties. The authors have also shown how 
to make analysis using game theory.
699
 They all have, in one way or the other, suggested that 
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one of the best ways to understand basic game theory principles is to look at a classic game 
theory example: the prisoner’s dilemma.  
The discipline of game theory describes how iterated (repeated) games model long-term 
interaction.
700
 A single stage game, one-shot games or single shot game are names for non-
repeated games.
701
 These are games played once; the pay-offs (outcomes)  may be such that a 
game might be impossible to play twice;
702
 E.g. mutually assured nuclear destruction or the 
dueling conflicts which were medieval methods for settling trade or conjugal disputes.
703
 It is 
important to clarify and distinguish ‘iterated games’ (repeated games) from ‘non-iterated 
games (non repeated or one shot games), and to justify its selection in this thesis. The one-
shot game of ‘Chicken’, which was used to issue a caveat to the US and its allies about the 
disaster and counter-productivity of nuclear warfare will serve as an illustration.  
At the start of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration considered the use of nuclear 
weapons, alongside other weapons of war that the US had at its disposal.
704
 Henry Kissinger, 
the secretary of state at the time, who had an experience in game theory analysis proposed 
that the game theory analogy be used to predetermine the possible outcome of actually 
launching nuclear attacks.
705
 He employed the analytical skill of another game theory 
specialist, Thomas Schelling. Together they assessed each country’s potential to use nuclear 
weapons as a strategy for winning the war.  A forecast of the likely consequences (payoffs) 
that would arise from the exchange of nuclear attacks and exploring different dominant 
strategies was based on the following considerations:    
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-Nuclear weapons are no larger than traditional bombs, but a single blast can devastate an 
entire city, emitting fire and radiation. Nuclear weapons are in fact weapons of mass 
destructions, and therefore, a major form of deliberation and consideration is required before 
they can be used.  The grievous impact of nuclear weapons cannot easily be undone.
706
  
-Neither state could gain advantage through a nuclear attack -- the reprisals would be too 
devastating. This was known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). So a balance was 
struck, requiring open acknowledgment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of each state. As 
Aumann put it, “Nations must learn war in order not to fight,” …You can have peace, but the 
swords must continue to be there.”707 However, as prisoner's dilemma exemplifies, both 
players must assume the other is only concerned with self-interest; therefore, each must limit 
risk by adopting a dominant strategy.
708
 
-If one country changes the balance of power and adopts a dominant strategy (by building a 
missile-defence shield for instance), would it still lead to a strategic blunder that resulted in 
nuclear war? (In fact, one country built missile silos, the other targeted them.
709
 The Soviet 
Union and the US then spread out and hid their launch sites around the globe, which required 
each to commit more missiles to a potential first strike in order to diminish the retaliatory 
abilities of the other.
710
 Each also kept nuclear-armed aircraft aloft in the skies at all times, to 
provide a deterrent in case the silos were destroyed.
711
 As another deterrent, each superpower 
also established nuclear-armed submarines, thus, ground, air and sea. The atmosphere was so 
tense that was a constant threat and miscommunication which could have led to disastrous 
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results. In the midst of such massive distrust, even a defensive move like building fallout 
shelters was supposedly provocative). 
712
 
-However, by no rational or logical measure would it make sense for one country to launch 
nuclear weapons after it had already taken a significant hit. It achieves nothing apart from 
world destruction for the sake of revenge. The question is, if revenge is not even a deterrent, 
what can prevent either country from launching a first strike? The best strategy to counteract 
the threat of a ‘first strike’ was for American and Soviet leaders to sometimes use a ‘madman 
strategy’ or issue propaganda that they were mentally unstable or blind with rage to keep the 
other off guard. 
713
 
Eventually, weapons control and disarmament negotiations began and the conflict moved 
from a one-shot into a Peace War iterated game scenario. This allowed both parties to reward 
cooperation and punish defection. Through repeated meetings and increased communication, 
trust and co-operation led to (some) disarmament and less strategic posturing. This was 
largely due to the expense of maintaining an ever-growing nuclear capability. Neither country 
was willing to play the final stage of a game in which the best possible outcome involved a 
victory that could only be celebrated by a handful of survivors underground.
 714
 
The point is that in a non iterative (one-shot) game like Chicken, in which players have 
mutually assured destructive weapons as their dominant strategies, players only need apply 
the strategy once to generate the ultimate and many times detrimental consequences in pay-
offs.
715
 This is why serious caution is to be taken before making decisions and acting on 
them.  Unlike non-cooperative one shot games where there is no possibility of alliances, 
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cooperative games can result in parties expressing interest in cooperating to form coalitions 
for the purpose of entering into an agreement.
716
  
In contrast, one shot games feature players in pursuit of individual interests, such that, one 
person’s gain always is another’s loss.717 One-shot games are games that are played only 
once and thus deemed as non-cooperative.  This is due to the absence of external means to 
enforce cooperative behaviour (e.g. contract law) as opposed to co-operative games.
718
  
Iterated (repeated) games like the Peace War and Prisoner’s Dilemma trigger strategies in 
small doses such as tit for tat can therefore encourage cooperation. On the other hand, in 
iterated games, a strategy may be contingent on past moves, thus allowing for reputation 
effects and retribution.  
In game theory, an iterated game is an extensive form of game that consists of a number of 
repetitions of some base game (called a stage game).
719
 The stage game is usually one of the 
well-studied two-party games. Iterated games capture the idea that a player will have to take 
into account the impact of his or her current action on the future. So, game theorists have 
found the pay-offs of a game of cooperation to be more beneficial to both players.
720
 With 
iterated games, there is more scope for co-operative strategies to emerge.
 721
 
Some proponents of game theory have observed the benefits of co-operation by parties, and 
how iterated interaction can yield in co-operation. Neyman, Aumann, Schelling, de Mesquita, 
Kandori and a host of other scholars have shown how this is possible.  Neyman has shown 
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that cooperation can result from a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.722 Aumann, Schelling 
and Kandori have also demonstrated how players benefit most by co-operating with each 
other.  
 
4.3.4.4 Conflict Enhancing Co-operation 
These authors show how even self-interested parties are sometimes able, or forced from lack 
of better alternatives, to co-operate in a long-term relationship.  When parties first interact or 
interact only once, as is the nature of non-iterated games they often have a natural incentive 
to ‘not co-operate’ with one another. Instead, they selfishly defend their individual interests 
using strategies they deem fit.  One such example is US president George W. Bush’s 
aggravated declaration of war, following the 9/11 al-Qaeda attack. Such response is only an 
expected initial reaction and rational to game theorists. As Aumann puts it:  
‘… can war be rational? Unfortunately, the answer is yes; it can be. In one of the 
greatest speeches of all time – his second inaugural – Abraham Lincoln said: 
“Both parties deprecated war; but one would make war rather than let the nation 
survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish. And the war 
came.”723 
In iterated games (pro-longed conflict) it is not uncommon for violence to initially be the 
dominant strategy. It is only after a conflict is prolonged that parties may begin to consider 
the benefits of co-operating to achieve better outcomes individually and collectively.
724
  
 
The theory of iterated interaction proposes that any mutually beneficial outcome can be 
sustained in ‘equilibrium.’ Such outcomes are able to account for phenomena such as 
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altruism, cooperation, trust, loyalty, revenge, threats (self-destructive or otherwise) – 
phenomena that may at first seem irrational – in terms of the “selfish” utility-maximizing 
paradigm of game theory.
725
 That it accounts for such phenomena does not mean that people 
deliberately decide to take revenge or to be purposefully generous and self-serving; having 
rational motives. Rather, over the millennia, people have evolved norms of behaviour that are 
by and large successful and indeed optimal.
726
 
 
Aumann, whose fundamental works have both clarified the internal logic of game-theoretic 
reasoning and expanded game theory’s domain of applicability, lends insight into the impact 
of long-term interaction (Iterated games) and compares this with short-term interaction (non-
iterated or one-shot games) in conflict.
727
 Amongst Aumann’s many contributions to the 
study of factors that facilitate co-operation includes an illustration using a prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario.
 728
  He points out that the difference between short-term and long-term interaction is 
perhaps most easily illustrated by the well-known prisoners’ dilemma game. His precise and 
general statement offers proof that laid the foundation for subsequent analyses of repeated 
interactions.
729
  
In his work with Schelling, Aumann concludes that the ‘equilibrium’ outcome is worse for 
both players than the strategy pair where both “cooperate.”730 In other words, parties derive 
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larger pay-offs (better outcomes) when they cooperate with each other.
731
 They concluded 
that sometimes conflicts of interest may appear very strong as to be insoluble. However, the 
best strategy for an individual may result in the worst outcome for a group. Schelling noted 
that many agreements are made enforceable only upon recognition of future opportunities for 
agreement,
732
 which will be eliminated if mutual trust is not created and maintained. Thus, if 
the parties take a long perspective and do in fact interact repeatedly; their common interests 
may be sufficiently strong to sustain co-operation.
733
  
Using the first Prisoners Dilemma scenario (and game matrix) given below, the game can be 
played iteratively for a number of rounds until the interrogation ends (as if the players are 
repeatedly interrogated).
734
 Each player may decide to answer the same questions, differently, 
which will lead to different payoffs. In many cases, a series of interrogations can lead to 
bargaining, for instance, the promise of a lesser sentence if they decide to confess. It should 
be noted here that this thesis makes use of the Peace War game theory that is modelled after 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Peace War game theory is also a two person game, but the two main 
strategic options of ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ in the prisoners dilemma is replaced with the 
options of either to perpetrate ‘peace’ or go into ‘war’ in the Peace, War game. 
4.3.4.5. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
The prisoner’s dilemma provides a means of investigating the fitness consequences of 
cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The prisoner’s dilemma is a symmetric, two-player 
game with two alternate strategies, ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect.’735 This game of strategic 
interaction seems to be a common introductory example in many game theory textbooks. It is 
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a standard example of a game that shows why two completely “rational” individuals might 
not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.
736
  This is a two-
person game, where each player decides on either of two options: to “cooperate” (C) or 
“defect” (D). The players choose their options simultaneously.737 Each player’s dominant 
choice is D–that is, D is an optimal choice irrespective of the other’s choice–but both players 
gain if they both play C. When played once, the game thus admits only one Nash equilibrium: 
that both players “defect.”738 For clarity, hypothetical examples of typical prisoner’s dilemma 
game are represented below: 
Tom and Harry have been arrested for robbing the Savannah Savings Bank and placed in 
separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their personal freedom than about the 
freedom or welfare of their accomplice. An intelligent interrogator makes the following offer 
to each. “You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice 
remains silent we shall drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that 
your accomplice does serious time. Similarly, if your accomplice confesses while you remain 
silent, he will be set free whilst you do the jail time. If you both confess I will get two 
convictions, but I will also ensure that you both get lesser sentences with high chances of 
parole. If you both remain silent, I will have to settle for small sentences on firearms 
possession charges.  You have twenty four hours to decide.” 
The “dilemma” faced by the prisoners here is that whatever the other does, each is better off 
confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome derived when both confess is worse for 
each than the outcome they would have derived had both remained silent. A closely related 
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view is that the prisoner’s dilemma games model familiar situations in which it is difficult to 
get rational, selfish agents to cooperate for their common good. Much of the contemporary 
literature has focused on identifying conditions under which players would or should make 
the “cooperative” move corresponding to remaining silent.  
The logic behind the Prisoners Dilemma game is diagrammatically represented in the game 
theory matrix as follows: 
 
(i) The two players in the above matrix have been accused of a crime and have been 
placed in separate rooms for interrogation so that they cannot communicate with each 
other.
739
 
(ii) Each player is asked independently whether he is going to confess to the crime or 
remain silent.
740
 
(iii) Because each of the two players has two possible options (strategies), there are four 
possible outcomes to the game.
741
 
(iv) If both players confess, they each get sent to jail, but for fewer years than if one of the 
players got ratted out by the other.
742
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(v) If one player confesses and the other remains silent, the silent player gets punished 
severely while the player who confessed gets to go free.
743
 
(vi) If both players remain silent, they each get a punishment that is less severe than if 
they both confess.
744
 
In the game, punishments (and rewards, where relevant) are represented by utility numbers. 
Positive numbers represent good outcomes, negative numbers represent bad outcomes, and 
one outcome is better than another if the number associated with it is greater. One must be 
careful however, of how this works for negative numbers, since -5, for example, is greater 
than -20.
745
 
Once a game is defined on a ‘matrix’, the next step in analyzing the game is to assess the 
players’ strategies and try to understand how the players are likely to behave. One easy initial 
approach is to look for what are called dominant strategies- strategies that are best regardless 
of what the other player chooses. In the example above, choosing to confess is a dominant 
strategy for both players:
746
 
(i) Confess is better for player 1 if player 2 chooses to confess, since -6 is better than -10. 
(ii) Confess is better for player 1 if player 2 chooses to remain silent, since 0 is better than 
-1. 
(iii) Confess is better for player 2 if player 1 chooses to confess, since -6 is better than -10. 
(iv) Confess is better for player 2 if player 1 chooses to remain silent, since 0 is better than 
-1. 
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Given that confessing is best for both players, it is not surprising that the outcome where both 
players confess is an equilibrium outcome of the game.  
The Nash equilibrium matrix represented below shows the outcome where player 2’s strategy 
is the best response to player 1’s strategy and player 1’s strategy is the best response to player 
2's strategy: 
 Confess Don’t confess 
confess (-6, -6) (0, -10) 
don’t 
confess 
 (-10, 0) (-1, -1) 
 
Finding the Nash equilibrium through this principle can be illustrated in the table of 
outcomes. In this example, player 2's best responses to player one are circled in green. If 
player 1 confesses, player 2's best response is to confess, since -6 is better than -10. If player 
1 does not confess, player 2's best response is to confess, since 0 is better than -1. (Note that 
this reasoning is very similar to the reasoning used to identify dominant strategies.)
747
 Player 
1’s best responses are circled in blue. If player 2 confesses, player 1's best response is to 
confess, since -6 is better than -10. If player 2 does not confess, player 1's best response is to 
confess, since 0 is better than -1. In many games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, game theory 
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predicts suboptimal outcomes, since each agent acts in their self-interest, which may not be 
the common interest. 
748
  
Another example of a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma is the one explained by Osborne. This 
dilemma is about how two players interact based on an understanding of motives and 
strategies (see Appendix 2; a pictorial representation of prisoner’s dilemma game theory 
matrix with affixed numeric values of payoffs).
 749
 They are both arrested and brought into a 
police station. If both suspects protect each other by staying quiet (called cooperation in game 
theory terms), the police have only enough evidence to put each in jail for five years. 
However, each suspect is offered a deal. If either one confesses (defection from a cooperative 
relationship), and the other suspect does not, the defector will be rewarded with freedom, 
while the tight-lipped suspect will get 20 years in jail. If both confess, both get 10 years in 
jail.
750
 
Receiving a 20-year jail term is an unacceptable outcome. Since there is an opportunity for 
one of them to go scot-free by defecting, both players know the other is thinking along these 
same lines, both must defect out of self-interest.
 751
  In doing so, the suspects receive 10 year 
sentences. This is certainly not the best outcome (Nash-Equilibrium), but it is the best 
strategy for the situation the players find themselves in. Any agreement or heartfelt promise 
between the two players to cooperate only guarantees that both will, in fact, secretly defect. A 
mutual promise not to confess actually encourages confession, which leads to freedom (the 
optimal individual outcome) for the self-interested. This is the prisoner's dilemma. Game 
theorists have determined that confessing is always the answer (optimal strategy) for both 
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parties in this case.
752
 The reason for this is that, in the event that neither communicates 
intended moves (strategies) to each other, each party must assume that the other will act with 
only self-interest in mind.  
This situation is better understood with the examples of game theory matrices charted below. 
The matrices allow the researcher to anticipate and explore all possible strategic approaches 
for dealing with a conflict, as well as the responses to the approaches in order to determine 
the best strategy that produces the most desirable outcomes.
 753
 It is for this reason that the 
game theory is introduced in this thesis. The game theory technique allows the researcher to 
test the potential that targeted killing strategy has in achieving its goals. 
Using the example stated above, a range of preferences are assigned to the different outcomes 
below to determine motives, with 1 representing the worst outcome (20 years’ imprisonment) 
and for the best (going free): 
(i) 20 years: 1 
(ii) 10 years: 2 
(iii) 5 years: 3 
(iv) Go free: 4 
Now the outcomes and preferences are known, as well as the available strategies: do not 
confess (cooperation between players) or confess (defection). It is possible to see how 
different combinations of strategies will create different results. The outcomes are 
represented by number-pairs, with the first number representing Player 1, and the second 
number representing the outcome of Player 2. (see the matrix in Appendix 2). Now, the 
options are evaluated by examining the outcomes represented in each column. The first 
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column shows that 2 is greater than 1, and in the second column, 4 is greater than 3. So, each 
players best strategy, no matter what the other person does, is to defect (confess). Since the 
outcomes of one’s co-operation (confession) are better than the outcomes of defecting (not 
confessing), this is called a strictly dominant action or dominant strategy.  
Scheve’s however cautions, giving examples of how a player’s decision to co-operate can pan 
out differently and may not always be the best outcome.
754
 It explains that a reader could 
imagine himself or herself to be a soldier posted on a defensive line. The next day, there will 
be a great battle. There are two possible outcomes of the battle (victory or defeat), and two 
possible outcomes for the soldier (surviving or dying).
755
 The norm is to assume everyone’s 
preference is to survive. If the soldier’s line is breached, he or she will die. However, even if 
the defensive line holds, the soldier may die in battle. It seems that the soldier’s best option is 
to run away. But if the soldier does run, the ones who stay behind and fight may die. Every 
other person on the defensive line is thinking this very same thing. So if the soldier decides to 
stay and cooperate but everyone else flees, he or she will certainly die.
756
  
This problem has plagued military strategists since the beginning of warfare.
757
 That is why 
in some jurisdictions, a new condition entered into the equation: if you flee or defect, you will 
be shot as a traitor.
758
 Therefore, the best chance you have of surviving is to keep your 
position on the line and fight for victory. However, if the soldier knows that he will be shot as 
a traitor on a later date, he still may decide that fleeing is a better, immediate, decision to 
make. This is simply because he may later end up with a lesser sentence once he is able to 
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negotiate the case in his favour. So, if he is interested in making a decision out of self-
interest, fleeing will offer a better outcome. However, co-operating would be the best strategy 
to choose if the soldier decides to do what is morally justifiable.
759
  
This exemplifies how the decision to co-operate may not always be in the best self-interest of 
a party. At any rate these examples highlight how parties in conflict struggle to make 
decisions that are beneficial in bringing out the best outcomes in their favour. It also 
highlights why game theorists make this type of analysis; it is not easy to determine what 
strategy will achieve the best outcome without first making a contextual analysis of the issue 
at hand.  Having explored the prisoner’s dilemma game, it is time to show how it relates to 
the peace war game and how the latter is applicable to this thesis. Similarly, the following 
peace war matrix exemplifies how co-operation can be anticipated following iterative 
interaction through violence related conflicts. 
4.3.4.6. The Peace War Game Theory Approach 
The Peace War Game is a game theory approach to peace and conflict studies.
760
 The game 
was played for decades in academic groups and by computer simulations, to study possible 
strategies of cooperation and aggression.
761
 In this thesis, the peace war game theory method 
allows for a systematic review of US and Israel’s targeted killing dominant strategy, which is 
‘to kill’, in the ‘war against terror.’ 762 The iterated approach using the Peace War game 
underscores the long term interaction between the parties engaged in the war against terror, in 
which both players (parties) repeatedly use the same ‘kill’ strategy. The peace war game 
theory approach is relevant to the study of terrorism and targeted killing conflict because it 
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helps to answer the question: how does one determine the best strategies for dealing with 
such violence related conflicts.
763
  
 
The Peace War game is a variation of an iterated (repetitive), prisoner’s dilemma in which the 
decisions available to each opponent,  essentially limited to two strategies,(confess, defect) is 
replaced by (Peace, War). Further, like the prisoner’s dilemma which is modelled after the 
interaction carried out during an interrogation process between law enforcers and suspected 
culprits; the Peace, war game is basically modelled after the recurrent (iterated) interaction 
between states during armed conflict. A major reliance on iterated games, such as peace war 
is in the high possibility for trigger strategies such as ‘tit-for-tat’ to eventually encourage co-
operation; which is typically the ultimate goal game theorists anticipate in conflict situations. 
In game theory, tit-for- tat is a type of trigger strategy usually applied to the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma and peace war, in which a player (party) responds in one period with the 
same action her opponent used in the last period. 
764
 However, strategies remain the same 
with reciprocal altruism ‘tit-for-tat’ (make war if an opponent does) or ‘make peace while 
posturing in preparedness for war’ as the best deterministic strategies.765 The latter strategy is 
simply to make peace on the first iteration of the game; after that, as expected, the player 
does what his opponent did on the previous move.
766
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Another strategy is the ‘tit-for-tat with forgiveness.’ When the opponent makes war, on the 
next move, the player sometimes makes peace anyway, with a small probability. This 
prevents the sometimes counter-productive cycles of retribution. ‘tit-for-tat with forgiveness’ 
is the best strategy to be adopted when miscommunication is introduced, i.e., when one 
party’s move is incorrectly reported to the other party.767 Otherwise, the general essence of all 
games is the interdependence of player strategies, of which there are two distinct types of 
strategic interdependence: sequential and simultaneous.
768
 In the former, the players move in 
sequence, each aware of the others’ previous actions. In the latter, the players act at the same 
time, each ignorant of the others’ actions.769 These are the applicable strategies under a peace 
war evaluation. 
 
Instead of prisoners, the parties are neighbouring countries; and instead of either staying 
silent or ratting, each year the countries declare peace or war against the opposing country, 
scoring a number of points based on who declares peace or war. The game continues for a 
number of years and the winner is the country with the most points.
770
  As noted above, in 
game theory, a game is ‘iterated’ (repetitive) when players interact by playing a similar stage 
game (such as the prisoners dilemma numerous times. This means a strategy can be 
contingent on past moves, thus allowing for reputation effects, retribution and then possibly 
eventual co-operation involving bargaining and negotiations.
771
 The typical Peace War matrix 
below exemplifies this:  
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  A declares peace A declares war 
B declares peace A and B get 3 points A gets 5 points; B gets no points 
B declares war A gets no points; B gets 5 points A and B get 1 point 
 
If country A declares peace, country B's best response is to declare peace, practically, both 
neither lose nor gain from the interaction and so it is scored at an average mark of 3. 
However this gives both parties a good optimum outcome rather than when one declares war 
and the other declares peace.  
If country A declares war, country B’s best strategic response is to declare war as well (tit for 
tat), since the outcome of 1 point is better than no point at all i.e country B will lose if A 
declares war and B declares peace. So, each declaring war will be the dominant strategy and 
the best strategies for both parties should one party persist in declaring war. 
It must be noted by both parties that based on the inflictions and cost of engaging in warfare; 
the point scored for both going to war is 1 which is a lot less than if both decide to choose 
peace which is scored at 3 points. This argument is most realisable after an iterated 
interaction by both countries, where each chooses to go to war.  However, it is upon the 
recognition that the decision to go to war yields a much lower outcome than peace, that 
parties begin to realise the benefits of co-operating by negotiating and bargaining. 
Understandably however, parties do not wish to portray weakness to their opponents at the 
initial stage of a conflict. They tend instead towards retributive violence as a form of protest, 
before deciding to renegotiate the conflict. 
It can be deduced from the matrix above that it is important for both parties to realise the 
relevance of the peace strategy at the same time, because the scores above show how the 
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party that chooses peace loses by having the lowest score of 0, while the party that, 
regardless, chooses to go to war, scores 5. 
Although modelled after the peace war game, the decision making in this thesis is reduced to 
‘Kill’, ‘no Kill’, where ‘kill’ replaces ‘war’ and ‘no kill’ replaces ‘peace’. This is because of 
the inconclusive legal description of terrorist status and terroristic conflicts under 
international law. At any rate, the kill, no kill specification can more appropriately be applied 
to the conflict between the US and Israel vs. terrorists. As each side has the incentive (choice) 
to either ‘kill’ or ‘not to kill’. The US chooses to use targeted killing or not to target and kill 
(one alternative is arrest); terrorists choose a fatal terroristic act or not (one alternative is 
capture and keep hostage). This too is a repetitive choice, (iterative). This type of game offers 
each side the opportunity to change strategy in order to achieve a better outcome, each time 
the game is played. There is also an opportunity to learn from previous games (conflict 
scenarios), react or retaliate. Each can also try to modify an opponents’ behaviour by 
signalling a desire for peace, playing ‘no kill’ even if preceded by a ‘kill’ by the opponent, or 
choosing an entirely different strategy. Ultimately, the thesis discovers the extent to which 
targeted killing strategy is optimal in deriving the anti-terror goals of the US and Israel. 
 
4.3.4.7 Evaluating Targeted killing using the Peace War Game  
The first step of the game theory application under the socio-legal inquiry of this thesis 
begins with reflectively identifying and outlining some recent targeted killing scenarios and 
quantifying their outcomes. Different scenarios will be reduced to a picture game plan (the 
game theory matrix), as shown in the examples above. In the game theory application, the 
outcomes derived are numeric values the researcher realistically awards against each party’s 
 207 
 
strategic choice, including targeted killing.  Game theory is applied to this thesis to derive the 
following advantages: 
Advantages of the Peace war game theory approach 
1. Game theory is helpful in mapping assumptions into logically valid conclusions.772 
This comes with the understanding of how parties in conflict interact. Parties interact 
strategically; what one does affects the other. Game theory is a decision-making tool 
that analyzes the players, strategies and payoffs of situations, which can be 
represented in payoff matrices.
773
 Such investigations can guide the behaviour of 
individuals or entities, including parties to terroristic conflict, who seek the outcome 
that best satisfies their goals. This concept is quite relevant to law, specifically in 
regards to negotiations which are expected to lead to the formulation of policies.  It 
should be noted that negotiations and other forms of agreements are attempts to 
resolve conflicts between parties through compromise.  
 
Resolutions can be drafted by using the reasoning of game theory.  In order to achieve 
this, one must realize that game theory calls for each player to take into consideration 
the other players’ strategies and desired outcomes, not just his own. In doing so, the 
players act in ways that maximize their payoffs. Game theory analysis derives the 
payoff matrix for the specific case, interprets it, and uses the analysis to lead the parties 
to the most beneficial settlement.
774
  How does it do this? If for instance, as shown in 
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the matrix below, each opponent has the choice of two strategic options: to kill or not 
kill. Then each option of the first player could be combined with either option of the 
opponent resulting in four different combinations of conflict. This is drawn in the 
matrix below: 
 
               Kill      Not Kill 
Kill        Kill, kill      Kill,  Not kill 
 Not Kill Not Kill, Kill Not kill, Not kill 
Knowing what each opponent values, one can suggest a value outcome for each 
‘player strategy’ in each cell. For instance, the fact that some terrorists favour the 
strategy of suicide bombing but The US is alien to the idea only suggests how 
ineffective the threat of death to such terrorists will be compared to the impact of the 
death of US citizens on the US generally.    
Bearing in mind that the optimum outcome sought from targeted killing strategy is to 
eliminate terrorism; one can begin to presume how unlikely it is for the much lauded 
targeted killing strategy to yield the much needed effect. In a game theory matrix, the 
general numeric value in outcome of targeted killing response to terrorism will be 
scored lower than the lethal consequences of terrorism, even though, as a matter of 
fact, both parties apply strategies that result in similar consequences. The reason is 
that the outcomes that determine the effectiveness of a strategy are measured in 
consideration of how much a party is impacted by an opponent’s strategy. This must 
not be confused with a party deciding which of several strategies at its disposal works 
Player 1 
Player 2 
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best in achieving set goals. In this case the party compares what it has achieved from 
using one strategy with what it achieved from using another.  
 
The measurement of outcomes is what awards game theory a predictive character. 
From narrowly assessing past and present consequences of using a strategy, it 
becomes easier to deduce its future implications. It is not that other methods are 
incapable of offering similar conclusions, but game theory simplifies the complex 
nature of terroristic conflict by illuminating the main forces that are at work but not 
plainly visible when explored in all its detail.
 775
  Like other economic methodologies, 
Game theory is designed to simplify an analysis so as to be able to focus on what is 
important about the issue at hand.
776
 In this thesis, it brings into sharper focus the 
implications of strategic options facing the parties to terroristic conflict. Game theory 
facilitates the determination of the viability of targeted killing, in relation to its goal.   
 
There is often a combination of strategies’ that gives the best payoff for both sides in a 
conflict.  Neither side would wish to change their strategy (i.e. the Nash equilibrium).  
This is the solution to aim for, with education, diplomacy, negotiation, legislation and 
sanctions, to bring understanding, trust, agreement, confidence and a peaceful 
settlement.  
1. Game theory allows players to understand their opponents better because it enables 
close scrutiny of the opponent’s inclinations and inhibitions.  A general principle 
for a player in a game is to look ahead and reason back. Each player should figure 
out how the other players will respond to his current move, how he will respond in 
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turn, and so on. The player anticipates where his initial decisions will ultimately 
lead and uses this information to calculate his current best choice.
777
 When thinking 
about how others will respond, he must put himself in their shoes and think as they 
would; he should not impose his own reasoning on them.
778
 This offers the player 
an objective viewpoint of the outcome of a conflict, which then guides realistic 
planning of effective strategies for the future.  
2. Armed with an understanding of each party and their aims, a game theory analyst is 
able to determine two important details when making observations.  The first is 
whether the strategies in use by parties have necessitated a change to a different 
strategy (based on the outcome, this is the point where a strategy is not yielding the 
desired outcome, and there is need for a player to explore a different option).  The 
second is ‘when’ it is time to change, possibly to a more diplomatic means of 
settlement of the conflict. (The timing of this is important). For example: targeted 
killing strategy may be impacting in two ways: Firstly, its gruesome impact on 
terrorists and their families is intended to force terrorists to negotiate the conflict 
using diplomatic means.  
Secondly, targeted killing may, in itself, be effective in bringing an end to the 
conflict if every single terrorist on earth has been successfully eliminated.  Whilst 
the latter is unachievable, the former may be possible. This however depends on 
whether the overwhelming impact of targeted killing strategy succeeds in 
compelling terrorists to cooperate. To a game theory analyst, it is very important 
for an opponent to identify, through observing interactions in conflict, ‘when’ such 
a party who is at the receiving end of the conflict has reached the overwhelming 
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stage. This may be followed by the party’s willingness to change its strategy; 
which its opponent takes advantage of by suggesting other strategies that both 
parties may benefit from.  Aumann has cautioned however that this stage does not 
usually occur at the start of a conflict because when conflicts commence, parties 
are by nature inclined to act in self-interest.
779
 They would rather engage in a chain 
of retributive violence until they are weakened by the counter-productivity of such 
approach.  From studying the interactions in ongoing war against terror, the game 
theory analysis is able to interpret the stages of the conflict. This leads to the third 
advantage; 
3. Game theory acts as a prompt, navigation tool and measure, in exploring the above 
mentioned and other strategic options that are available to all the parties to terroristic 
warfare. 
As there are advantages to game theory, there are also limitations that this thesis makes note 
of. However, chapter six will detail the limitations encountered and addressed in the course of 
the research while chapter five uses the game theory method to analyse the strategic options 
facing parties to terroristic conflicts.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to explain and establish the role of the Doctrinal, Hermeneutical and 
Game theory methodologies used in this thesis. It did this by mainly highlighting the 
characteristics uses and advantages of each methodology. The doctrinal evaluation answers 
questions on the legality of targeted killing and its current interpretation under international 
law. The approach shows us the complexity of modern warfare and the difficulties of 
applying ‘lethal force’ regulatory laws to terroristic conflicts. Through the doctrinal 
approach, the researcher is able to identify ambiguous doctrines that do not have provisos that 
explain their application to modern conflicts. Doctrinal investigations based on 
predominantly formal conclusions in the literature of targeted killing have arrived at logical 
conclusions on the general premise that the legality of targeted killing is debatable. It 
considers targeted killing to be illegal under the LOAC because it involves the premeditated 
use of lethal force, against civilians and within civilian territories. This contravenes the 
LOAC precept that prohibits targeting directed against civilians.  
 
Targeted killing process also contravenes human rights laws for failure to fairly determine the 
guilt of suspected terrorists before awarding punishment. However, whilst the doctrinal 
approach addresses numbers one and two of the aims and objectives of this thesis (clarifies 
the current legal interpretation of targeted killings and critically evaluate the relevance of the 
laws of war and conflict in relation to targeted killings) it does not address numbers three and 
four aims and objectives. The doctrinal approach does not determine the impact targeted 
killings and terrorism have on its victims, neither does it clarify  the  contribution  of  targeted  
killings  in  the  pursuance  of  a legitimate counter-terrorism strategy. The hermeneutical 
methodology is employed in this thesis to assess the impact of targeted killing and terrorism 
and the justification for targeted killing counterterrorism strategy.  
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Because of gaps in the doctrines that regulate the use of lethal force, there are diverse 
interpretations in the literature about how the laws should be made applicable to terroristic 
conflicts. The hermeneutic approach is employed in this thesis to explore the diverse 
interpretations. It explores the reasons why targeted killing strategy is used despite criticisms 
of its ‘not so legal’ status. The claim made by those in favour of the controversial strategy of 
targeted killing is that it involves a more practical process of apprehending terrorists who 
hide from detection than the impracticable guidance stipulated under existing laws.  
 
The diverse hermeneutical analysis includes the rationale and ideologies that drive terrorism 
and targeted killing. This novel approach gives multiple view points of the Liberal 
Cosmopolitan, Realist and Pragmatic schools of thought that inform the debates around 
targeted killing. It is appropriate to assess these schools because highlighting their values 
enables the researcher determine the factors that spur the actions of parties involved. This 
lends realistic insights into strategic options to consider when determining factors that may 
quell terroristic conflict. Notwithstanding the insight the hermeneutical approach offers, it 
does not provide a system for guaranteeing the effectiveness of strategic approaches to 
conflicts.  
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the ultimate aim of this thesis is to arrive at 
suggestions in the form of a modus operandi for legally and effectively defending against 
terrorism. This includes suggestions that dismisses or entertain the use of targeted killing; 
depending on the conclusion arrived at from using game theory analysis. Thus, the socio-
legal Peace War game theory method is employed to address the fourth aim of this thesis. It is 
applied to assess, clarify and possibly forecast future implications of strategic decisions made 
in terroristic conflicts. It is narrowed down to clarifying the effectiveness of targeted killing 
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strategy. The game theory method allows the researcher to give a visual picture of how 
terroristic conflict can pan out in different ways, depending on the strategic choices parties 
make. Game theory serves as a precautionary scale for measuring the future implications of 
targeted killing. It clarifies the extent to which targeted killing counterterrorism strategy is 
helpful in winning the war against terror.  In this thesis, the game theory approach draws 
attention to the reality that in addition to the economic cost of using targeted killings as 
verified by a game theory analysis, targeted killing is nowhere close to achieving the goal of 
complete elimination of terrorism. 
A combination of the above methodologies is best suited to achieving a comprehensive study 
on targeted killings. This is opposed to purely opinion based critiques which are often based 
on transcendent standards, for which little basis are provided. Following this description of 
the scope and expectation of game theory, the following chapter will, in applying the game 
theory method, propose and critically evaluate some pragmatic steps aimed at tackling 
terrorism.  
Having explored the application of the game theory method in this chapter, the following 
chapter applies the method to study the effectiveness of targeted killing, using the US 
programme as case study.  
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1:    
Game theory expressions: 
Parties – players 
Table- Matrix  
Game- Competition or Conflict situation  
 
A GAME consists of: 
(i) Players- A collection of decision-makers,;  
(ii)  Perfect or imperfect information-The possible information states of each player at 
each decision time; 
(iii)  moves- The collection of possible moves (decisions, actions, plays,..) that each 
player can choose to make in each of his possible information states; 
(iv) Decision node- A procedure for determining how the move choices of all the 
players collectively determine the possible outcomes of the game. The decision is 
not a part of the game matrices. It is usually added to the game form merely to 
allow us to discuss the player's reasoning in the state of doubt. 
(v) Numeric values -  Preferences of the individual players over these possible 
outcomes, typically measured by a utility or pay-off function.  
(vi) A pure strategy- for a player in a particular game is a complete contingency plan, 
i.e., a plan describing what move that player should take in each of his possible 
information states.  
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(vii) A mixed strategy - - for a player in a particular game is a probability distribution 
defined over the collection A of the player’s possible pure strategy choices.  
(viii)  A one-stage simultaneous-move n-player game -The game is played just once 
among N players. Each of the N players simultaneously chooses a strategy based 
on his current information state, where this information state does not include 
knowledge of the strategy choices of any other player. 
(ix) A pay-off -  (reward, return, utility outcome,...) for each player is then determined 
as a function of the N simultaneously-chosen strategies of the N players. 
 
For iterated games there are multiple decision times. Consequently, a choice of a move based 
on a current information state does not constitute a strategy (complete contingency plan). 
Rather, a strategy is the choice of a move for the current iteration, given the current 
information state, together with a designation of what move to choose in future iteration, 
conditional on every possible future information state .Nash equilibrium for an n-player 
game: (See explanation in text)  
Dominant strategy for an n-player game - A feasible strategy for a player in an N-player 
game is said to be a dominant strategy for this player if it is this player’s best response to any 
feasible choice of strategies for the other players. 
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Appendix 2: (Culled from google images) 
.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
A SEMI-QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED 
KILLING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY USING THE PEACE, WAR GAME 
THEORY METHOD 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
Both terrorist organizations and states choose strategies based on their expected effectiveness. 
This explains why suicide bombings and other types of spontaneous attacks were adopted by 
over thirty different terrorist organizations, with attacks carried out in more than thirty 
countries in four continents.
780
 Based on the same logic of expected effectiveness, targeted 
killing became a prime method applied by Israel and US during the first decade of the 21st 
century, as they sought to prevent future spontaneous terrorist attacks.  The strategies adopted 
clearly shows that death of those attacked is the main outcome sought by parties to terroristic 
conflict.  
Views differ as to the rationalization of targeted killing, yet ultimately, the “effectiveness in 
the short and long term remains the lynchpin of any justification for named target killing.”781 
The alleged effectiveness of targeted killing is the rationale for its use. Both the US white 
paper and the legal document endorsing the Israeli targeted killing programme have given the 
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rationale for the use of targeted killing as a means of pre-emptive self-defence against 
terrorism.
782
 This analysis chapter uses game theory to study the strategic interaction between 
the US and al-Qaeda with the aim of assessing the effectiveness of targeted killing and other 
strategies sampled in the matrices. The effectiveness is measured against the goals the parties, 
particularly the US intend to achieve from their conflict with al-Qaeda.   
 
5.2. The US Counterterrorism Goals: 
The obvious goal sought from using targeted killing is to:  
i. Successfully kill all terrorist threats; leading to a cessation of terrorism and or 
ii. Act as a deterrent, in which the fear of being targeted and killed forces terrorists to 
refrain from engaging in terrorism.
783
 
In light of the fact that terrorism has not abated despite targeted killing being the prime 
measure used by a number of states, it is important that its effectiveness be assessed, in the 
context of its goals. This is the main research problem explored in this chapter. Its importance 
is more strongly recognized today as terrorist attacks against the US, Israel and western states 
persist. In fact, this thesis asserts that due to covert plotting and spontaneous execution of 
attacks from lone terrorists, there is a global increase in terrorism. This challenges the 
assertion made by Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s Minister of Defense that targeted killing disrupts 
the daily routine of terrorists: “The potential target tries to avoid being seen in public, doesn’t 
use means of communication since he understands we’re listening. He is forced to rely on 
                                                          
782
 The US Justice Department White Paper on Targeted Killing; Available at: 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/justice-departments-white-paper-targeted-killing [Accessed on 
13/05/2020]; HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2006] 
(Isr.) [hereinafter the Israeli Targeted Killings case]. 
783
Ibid  
 220 
 
messengers and face to face meetings”.784 In other words, the threat of targeted killing forces 
terrorists to become preoccupied with the need to survive rather than attack. Calculated 
targeting is expected to reduce terrorists’ drive, render their operational capabilities redundant 
and, of course, boost the morale of the attackers. 
 
On the other hand, the threat of targeted killing may force terrorists to be even more discrete, 
making surveillance even more difficult. Even the successful killing of terrorist targets may 
create new “martyrs”, evoking in terrorists the desire to revenge and cause risk to innocent 
civilians. Also the fact that a significant portion of terrorist organisations choose suicide 
bombings as their main strategy suggests that perhaps the threat of death is not enough to 
deter terrorists or eliminate terrorism. In fact the general explanation for suicide terrorism is 
that there are no loses to be counted when death occurs in the name of allah.
785
 These are the 
consequential effects that the states which endorsed targeted killing failed to consider when 
lauding the strategy as the best counter-terrorism solution.  The concern that it may be 
counter-productive stimulates a reassessment of the effectiveness of targeted killing in this 
chapter. The aim is to clarify, with the help of the peace war game theory, the contribution of 
targeted killing to an effective counterterrorism strategy.  
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De Mesquita has defined game theory as logic written down, thereby offering transparency to 
what is being analysed.
786
 Game theory is applicable in this chapter because of its 
mathematical nature. It is structured to provide a succinct yet holistic, reflective, objective 
and futuristic point of view of the effectiveness of targeted killing than any other study. It 
does this by breaking down the question of the effectiveness of targeted killing counter-
terrorism strategy and analysing it from different angles. This has been compared to the need 
to have all the pieces of a tricky jigsaw puzzle in one place before trying to put them all 
together.  Usually, the end result of a game theory analysis is simply to work out how events 
will unfold as people and organisations act in what they perceive to be their best interests. 
Numerical values are placed on the goals, motivations and influence of “players”—
negotiators, business leaders, political parties and organisations of all stripes, and in some 
cases, their officials and supporters. It is a mathematical approach which proposes a more 
substantiated and systematic way of analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing, than  
theoretical underpinnings of opinion based claims and counter-claims.  
 
Game theory approach forces the researcher to analyse the effectiveness of targeted killing in 
relation to the overall goal for which it is used. It asks the questions: What is the outcome 
expected from using targeted killing? Is targeted killing able to achieve the expected outcome 
of coercing terrorists into cooperating, leading to a cessation of terrorism? An answer in the 
affirmative to the latter question would suggest that targeted killing is effective in achieving 
the goal for which it is used. This is as opposed to an arguably flawed conclusion that 
targeted killing is effective simply because of an increase in the rate of successful killing of 
‘listed’ notorious terrorists.  
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The effectiveness of targeted killing is determined by exploring terrorists’ response to 
targeted killing. This regards breaking the varied impact targeted killing has on terrorists into 
pieces. It must however be borne in mind that game theory is all about a party exploring 
different strategies for achieving set goals. The approach will be to weigh the US and Israel’s 
strategy of targeted killing against the value system of terrorists in general and their reaction 
to past cases of targeted killings in particular.  Likewise, spontaneous killing and suicide 
bombings, which are the main strategies used by terrorists, are weighed against the US and 
Israel’s value system and desired outcome from terroristic conflict. This in-depth study better 
articulates the effect of targeted killings of terrorists than an exploration of theoretical 
underpinnings.  
 
Peace war game theory is used as a semi-quantitative tool for exploring the strategy of 
‘killing,’ and the impact of death on both parties in terroristic conflict. The result surprisingly 
yields insights into the counter-productivity of targeted killing strategy. Targeted killing may 
be a practical strategy for dealing with the changed face of modern terroristic conflicts, but 
the strategy is not helpful in putting an end to terrorism. Although each party applies a similar 
strategy of ‘kill’,(the killing of individuals from opposing sides), this does not mean that the 
impact is equally felt by both parties.  
The strategies adopted by each party to the terroristic conflicts suggest that states at the 
receiving end of terrorism are wearier of deaths and harm caused through terrorism than 
terrorists are of targeted killing. It is unusual to find actors on behalf of a state using suicide 
bombing as a strategy for combating terrorism.  Whereas, suicide bombings became the most 
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significant 21
st
 century’s strategy used by some terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda 
and Palestinian terrorists.
787
 For some, loss of terrorist life is counted as gain: of dead 
enemies and gain of ‘heavenly blessing.’ This is exemplified by suicide bombing being one 
of their main strategies. Further, they successfully continue to recruit and train to replace 
losses, despite successful cases of targeted killing and elimination of terrorists through 
suicide bombings. On the other hand, if there were no targeted killings, the US, Israel and 
other western states may very well have faced more terror incidences. At any rate, there is a 
deficit in research that specifically assesses the effectiveness of targeted killing in relation to 
the goal for which it is used.  
 
Economists use game theory to describe, predict and explain behaviour during conflicts as 
well as responses to conflict related policies.
788
 In this chapter, game theory analysis is used 
to: describe the impact of targeted killing policy on terrorists; attempt to decipher the future 
implications of a continued use of targeted killing counter-terrorism strategy and; facilitate 
logical conclusions on whether counterterrorism goals are being achieved. The aim is to 
stimulate new thought and enquiry on alternative strategies to the seemingly unending war 
against terror. Using the most basic of game theory matrices, the mathematical illustrations 
below anticipate a more precise reflection upon the effectiveness of targeted killing strategy. 
Further, the choices a player (party) makes give insights into how it makes strategic 
decisions. While working through the game theory map that outlines conflict scenarios and a 
party’s strategy (for instance, party A) the researcher will also be able to simultaneously 
outline on the game theory map, the opposing party’s strategy (for instance party B) and 
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response to various scenarios within the terrorism vs targeted killing conflict. This is first 
done in hindsight and then in foresight. In other words, the long-term interaction between 
terrorists and states using targeted killing is replicated on a game theory map; this is then 
studied in order to determine a trend in strategies and outcomes. This helps in predicting 
future outcomes from using the same strategies under study, thereby working out the 
effectiveness of such strategies. While setting aside the legal issues around targeted killing 
and focusing on determining its effectiveness, game theory helps to accentuate findings that 
clarify whether the optimal ‘terror elimination’ gain to be achieved from the use of targeted 
killing substantiates its use. 
5.3. Data collection/ procedure 
This chapter generally analyses targeted killing as a response to terrorism, with the strategy 
of killing being the main focus when presuming and quantifying outcomes. The examples 
used are hypothetical; however they take into consideration real life interactions between 
terrorists and the states using targeted killing strategy. In other words, when hypothetically 
making illustrations, the quantification of pay offs is subject to the ideological values the 
parties to the terroristic conflicts hold.
789
   
This analysis is not dependant on statistics. In other words, it is not important to specify the 
number of targeted killing events that have occurred in order to make the analysis using game 
theory. A game theory research may commence when the researcher has up to date 
knowledge about the strategic interaction between parties under study, and is armed with an 
understanding of parties’ ideological values, goals and objectives .790 Thus, the game theory 
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analysis in this chapter is reliant on the hermeneutical analysis carried out in chapter three of 
this thesis. This is because information gained from determining the ideological values of 
parties and commentators to terroristic conflict serves as a standard when determining 
parties’ payoffs under the game theory analysis.  
The information used to carry out this analysis was gathered by reviewing leading media 
sources (by means of organizational websites and other search engines such as Westlaw and 
Google for Scholars), governmental and non-governmental organization sources and data 
attained through personal communication with other top researchers (Antonio Cerella, Peter 
Lee) about their personal interviews with persons directly involved in the ongoing terroristic 
conflict. Information on the US rationale and objective for targeted killing, including detailed 
accounts of al-Qaeda attacks was found mainly in the US white paper, Department of defence 
websites, International Committee of the Red Cross website, news articles and academic 
literature. Information on Israel’s targeted killing regime is limited as most Israeli security 
activities seem to be classified.  However, Israeli’s targeted killing case offers necessary 
information about Israel’s rationale and its intention to indefinitely rely on targeted killing as 
its main counter-terrorism strategy. 
791
 Information on suicide bombings carried out by 
Palestinians against Israel was mainly gathered by Falk from Israeli Security Agency 
Reports, Israel’s office of Foreign Affairs, and detailed databases.792 Some of the information 
on Palestinian attacks against Israel and al-Qaeda against the US (including those concerning 
worldwide suicide and terror attacks) have been previously analysed and published by Falk 
and Morgenstern in Suicide Terror: Understanding and Confronting the Threat.
793
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data in the latter include the date and location of suicide bombings, origin and the number of 
resultant fatalities.
794
  
The analysis, including matrices, summaries and conclusions contained in this chapter were 
generated by me while working on the thesis. However, it is reliant on the previous work of 
Schelling, Aumann, Osbourne and De-mesquita on the concept and application of the peace 
war game theory.  The formant for designing the matrices was derived from Schelling.795  
These works could only serve as a guide in developing my analysis, as there is little research 
on applying peace war game theory to conflicts, let alone terroristic conflict. These authors 
directed that analysis related to Peace and war which they tag ‘peace war game theory’ 
should follow the model of prisoners dilemma. The only difference is in the name and the 
strategic decision to either make peace or war rather than cooperate and defect as envisaged 
under prisoners dilemma. Thus, the originality of peace war game theory approach to this 
thesis is multifaceted.  The peace war game theory analysis of war efforts is still developing, 
as only a few authors have applied this method. This is the first time the  approach has been 
used to analyse terrorism v. targeted killing conflict in a law thesis.  
 
5.4. Game theory method 
In order to verify implications of relying on targeted killing, game theory reduces each 
scenario to a picture game plan called the game theory map or matrix. Setting the various 
potential conflicts within a matrix framework brings order, precision, complete analysis and 
reflection. By taking the view point of one opponent at a time and bearing in mind their 
beliefs and values, the outcomes can be judged and the researcher can convert that judgement 
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into a numeric value, this is done for each strategy. This gives the analysis a semi-
quantitative component, which in turn gives insights into how one player might behave when 
faced with an opponent’s strategy. Indeed it might be clearly seen that there is a best strategic 
choice for the player against both strategies of the opponent (deciphers future implications).  
 
In order to provide a balance in analysis, this chapter must regard terrorists as rational 
decision makers, even though it can be argued that it is against reasonable judgment to do so.  
It is a basic assumption of game theory that must be made. However, it does not in any way 
impair the ability to objectively evaluate the optimum strategies available to the states; which 
is what the application of game theory seeks to achieve in this chapter. Furthermore, the 
assumption of rationality is only to the extent of accepting that terrorist organisations also 
make strategic decisions when plotting attacks. This affords a level playing field to all parties.  
 
Arguably, the war against terror is an ideological one so the different model approaches of 
game theory below would consider preliminary ideological factors.  Further, the analysis uses 
people centred decision networks, i.e the people involved in making a decision for  (1)state 
and (2)Terrorists. However, the analysis specifically acts on behalf of the states using 
targeted killing. In other words, it is narrowed down, to answering questions on the reliability 
of the strategy of targeted killing.  The aim of this chapter is to sample and compare 
strategies, so that it is easier to choose which offers the best outcome. However, it does not in 
any way refute the idea that more than one strategy can be applied at a time by parties or 
assessed at the same time using game theory. Game theory is flexible enough to analyse 
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multiple strategies in one matrix.
796
 However, the game theory application is kept simple in 
this thesis by comparing the strategic options, to killings in general and targeted killing in 
particular. It is considered that it is better to introduce game theory to a law research analysis 
using the most basic applications.  
 
Targeted killing is practised by both the US and Israel. However, it is the strategic interaction 
between the US and the al-Qaeda organisation that will be used as the main case study 
examples in this chapter. Interactions with other terrorist groups will simply serve as 
reference points. Nevertheless, the results achieved from the study should serve as helpful 
tips towards a reassessment in reconsideration of Israel’s targeted killing programme. The 
result can also serve as a guide to strategic decision making for other states which consider 
making targeted killing their counter-terrorism strategy. The basic iterated Peace War 
(Prisoners Dilemma) game theory method is used in the next section to explore the following 
arguments made in favour of targeted killing strategy, raised in chapters two and three of this 
thesis: 
i. The argument that targeted killing is effective in achieving the counterterrorism goals 
for which it is used. It does this by using game theory to help determine the impact of 
targeted killing on terrorists.  
ii. The argument that consider targeted killing to be a last resort counterterrorism 
strategy. It does this by comparing targeted killing to some alternative strategies like 
attacking terrorist assets, Media Campaign and ceasefire negotiations.  
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iii. The argument that targeted killing, (especially of terrorist leaders) reduces risk of 
terrorism. It does this by considering whether terrorism is quelled or fuelled by 
targeted killings. The scenarios consider the counter-productivity of targeted killing 
from exploring vengeful responses from terrorists.   
 
In consideration of the ideologies of al-Qaeda terrorists and the US, explored through a 
hermeneutic analysis of the literature in chapter three of this thesis, an empirical model was 
built for this study. It ultimately tests the hypothesis that targeted killing is effective in 
achieving the counter-terrorism goals for which it is used (eliminating terrorist threats by 
successfully killing some and forcing others to refrain from terrorism for fear of being killed). 
The model also facilitates the examination of the effect of targeted killings in Pakistan, as 
well as the effect of targeting one type (i.e. ideologically motivated terrorists) in comparison 
to a different type (i.e. politically motivated terrorists). An examination that groups both 
types of targets into a singular unit is also studied. It is important to note that the numeric 
outcomes of a matrix depend on how outcomes are valued by a researcher. As a guide, the 
ideological values will inform results on terrorists’ outcomes in this chapter. This chapter also 
takes into consideration the ideological values of the US when determining their outcomes.  
 
The matrices are a two-party game, where each player decides on one of two options: ‘to kill’ 
or ‘not to kill’. Both players are not in communication, therefore their actions may occur 
simultaneously or sequentially. Each player’s dominant choice is ‘to kill’–that is an optimal 
choice where they would not prefer a different strategy irrespective of the other’s choice. 797 
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This is succinctly listed in the game plan below. 
5.5. Game plan 
The game theory matrices will each be played using the format below: 
i. By identifying the parties, 
ii. By identifying the strategic choices, goals and outcome sought by both parties 
iii. By presenting scenarios of the strategic interaction involving i and ii above, and 
then rationally awarding numeric values to the outcomes achieved from the 
interaction in comparison to the outcome and goal sought.  
iv. Presentation and discussion of the results of each matrix will be made following 
each matrix.  
 
5.6. Components of the Matrices  
The opposing parties (players) are al-Qaeda Terrorists vs. The US.  
The strategic options to be explored simultaneously by both parties in the matrices consist of 
the following:  
Suicide bombing (killing) or no action (choosing not to kill); 
The ‘no kill’ strategic option means ‘no response’. Other strategic options to be considered in 
the matrices below may include media campaign, sanctions, attacking assets and ceasefire 
negotiations. Each of these will be explored in the matrices below.  
 
5.7. The goal and values of the parties:  
Bearing in mind that game theory study is concerned with finding the best strategy that gives 
the most desired outcome: 
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For  al-Qaeda Terrorists it is the desire for an Islamic state and/or simply to kill as a means of 
promoting the jihadi ideology in return for presumed heavenly reward.
798
 
For the US, it is the desire to put an end to terrorism by targeting and killing some terrorists, 
while forcing others to be preoccupied with avoiding detection rather than carrying out acts 
of terror. 
 
It remains to be seen whether the optimum outcome sought from using targeted killing can be 
achieved given that terrorist organisations may place higher value on the death of their 
members than life. Matrix 1 has two scenarios that can be argued from two different angles. 
The strategic options of whether to ‘kill’ or ‘not kill’ can be use to argue two different 
viewpoints, depending on the value system employed. Relying on Schelling’s matrices 
model/map but without the tables, the matrices are presented below. 
799
The first scenario 
offers some decisional explanation of suicide bombers. It shows where killing is awarded 
greater numeric value on both sides than the option of not killing. The second scenario 
awards both parties greater values to the choice of ‘not killing’ than ‘killing’, under a 
different value system. The numeric values of al-Qaeda are represented on the left and that of 
the US are represented on the right hand side of the matrices. 
 
5.8. Matrices Analysis   
Where both players value the outcome of the strategy of killing more than not killing: Where 
5 is the highest score obtainable in the matrix, a suicide bomber may value a successful 
mission (where the bomb is successfully detonated) as score 4 versus no attempt as score 0. It 
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is proposed that US would value a ‘kill’ (a successful case of targeted killing) as 2 and ‘no 
kill’ as (0). In order to distinguish one from the other, the terrorist strategic choices and 
outcome values are in bold whilst the US strategic choices and outcome values are written in 
italics. If we input this into a game matrix:  
5.8.1. Game matrix 1: War (killing) or Peace (no killing) options 
     
Where the outcome 
of killing is preferred 
(given greater 
numeric score) 
             US   Kill  (Tk)            US   No Kill 
Al-Qaeda Terrorists     
kill (suicide) 
                     4,2                     4,0 
 Terrorist     No Kill                      0,2                     0,0 
 
5.8.2. The rationale behind the suicide bombers scores: 
From the suicide bombers rational view it is better to have a strategy of ‘kill’, scores 4 (rather 
than ‘no kill’ scores 0); out of the two options this gives the better value outcome i.e. 
whatever the US strategy. The total score given to terrorists outcome is 4 looking at it from 
the terrorists viewpoint: one point is for sacrificial suicide, one point is for inflicting death on 
the enemy, and two points is for generally inciting terror.         
 
There is a high possibility that the suicide bomber does not count his own death as a loss. 
Further, the suicide bomber believes that there is a reward for killing opponents in holy war. 
If we follow the norm of terrorist organisations, suicide bombers are likely to have recruited 
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more persons to continue their cause. So, in his opinion he will have lost nothing.  It should 
be noted again that each numeric value is to be awarded in consideration of each player’s 
perspective. 
5.8.3.The rationale for the US scores: 
From the matrix above, where to kill is valued, the best strategy for the US appears also to be  
to ‘kill’,  (targeted killing): scoring an average point of  2 for each of the terrorist strategic 
choices of ‘kill’ or ‘no kill’ rather than 0 for the no kill strategy, for each of the terrorist 
strategy choices.  
 
As argued above, an Islamic suicide bomber who believes that there is reward in dying for 
his/her cause will not be threatened by targeted killing. For ostensible reasons, it is argued 
that al-Qaeda terrorists who engage in suicide bombing would not consider their deaths as a 
loss like the US would consider the deaths of its soldiers or agents. This is one of the reasons 
why terrorism may be more impacting on victims than targeted killing on target culprits. The 
focus of game theory is not to award numeric values based on competition i.e by comparing 
each party’s outcome to decide who is winning the war. However, it is useful in realising that 
the fact that a party may thrive using a particular strategy does not mean that its opponent 
will thrive by responding with the same strategy. Suicide bombing is arguably similar to 
drone attacks. Just as the perpetrator of a suicide attack is killed alongside his/her victims, the 
drone also targets terrorists alongside bystanders. These bystanders may or may not be 
members of terrorist organisations. If they are and they hold the same values as suicide 
bombers, then some may consider it to be gain to die for their cause as well; thus reducing the 
feeling of loss of its members. This illustration is aimed at emphasizing that it is the resultant 
impact a strategy has on its targets, and how much of a goal a party achieves from using the 
strategy that are measured in game theory numeric valuation. So in the matrix, the US is 
 234 
 
awarded less points for using the same ‘kill’ strategy as terrorists. Thus, one targeted killing 
of a terrorist yields one point. Another generous point is given to the US from possibly 
eliminating threats from that one terrorist making everything a total of two points. 
 
Another rationale for awarding the US only two points is because: the impact of targeted 
killing of one terrorist yields little compared to the efforts put in place to carry out each 
targeted killing attack, in terms of the cost of targeted killing; the little impact it has on 
terrorists and the very minimal number of terrorists the US are usually able to successfully 
eliminate per time. This goes without including the rate at which terrorists are radicalised to 
replace those killed.  
 
5.8.4. Conclusion on Matrix 1. 
The game theory matrix employed realistically and numerically rates the performance of the 
chosen strategies each party has employed in the specific interaction above. To summarise 
using game theory terms, the following is true of suicide bombers: 
Their dominant strategy when seeking to achieve their goal is to kill rather than refrain from 
killing. In the matrix above, the optimum score of ‘5’ is not awarded to the suicide bomber. 
This is because he will regard suicide killing as the best of the two options, even though the 
approach does not necessarily oblige the US to cooperate with terrorists demands. A strategy 
that results in terrorists achieving their goals, for example including the establishment of an 
Islamic state, would optimise their outcome score to 5. However, he/she is able to achieve 
three goals (die for his reward, kill for his cause, and inflict fear through terrorism) out of 
four goals (kill for his cause, die for his reward, establish an Islamic state and inflict fear 
through terrorism). 
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5.8.5. Matrix 2: War (killing) or Peace (no killing) options with alternative value 
systems. 
This is a reverse of matrix one, giving a different value system is considered to the matrix, 
(see below) i.e. if al-Qaeda regards the targeted killing of its members and suicide bombing 
as loss, meaning preservation of life has higher value.  The best of the options between 
whether to carry out suicide bombing or not will be not to carry out suicide bombing, because 
the perpetrator loses his or her life in the process. Depending on the angle from we are 
assessing the issue, two options are available to the US options: In response to terrorists 
refraining from attacking US altogether, the latter’s best option is also not to carry out 
targeted killing. The strategy does not attract any significant advantage because it is only to 
refrain from provoking the opponent. Should al-Qaeda terrorists who place value on their 
lives succeed in escaping after launching attacks, the US benefits from the strategic response 
of targeted killing. However, the US has to consider whether counter attacks of targeted 
killing benefits the country in the long run, as it may be counter-productive should al-Qaeda 
terrorists respond in the same vein. Matrix 2 represents the first example.  
 
Where Preservation of Life 
is Valued 
               US  Kill  (Tk)             US    No Kill 
    Al-Qaeda terrorists -           
Kill suicide 
                     1, 1                     1,-3 
    Al-Qaeda terrorists   -
No Kill 
                    -2, 1                      0, 0 
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5.8.6. Rationale for the US score 
The US is awarded -3 for failing to respond to the killing of victims by terrorists. This is 
because, in that round of interaction, the US has lost some of its citizens to terrorism but has 
not gained anything by not fighting back through targeted killing. This considers the fact that 
in that interaction, targeted killing could be a better strategic option than the option of not 
responding at all. In such situations, peace war game theorists would regard targeted killing 
to be a strategic option resulting in a Nash equilibrium, but not an optimal strategy. In the 
former, neither party has an incentive to change their strategy. In the latter, a party’s 
objectives are met by applying such a strategy. It is very likely that parties will be able to 
devise a strategy that yields optimal results until the warfare has gone on for a protracted 
period.  This is because the interactions allow parties to understand their opponents and 
sample strategies in other to devise an optimal strategy. The matrix above shows how at the 
start of terroristic conflicts or warfare, the parties were inclined to remain in a state of nash 
equilibrium. i.e the US value outcome from using targeted killing is higher than when it does 
not use targeted killing. Thus, the country has no incentive to change its strategy from its 
dominant strategy of targeted killing.  Game theorists reason that it is unrealistic to facilitate a 
peaceful negotiation at the beginning of the war, when parties are more inclined to vengeful 
acts of aggression. 
800
  
5.8.7. Rationale for terrorist scores: 
Terrorist ‘kill’ strategy outcome values: 1 point for the death of the terrorist.  
If the terrorist values his/her own life, in the process of carrying out terror through suicide 
bombing, he/she will have achieved only one goal, which is terrorism. Only one point is 
awarded, instead of between 2-5 points. This is because the suicide bomber will have lost 
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his/her life in the process, and more than one point is placed on life, especially if he/she will 
rather preserve his/her life.  
On the other hand, if the same perpetrator was not a suicide bomber and had escaped after 
carrying out the acts of terror, he will have scored either 3 or 4 points. This is because of the 
future implications of having a dangerous terrorist roaming free. This would mean that future 
threats have not been eliminated from that one perpetrator, making the public vulnerable to 
future attacks from him. Thus, the terrorist will have met some of his or her goals with the 
following points: two points go to staying alive, another goes to generally inflicting terrorism, 
another for causing deaths and harm making 4 points.  Again, the maximum of 5 points are 
not awarded because the terrorist has not achieved his entire goal from that one act; for 
instance, it has not facilitated the creation of an Islamic state. The 0 score is awarded to both 
opponents when they have neither gained nor lost from their actions. Note that the decision 
‘not to kill’ suggests no action, so it excludes every other alternative option. Alternative 
options will be explored in subsequent matrices.  
 
5.8.8. Conclusion on matrix 2 
Following a game theory thought process; it is usually after a repeated use of targeted killing 
that the US will be inclined to weigh the outcomes from using targeted killing against 
possible outcomes of applying other strategies. It is only after doing this that it becomes clear 
that, not only is targeted killing inadequate, but other potential strategies may facilitate the 
quelling of the conflict. Matrices one and two above score the US low points of 2 and 1 when 
targeted killing is used as a response, whether or not terrorists attack. This is calculated based 
on the advantage targeted killing offers. The low scores depict how, although yielding some 
desired outcome, targeted killing is nowhere near meeting the target goal of properly 
addressing terrorism. Interestingly, the value of targeted killing drops further in scenarios that 
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consider the counter-productivity of the tactic. The next matrix suggests how targeted killing 
may even fuel the conflict further. As will be illustrated, targeted killing may not only yield 
little results but also lead to counter-productive outcomes. For example; the event that an 
eliminated terrorist has 5 recruits ready to avenge his or her death. 
 
5.8.9. Matrix 3: Tit- for-tat Responses 
Islamic terrorism occurs today with the following motivations:  To achieve a geographic 
caliphate state with Sharia rule, ambitions of world domination and suppression of western 
culture and ideology; to win hearts and minds to Islam; in response to the call of being part of 
a holy war where there is value and perceived reward for killing and dying for allah.
801
 These 
deep rooted ideological causes are pursued whether or not a western state resorts to targeted 
killing of terrorists. In addition to an already subversively motivated cause, it goes without 
saying what is to be expected from such causes; they become frothed with vengeance. Al-
Qaeda’s refusal to succumb to targeted killing was perhaps not anticipated by the US; neither 
will the US have anticipated that targeted killing will even invoke terrorism further. This 
matrix offers possible reactions of terrorist organisations and lone wolves to the targeted 
killing of their leaders and those they hold in high esteem. 
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Where targeted killing 
incites terrorism 
further 
          The US -  kill  (tk)          The US -  No kill 
Al-Qaeda Terrorist                 
vengeful killing 
                      4, - 5                4, 0 
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5.8.10. Rationale for US Scores 
Matrix one has already argued that terrorists, especially suicide bombers are not fazed by the 
threat of death. Matrix 3 argues that it is highly plausible for the targeted killing of al-Qaeda 
terrorist leaders to serve as a motivation and reminder to terrorists to vehemently pursue 
terrorism even further.  For example, it seemed that the targeted killing of former al-Qaeda 
leader, Osama bin Laden, was a major antiterrorism breakthrough for the US. However, it 
turns out that that one case led to a threat of revenge by bin-ladens son
802
 followed by 
multiple instances of terrorism by al-Qaeda and its allies.
803
 Home-grown terrorists (lone 
wolves) seem highly supportive of al-Qaeda; some declare their attacks on behalf of the 
organisation (like the assault on the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015).
804
 The 
constant targeted killing of al-Qaeda leaders and most certainly, the killing of bin Laden are 
arguably effective in diminishing in some way the threats from those killed. For example, it 
was reported that al-Zawahiri who replaced bin-Laden is more preoccupied with being 
discreet and under the raider; as a result he has been unable to function or publicize 
propaganda materials.
 805
  Thus, it can be argued that to an extent, the constant decapitation of 
al-Qaeda leaders may be effective in destabilising the organisation.  However the effect has 
not been felt: The emergence of the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS) has in many ways filled al-
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Terrorists  - No kill 
strategy 
                      0,  2                0, 0 
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Qaeda’s void. ISIS claims to be responsible for the most recent terrorist attacks in Paris and 
Brussels. It now poses the bigger immediate threat. al Qaeda may have been hurt by the 
demise of its charismatic leader. However, it has not in any way hampered the motivation for 
terrorism.  
5.8.11. Rationale for Terrorists scores 
Matrix 3 scores the US -5 for not achieving any of its goal through targeted killing, but 
instead invoking terrorism on the US in particular and on the world in general. Al-Qaeda is 
scored 4 because terrorism continues to occur in-spite of targeted killing. In addition to that, 
as the tit for tat characteristic of a peace war game theory envisages, targeted killings may 
potentially instigate revenge terrorism.  As hinted above, the 0 score is awarded for failure to 
act. This means the situation of things remains unchanged. The party which takes action in 
that same interaction (targeted killing for instance) is bound to achieve more points than the 
one which does not. This will be different were both parties do not act and thus are both 
scored zero. This does not necessarily depict a low score, instead it places both on a status 
quo where the absence of conflict and interaction suggests that they neither gained nor lost. 
5.8.12. Conclusion on Matrix 3 
The tit for tat nature of the peace war game theory describes how conflicts can be prolonged 
when each party retaliates the actions of the other.
806
 This chain reaction may continue until 
one party decides to choose a different strategy. Targeted killing may have gone as far as 
proving that the US has the power and intelligence to retaliate, but it does not seem to lend 
itself as a solution to winning the so called war against terror.  It is with realisations like this 
that a party should begin to model different strategies to determine which may be 
instrumental in achieving an end to such a protracted conflict. Perhaps peace negotiations are 
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not the next option that come to mind. As much as possible, this chapter is a narrative of 
realistic expectations from conflict interactions; especially between states. In other words, it 
models the matrices based on the most realistic ways in which parties will respond to each 
other during conflicts.  The realisation that targeted killing is a failed strategy may not 
quickly result in the desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. This is 
understandable because, not only will a state be concerned that initiating peace may depict 
weakness on its part, it may also imply that it is ready to imbibe whatever standards the 
opponent tries to impose. As much as possible, states are more interested in strategic 
posturing: In which they take different actions to prove that they are capable of subduing 
unwanted impositions.  Other options that include attacks on terrorist assets; sanctions against 
terrorist assets; media campaigns will be explored one after the other in the following 
matrices, ceasefire negotiations will be the last to be explored. Using the same matrix 
template as above, the killing option (targeted killing and killings done by al-Qaeda) will be 
compared to the above alternative options. In other words, both party’s outcome using the 
‘killing’ strategy will be objectively compared to the outcomes from using each alternative 
strategy. This is aimed at deciding if and when the alternatives yield better outcomes than 
killing. 
 
5.8.13. Matrix 4 : Attacks on assets  
By substituting the ‘no kill’ (no action) strategy with the options stated above, matrix 4 
compares the outcomes from killing members of the opponents party to the outcomes derived 
from attacking the opponents asset. Bearing in mind the possible responses to be had from the 
‘kill’ strategy as explored in the previous matrices, the following matrices considers what 
responses can possibly be invoked from using strategies other than killing. 
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 US Targeted Killing US Attack on terrorist assets 
Al-Qaeda terrorists’ killing                        3, 2                   3, 4 
Terrorist financial and 
cyber-attack on US 
                    4, 2                4, 4 
 
As discussed earlier, al-Qaeda terrorists seem to achieve more of their objectives from killing 
than the US from targeted killing. If targeted killing is ineffective in promoting the desired 
response from terrorists, a reconsideration of the strategy is advised. A good approach will be 
for the US to apply strategies that not only achieve its counterterrorism goals, but are also 
unique and inaccessible to its opponent. In other words, a strategy should not only be 
effective in limiting the function of an opponent, it may also be one that an opponent is not 
able to use as a devise for retaliation. A strategy that is accessible to an opponent only shows 
that the opponent will be able to get some satisfaction from issuing similar threats.
807
 With 
the help of the game theory matrix 4, it is important to determine the effect the US attack on 
al-Qaedas assets and of course the assets of the allies that fund and support al-Qaeda. 
5.8.14. Rationale for the US scores 
In response to al-Qaeda’s killings, the US scores 2 points For carrying out targeted killing 
compared to 4 points for attacking al-Qaeda’s assets. The same scores are awarded when 
responding the same way to terrorists cyber attacks. The rationale for a higher score of 4 
compared to that gained from targeted killing is that: compared to merely eliminating a 
terrorist per time through targeted killing, the US is able to paralyse the facilities that enable 
terrorism. However is it enough to bring about the expulsion of terrorism?  
                                                          
807
 Ibid 
 243 
 
5.8.15. Rationale for al-Qaeda’s scores 
Looking at the scores awarded terrorists, the tit for tat response by al-Qaeda is an equally 
rewarding 4 points. In addition, the outcome values for terrorist killing strategy (3) are higher 
than the effect of targeted killing. More importantly, the 4 points awarded for US strategic 
attacks on terrorist assets is the same awarded to terrorists for using the same approach. Some 
peace war game theory authors who have studied interactions during conflict envisage that 
conflicts involving tit for tat interaction will always be prolonged.
808
 This is because by 
nature, a party is more interested in proving that it is powerful and insubordinate to the other 
party.
809
 Parties do not normally back down until either of two things happen: the party is 
effectively subdued by the other party or; both parties unanimously commit to a settlement of 
the conflict.
810
  
5.8.16. Conclusion of Matrix 4 
From this illustration, the outcome of the attacks on terrorist assets, however impacting, is not 
effective enough in seeing an end to terrorism. Instead, terrorists are in many cases able to 
recover and mobilise forces to carry out similar attacks. The 9/11 attacks on the twin towers 
in one of the world’s most industrious trade centres was not only an attack on lives, but also 
on the economy of the country.  The mere fact that an attack on assets does not subdue 
terrorists or facilitate a response that sees an end to terroristic activities means that an attack 
on assets is not achieving the counterterrorism goals. This suggests that a better strategy 
should be sought.  
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5.8.17. Matrix 5: Sanctions  
‘The Office of Foreign Assets Control administers and enforces economic sanctions primarily 
against countries and groups of individuals, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers. The 
sanctions can be either comprehensive or selective, using the blocking of assets and trade 
restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national security goals.’811  For clarity, sanctions 
in this context refers to a special form of embargo or restriction taken by one country against 
another.
812
 International sanctions are measures that are designed to bring a delinquent or 
renegade state into compliance with expected rules of conduct. International sanctions may 
be either non-forceful or military.
813
 Military sanctions include cutting off access, limited 
strikes and full-scale war. Non-forceful international sanctions include diplomatic measures 
such as the withdrawal of an ambassador, the severing of diplomatic relations, or the filing of 
a protest with the United Nations financial sanctions such as denying aid or cutting off access 
to financial institutions; and economic sanctions such as partial or total trade embargoes. The 
U.N. Security Council has the authority to impose economic and military sanctions on states 
that pose a threat to international peace and security.’814 One example is when UK and other 
European states withdrew their diplomats from Russia following a poison attack in the UK.
815
 
In another example, the US imposed financial barriers to business between North Korea and 
China until North Korea gives up its nuclear missile program.
816
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The International Community in general and the US in particular have limited ISIS, al-Qaeda 
and their allies from having access to the US financial system.
817
 US Cyber-sanctions were 
imposed to incapacitate the terrorism machine, by freezing assets, preventing funds from 
flowing to fund terrorist activities.
818
 Islamic extremist materials were banned on the internet 
to inhibit terrorists’ plots and recruitment.819   
 
These sanctions are part of a larger comprehensive plan to defeat Al-Qaeda, ISIS and  their 
allies.  The aim is to destroy terrorists in their safe havens, denying them the ability to recruit 
foreign terrorist fighters, stifling their financial resources, countering the false propaganda 
they disseminate over the internet and social media, and helping to stabilize liberated areas in 
Iraq and Syria so the displaced can return to their homes and begin to rebuild their lives.
820
 
By modifying matrix 4 above, the US option of attacking terrorist assets is changed to the 
sanctioning (freezing) of assets: 
 US  Targeted Killing US  sanctions 
Terrorism Killing                     3, 2                3, 3 
Terrorist Financial, Cyber-
attack 
                    2, 2                2, 3 
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5.8.18. Rationale for the US Scores: 
The US scores higher points (3) than terrorists (2) when they both use sanctions. States have 
the advantage of issuing sanctions that invoke the cooperation of other countries and 
organisations. This  may be because organisations like internet providers and search engines 
are more sympathetic to victims of terrorists than to terrorist groups. This is one of the 
reasons why international legislators are unconvinced that it is a good idea to confer state like 
powers on terrorist organisations.  
 
US scores 2 points for targeted killing which is less than the 3 points they score for carrying 
out sanctions against terrorists. This suggests that the decision to inhibit terrorists activities 
through sanctions is better than carrying out targeted killing. However, no more than the 
average score of only 3 is given because the proliferation of terrorism across the globe 
suggests that sanctions will not succeed in inhibiting unknown terrorists covertly acting on 
behalf of al-Qaeda.  It is easy to issue sanctions against those the US can identify as terrorists 
of interest. As noted earlier recent cases of spontaneous attacks from lone wolves using 
domestic machineries as weapons against unsuspecting victims are sufficient proof that 
sanctioning cannot achieve the goal of completely defeating terrorism. 
5.8.19. Rationale for Al-Qaeda terrorists scores: 
Al-Qaeda gains a higher score of 3 from terrorism that involves killing and harming than the 
2 points obtainable when it attempts to impose sanctions on the US. Although this is not good 
news for the US, it is important to note, for the sake of objectively determining realistic 
results from this analysis, that al-Qaeda will choose a strategy that it benefits from. This 
makes the one that offers the higher points the obvious choice.  
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5.8.20. Conclusion on Matrix 5 
It is not likely that al-Qaeda or any party for that matter will choose to rely on a strategy that 
yields little benefit. The reality is that parties will always choose strategies that they think 
generate the best outcomes. It is obvious that the freezing of US assets by al-Qaeda is not the 
strategy that the latter is inclined to utilise, since it has little authority to do this, except 
forcefully. The US on the other hand benefits more from an imposition of sanctions on al-
Qaeda’s assets. However, only assets that can be accounted for and attributed to al-Qaeda can 
be frozen. 
Moreover, the BBC has reported the results of the investigation by the UN Committee on the 
flexibility of al-Qaeda following the sanctioning of their assets and restrictions of their 
activities. The report states that “while al-Qaeda’s access to funding had been curtailed as 
result of international co-operation, so too has its need for money”.821  since the executive 
order for sanctions on September 23
rd
 2001, only 19 governments had recorded the presence 
in their countries, of any group or person thought to be linked to al-Qaeda as at 2004. This is 
much less than the number of places where the group is thought to be operating.
822
 The 
investigators also noted that most al-Qaeda attacks since 9/11 have involved arms not 
covered by sanctions. The report gives the example of the Madrid train bombings in March 
2004, in which nearly 200 people were killed by devices made from locally available mining 
explosives detonated by mobile telephones.
823
 The report further says that al-Qaeda has spent 
less than $50,000 (£28,000) on each of its major attacks since the 9/11incident, making it the 
only one to have required significant funding of over six figures.
824
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Even after the UN Security council has reacted to incidents, and all kinds of sanctions have 
been imposed on the al-Qaeda group, the latter has shown great flexibility and stayed ahead 
of them. Whilst these examples are proof of the little effect sanctioning of assets has on al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups, it does not mean that the US should give up the strategy 
altogether. In fact, these sanctions are argued to be a starting point to gaining some form of 
control over terrorist groups. However, the caveat is that sanctioning should not be relied 
upon to defeat terrorism. The following strategy to be considered; ‘media campaigns’, is one 
that may seem weak and inconsequential to winning the war against terror. However, some of 
its strengths should not be overlooked.  
 
5.8.21. Matrix 6: Media Campaigns 
There is a battle of ideology; democracy versus Islamism, a battle for the individual’s mind 
and senses. Mass media technology is used to convey information about the ideologies to the 
general public. The most common platforms for disseminating information are through 
newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the internet.  
i. Terrorist media campaign: Terrorists select the vulnerable and impressionable 
by using Facebook ‘friend request’, Twitter ‘follows’, direct messaging, you tube 
videos and apps to recruit children and youth.
825
 Social media is the main terrorist 
medium for recruitment and fundraising, whilst some more advanced terrorist 
organisations regularly publish magazines for their campaigns. For example, ISIS 
publishes magazines called Rimiyah, where images normalize brutality and 
glorify extremist religion.
826
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ii. Us media campaign: ‘Think Again Turn Away ’is a 5 million dollar budget 
project which has been operating since 2012. The conglomerate has a 45 man staff 
tasked with the responsibility of tweeting warnings against terrorism recruitment. 
827
 There is an increasing pressure on facebook and twitter to do more to detect 
and close accounts that propagate religious extremism. Facebook now uses 
artificial intelligence (AI) to find and remove “terrorist content” immediately after 
they are posted, rather than waiting till users flag them up. According to facebook, 
two million of such posts were taken down in the first five months of 2018.
828
  
The general effectiveness of both parties’ social media campaigns is analyzed in 
comparison to the option of killing, using the game theory matrix below. Terrorist 
party in this matrix does not mean al-Qaeda alone. Owing to the media support 
Islamic extremists give one another, reference to terrorists in this matrix 
represents al-Qaeda, ISIS and subsidiary groups.  
 
 
 
 US Targeted Killing US Anti Terrorism Media 
Campaign 
Terrorism killing                     3,  2                3, 2.5 
Terrorists Media campaign                      2, 2                2, 2.5 
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5.8.22. Rationale for US Scores: 
The US scores a higher mark of 2.5 for its antiterrorism campaign which is > (greater than) 
the 2 it scores for carrying out targeted killings. It is also the only time it scores a higher mark  
than the terrorists score of 2 for using the same strategy. The rationale behind an average 
score of 2.5 is because media campaigns warn and possibly restrict radicalisation. The media 
campaigns that warn are merely persuasive and not actively preventative of terrorism. It is 
still up to the general public to decide whether or not to agree with antiterrorism campaigns. 
The media campaigns that restrict may be more effective than the persuasive campaigns in 
that they help to prevent and monitor terrorism radicalisation. They do these by identifying, 
through social media, culprits responsible for propagating terrorism. They also identify 
victims of radicalisation who may go on to become culprits, should the radicalisation process 
become successful. 
 
Another rationale for awarding the US media campaign an average 2.5 points is because the 
campaigns do not especially prevent ‘word of mouth’ radicalisation. Radicalisations can 
occur through word of mouth in worship centres and covert face to face meetings. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to be suspicious of a culprit who intends to perpetrate terrorism by 
using his vehicle to run pedestrians over. While media antiterrorism campaigns may curb 
some radicalisation, it may not prevent it altogether. 
   5.8.23. Rationale for Terrorists Score:  
The outcome of terrorists’ killings is 3 compared to 2 for media campaigns which is less, as 
the killings will always be more grievous than the effect of their campaigns. The more 
grievous it is to the victims of terrorism and the public, the better the outcome for terrorists. 
This is why, in the eyes of terrorists, regardless of the US strategy the killings scores higher.    
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5.8.24. Conclusion on matrix 6 
The extent to which anti-terror media campaigns may curb terrorism is questionable 
especially because terrorist radicalisation can occur in other different forums, not to mention 
the already published magazines and books containing such ideologies. However, it suffices 
to consider the obvious fact that it is considered a slightly better strategy than targeted killing, 
which may have counterproductive results. At any rate, the advantages of antiterrorism media 
campaigns stated above cannot be overlooked It should not be abandoned whilst the quest for 
a goal oriented antiterrorism strategy continues. Some authors have concluded that many 
times the answers to resolving conflicts of aggression are embedded in the peace making 
strategies that are easily overlooked.
829
 This peace option is further analyzed in the next 
matrix. 
 
5.8.25. Matrix 7: Cease-fire & negotiate terms for peace. 
It may seem far-fetched to rely on or even expect some form of negotiations with al-Qaeda. 
This is a terrorist group that seems to kill to achieve several objectives that include 
gratification from killing itself. However, this matrix challenges the US targeted killing of al-
Qaeda leaders. It asks the question: Was it actually in the best interest of the US to kill 
influential al-Qaeda leaders like Osama bin Laden and Anwar al- Aulaqi. At the time, it may 
have seemed the most gratifying counter-terrorism decision the US will ever have made. 
However, this matrix challenges us to consider the negative implications the killing of these 
people have or will have on the US. It may be an unpopular argument, especially where it is 
strongly considered that keeping such people alive means putting innocent lives at risk. 
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However, the motive here is to consider the fact that killing an opponent, even as a last resort 
in such serious conflict of aggression, may not always necessarily be the best option.  
 
 US  Targeted Killing US Cease fire and 
negotiate 
 Terrorists killing                      3, 2                3, 0 
Terrorists cease fire and 
negotiate 
                    0, 3                5, 5 
 
5.8.26. Rationale for the US Scores 
As explained in chapter 4 of this thesis, game theory recognises that both parties achieve their 
goals from negotiations only when there is a mutual commitment to the deal. As experts of 
prisoners dilemma envisage, a culprit that cooperates whilst the other defects gets the 
maximum sentence.
830
 In other words, should one party default a ceasefire negotiation and 
carry on killing, this will be counted as a disadvantage to the party who does not default. This 
is depicted by the score of 0 awarded cease fire whilst terrorists carry on killing because it is 
under the assumption that the US acts upon a ceasefire bargain it has with al-Qaeda, whilst 
al-Qaeda breaches the agreement.  However, should both cooperate to negotiate the conflict, 
they both score the maximum points because the settlement implies that both parties are 
happy with the bargain. Granted, it is possible that not all parties objectives can be met in 
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peace negotiations, which is why parties resort to bargaining.
831
 However, the rationale for 
awarding 5 points for mutual commitment to negotiate is in the decision that both parties 
have facilitated an end to the conflict on favourable terms. When both carry on killing each 
other, the matrix defaults to the usual score that has been awarded for killing in previous 
matrices.  
5.8.27. Rationale for terrorists’ scores 
As in the US rationale, al-Qaeda terrorists also score 0 if they oblige the ceasefire option 
whilst the US carries on targeted killing. Al-Qaeda score a higher mark of 3 for terrorism that 
results in deaths whether or not the US uses targeted killing. However, al-Qaeda scores the 
maximum of 5 should it make a settlement with the US. 
 
5.8.28. Conclusion on matrix 7 
Matrix 7 shows a reversal of strategy for both opponents. Value systems differ and so do 
expectations in conflicts (as exemplified in matrix one). In the above matrix, the US scores 2 
points; not only because it achieves little from targeted killing but because it may not be in 
the interest of the US in the long run to carry on targeting and killing terrorists. Sometimes, it 
may be more important to the US to keep terrorist leaders alive rather than kill them. This is 
so that the right authorities that can agree upon ceasefire negotiations are alive to do so. For 
example, it was claimed that al-Qaeda has not been able to appoint new leaders who are as 
influential as Bin-Laden.
832
 Thus, it is expected that out of loyalty to bin Laden, al-Qaeda 
members are obligated to obey his last dictates. These are dictates regarding strategic 
decisions that others may not feel too keen to revise in his stead. This ultimately makes the 
group’s willingness to participate in peace negotiations even more unlikely.  
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Knowing that one of al-Qaeda’s objectives is to carry out terrorism, there are no guarantees, 
that favourable negotiations that potentially alleviates terrorism will arise from the US 
interaction with terrorists groups. There is a high possibility that if the leaders were kept 
alive, they will have pioneered more dangerous acts of terror. Furthermore, the expectation 
that peace negotiations with al-Qaeda will generally end in relief from terrorism is far-
fetched, considering that al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist group in conflict with the US. 
Where peace settlements with al-Qaeda are unlikely but possible, the proliferation of 
terrorism and terrorist organisations casts doubt on the ability of the US to generally 
eliminate terrorism. On the other hand, if the US wishes that the end result to terroristic 
conflict is peace, a prolonged use of targeted killing may not be the best option because the 
strategy itself does not initiate peace. However, when it is considered unlikely that al-Qaeda 
will yield to peace negotiations, it may be  necessary to carry on using other strategies like 
targeted killing, attacks on al-Qaeda terrorists’ assets and sanctioning which are better 
alternatives to no response. Notwithstanding, it is argued that the importance of peace 
negotiations should not be overlooked, as it may be the most important strategy of all. The 
political conflict between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the UK, also popularly 
known as the ‘Guerrilla war’, between 1969 and 1997 may illustrate this argument better. 
The IRA (which fought to achieve the independence of Northern Ireland from the UK) was 
formerly referred to by the UK as a terrorist group.
833
 The conflict claimed about 3500 lives, 
52% of which were civilians from both sides. 32% of the deaths were members of the British 
security forces and 16% were members of the parliamentary groups.
834
 After three decades of 
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seemingly unending war, neither party felt it would gain from carrying on fighting. Instead 
they stood to lose in every aspect including economically and fatally. So both parties decided 
that instead, they stood to gain from a peace settlement.
835
  
The war was brought to an end by a peace process that included the declaration of ceasefires 
by most parliamentary organisations, the total decommissioning of the IRA’s weapons, the 
reform of police and the withdrawal of the British armed forces from the streets of Northern 
Ireland and its borders.
836
  Another part of the peace agreement was for Northern Ireland to 
remain within the United Kingdom unless a majority of the Northern Irish electorate vote to 
the contrary.
837
  Except for a little variation in terms of the global nature of terrorist 
participation, the IRA conflict was very similar to  terroristic conflicts. The IRA conflict was, 
arguably, also an ideological one, that involved the killing of civilians as a means of 
protesting against a regime on the one hand, or the imposition of a new regime on the other. 
One must not overlook the possibility that terroristic conflicts can reach peaceful resolution. 
An attempt may be made to that effect; as game theorists argue, parties in conflicts realise 
their interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multinational negotiations.
838
 “A 
minimum of cooperation is a prerequisite for a prosperous society.”839 
 
5.9. Conclusion 
The results of the game theory analysis suggests that the US, even more than terrorists, are 
disadvantaged by their strategy of targeted killing. Having analysed some of the strategic 
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options available to al-Qaeda terrorists and the US, it is clear that the US will benefit more 
from a better strategy than targeted killing. Terroristic conflicts are ideological in nature, thus 
the goals sought by parties to the conflict are influenced by their ideological values. The 
ideological values of the parties played a vital role in deciding numeric outcomes to award 
parties for the strategies analysed in each matrix.  Judging from al-Qaeda’s value in killing 
and dying for the sake of Islam and its use of strategies like suicide bombings and suicide 
attacks, it is clear why targeted killing is not sufficient to coerce al-Qaeda into giving up 
terrorism. This is why the matrices do not generally award high points to targeted killing. 
However, matrix 1 and 2 have shown that targeted killing will always be a better strategy 
than a total lack of response to terrorism.  
On the other hand, terrorists seem to achieve more of their goals by killing and attacking the 
US assets, than alternative strategies modelled in this chapter, including media campaigning 
and sanctioning.  Baring terrorists’ achievement is definitely not aimed at upholding 
terrorism. Instead it is used to objectively decide which party seems to be winning the war 
against terror. The idea is to incite the US to devise a better strategy than targeted killing, that 
will defeat terrorism and more importantly, influence terrorists into deciding to stop. This is 
the type of strategy that the US should consider if it wants to achieve an end to terrorism. It is 
in consideration of such strategy that the cease fire negotiations option was modelled in 
matrices in this chapter. If commitment to a peaceful settlement was agreed, the outcome 
value would be (5) which is the optimum numerical value awardable in the matrices.  A 
mutual strategy of cease-fire may be agreed by both parties when they come to the realisation 
that it offers new opportunities of gain: peace, security, less death and civilian collateral 
damage, order, trust, investment, infrastructure, growth and development in areas of finance, 
economy, health, education, provision and wealth. At the same time, it reduces waste and 
cost from expensive killing programs for both sides. However, the major limitations of this 
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game theory analysis are the concern that not all of these advantages that are sought by both 
parties. The limitations of game theory and other methods used in this thesis will be discussed 
in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1. Introduction:  
This chapter details the limitations, overview of outcomes despite the limitations have been 
several limitations to the stage by stage analysis of targeted killing. The research included 
exploring its legal stance under international law, determining the ideological justification for 
which it is used and assessing its effectiveness. Some limitations encountered were due to 
inadequacies within the methodologies used. However, the main limitation is the novelty of 
targeted killings as a subject matter of research.  
This chapter begins with an exposition of the general limitation encountered in the course of 
the research of terroristic conflicts as a whole, before specifically highlighting the limitations 
of the methodologies used. The second part discusses the limitations of the doctrinal 
approach. The third part discusses the limitations encountered in the course of conducting a 
hermeneutical analysis of terroristic conflicts in general and targeted killing counterterrorism 
in particular. The fourth paragraph details the limitations encountered from using peace war 
game theory. For ease of reference, each limitation encountered is enumerated below. 
 
6.2. Limitation of the research  
The limitations encountered in carrying out this research range from a limitation in scope that 
considers word count constraint and the vastness of the subject matter. This is distinguished 
from the limitations from using the doctrinal, hermeneutical and socio-legal (game theory) 
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methodologies employed in this thesis.  The paragraphs portray how the subject matter of 
targeted killing and the methodologies employed impacted or influenced the interpretation of 
the findings. 
6.2.1. Limitation in Scope 
This considers the limitations in terms of what could realistically be achieved from the 
research. The limitation in scope distinguishes between the subject matters related to target 
killing that were explored in this thesis and those that were unachieved. It also offers reasons 
for the omissions.  
6.2.1.Word count constraint: 
 
Targeted killing counterterrorism strategy is a topical issue. Ideally, every issue related to the 
subject matter in question ought to be explored for a comprehensive analysis. Omissions of 
relevant issues may create a gap in the analysis. However, in order to meet the word count 
criterion, it was impossible to carry out a comprehensive analysis of every topical issue 
related to targeted killing. For example, this thesis did not elaborate on issues about civilian 
casualties and collateral damages which are the resultant effect of both targeted killing and 
terrorism. These issues were mentioned in pages 51 – 54 of chapter two, only as a means of 
assessing arguments over the capability of the US drones to comply with the LOAC 
principles of distinction. This is not to say that the subjects omitted were irrelevant in helping 
to determine the effectiveness of targeted killing. Statistical data on collateral damages for 
each targeted killing case may have helped generate more specific and accurate outcomes 
when applying game theory to clarifying the effectiveness of targeted killing. It may have 
rendered the game theory analysis less abstract than it currently is. For instance, if in a real 
case the killing of a culprit results in the deaths of ten civilians, then it becomes easier to 
compare the gains achieved from targeting culprits to the loss of innocent lives. This would 
remove the burden on game theory to decide what to award outcomes in scenarios like the 
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above. The theory will only be required to further clarify what has been established by a 
statistical evaluation. This will also result in more objective awards of numerical values, 
depending less on my perception. On the downside, a combination of a statistical evaluation 
and game theory evaluation may be too cumbersome to achieve in a singular thesis.    On the 
other hand, a statistical evaluation is unnecessary in this thesis because the rationale for 
applying game theory is to introduce to the literature one of several ways of substantiating 
ones perception about the effectiveness of targeted killings and other counterterrorism 
strategies. A statistical analysis may have more or less arrived at similar conclusions. 
However it is argued that game theory is a better approach, than a statistical approach, for 
analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing. This is mainly because a statistical analysis 
may not reflect the true state of the conflict; it is difficult and sometimes impossible to collate 
realistic data of terroristic conflicts owing to the covert nature of the parties approach to the 
conflict.
840
  
Although it is difficult to analyse every issue relating to targeted killing, there was 
comprehensive detailing of the topical issues that led to the conclusions contained here. 
These topical issues include the exploration of the debatable legal issues surrounding targeted 
killing and the ideological debates in the literature, which were examined in chapters 2 and 3. 
These explorations fed into the conclusions on the reality of modern warfare.  
6.2.2. The vastness of the subject of targeted killing 
 
There is usually overwhelming literature on topical subject matters such as targeted killings. 
Although this may be time consuming, it is due diligence to study as much of the available 
literature as are relevant. Regardless, this thesis explored a vast range of topics as enlisted 
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below.  The downside to this was that it was difficult, but possible in the end, to streamline 
the main issues to be explored. This was surmounted by specifically distinguishing in the 
introductory chapter between issues explored in the thesis and those briefly mentioned only 
as they related to the main issues. The acquaintance with a vast amount of literature informed 
this thesis of topics that are belaboured in existing literature. These include:  
i. Historical reviews of both the US and Israel’s targeted killing operations; 
ii. Researches debating and making recommendations over the legality of targeted 
killing;  
iii. Ethical evaluations of targeted killing and terrorism;  
iv. Statistical evaluations of the US drone collateral damages;  
v. Researches that theoretically assess the effectiveness of US and Israel’s targeted 
killing of terrorist leaders.  
 
The painstaking and time consuming research facilitated the realisation of the 
following gaps in research practice:    
i. Ideological debates upon which the war against terror is predicated;  
ii. Empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of US and Israel’s targeted killing 
operations in relation to the goals for which the strategy is used; 
iii. Recommendations for reforms of the laws of war in order to define what 
constitutes civilian participation and determine the best status to be given to 
terrorists.   
This thesis explores all the gaps listed, but time and word constraints limited its scope to 
addressing only the first and second gaps. 
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6.2.3. Methodological limitations 
This concerns the limitations encountered from using the methodologies applied in the thesis. 
It considers the implications of using the doctrinal, hermeneutical and socio-legal (game 
theory) methodologies. It also states how in spite of the limitations, the thesis was able to 
achieve its objects. Admittedly, not specific questions which are answerable could not be 
fully addressed, but these should be dealt with in future researches. 
 6.2.3.1 Doctrinal Analysis limitation:  
 
In doctrinal research, one is expected to only make clarifications about the position of the 
law. The doctrinal methodology is often criticised for being disconnected from reality - by 
focussing on legal sources it often does not question or challenge the application of the law, 
but instead analyses the law only in terms of internal consistency.  However, this limitation 
was a strength in thesis, because not finding answers to the questions made the researcher 
aware of the gaps in the law. It did this by allowing the researcher compare what was found 
in legal sources with what obtains in practise (the law in action).  It is the socio-legal inquiry 
into the law in action on targeted killing that helps us answer questions normally asked when 
conducting a doctrinal inquiry.   
 
There is little clarification to be achieved when relying on doctrinal analysis for facts about 
the practical application of existing laws to targeted killing. This is a well known limitation of 
the doctrinal approach; the result is that several doctrinal researches (including this thesis) are 
accompanied by other supplementary methodologies like the socio-legal methodology. This 
thesis did not anticipate answers to questions as to why and how the US and Israel utilize 
targeted killing through the doctrinal approach. It was already anticipated that the doctrinal 
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approach could not answer such questions. Therefore, the doctrinal approach was 
supplemented by the all important hermeneutical and game theory socio-legal approaches.  
 
In essence, this general limitation of the doctrinal approach did not pose a problem in this 
thesis because they were anticipated. However, it was the order in which the methodologies 
were applied and the research was carried out, which proved a limitation. This thesis contains 
a doctrinal, hermeneutical and then the socio-legal analysis of terroristic conflict in general 
and targeted killing in particular. It was time consuming and cumbersome to apply the 
research methodologies in this order, because the doctrinal approach as a starting point 
offered no answers to questions researchers usually ask at the start of a research. These 
questions include: What is targeted killing? How is targeted killing utilised? Under what 
conditions can targeted killing be legally done? What are the limits for using targeted 
killings?  
In hindsight, the first point of research on targeted killing should be the  socio-legal inquiry: 
to obtain general knowledge on the subject matter of targeted killings; to discover the legal 
definition and function of targeted killings; or even to identify subsidiary laws which are the 
only thing close to legal documents that describe the subject matter of targeted killings. The 
term ‘targeted killing’ does not come up in any of the main substantive international laws that 
regulate the use of force. It is however used in subsidiary rules like the interpretive guidance 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which relates the contents of legal 
doctrines to targeted killings. If the law in action is first clarified by a socio-legal inquiry, a 
researcher can identify contentious issues that occur as a result of the gaps in the law. The 
researcher can then clarify these using the doctrinal approach. 
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Since targeted killing is novel, the doctrinal analysis did not enlighten the researcher on its 
definition or functionality. This thesis therefore finds that when applying the mixed 
methodologies to the subject matter, it is less challenging to first conduct a socio-legal 
research before a doctrinal research. This reduces the time spent searching for answers where 
they may not be found; because they are unavailable in legal doctrines which, in the first 
place, have not legislated on the subject. This is a caveat for researchers to revise similar 
arrangements of methodological approaches for novel issues like targeted killing. Making the 
doctrinal analysis the first point of inquiry may end in such consequences as making non-
emotive conclusions or discontinuing the research for lack of articles that clarify the true 
position of targeted killings. In this thesis, the first approach which was the doctrinal 
approach was discontinued in order to conduct a sociological analysis; afterwards a doctrinal 
analysis was conducted. Therefore, in this thesis, the approaches to analysis were conducted 
in the following more cohesive order: Socio-legal, doctrinal, hermeneutic and game theory.   
 
 6.2.3.2 Hermeneutical Analysis limitation 
 
This section discusses both the limitations and strengths of the hermeneutical approach as 
experienced in the course of its application in the literature review chapter. Generally, this 
chapter exposes the limitations experienced in the course of carrying out the research. 
However, the strengths discussed are aimed at explaining how, in-spite of the limitations, the 
strengths of a hermeneutical approach, which can be easily overlooked by the reader, 
surpassed the limitations.  
 
The hermeneutical approach of interpreting texts, although lauded for its ability to evoke 
critical thinking, is not without limitations: A major problem that authors in this tradition 
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wrestle with is what is termed ‘the hermeneutic circle’ —the fact that there is no neutral, 
external standpoint from which to objectively measure the meaning of a system or an 
action.
841
 Instead, interpretation begins and ends with the given—the text or the action—and 
the only evidence available for assessing the interpretation is interior to the text itself.
842
 It 
may therefore appear that interpretations are self-confirming and heavily reliant on the 
researchers own ability to make logical conclusions that are unique to him or her.
843
  This 
may be unsatisfactory as such conclusions ought to be supported by rational and empirical 
justifications.  
Owing to the fact that interpretations through hermeneutical analysis are unique to the 
researcher, findings may not be generalised to a larger population, nor can findings be easily 
relied upon as the basis for theoretical frameworks or policy decisions.
844
 For example, not 
every single vision contained in the mandate of al-Qaeda organisation is shared by other 
terrorist groups. For example, al-Qaeda indulges in suicide bombings and aims at an Islamic 
state governed by sharia laws just like the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (hereinafter ISIS) or 
Boko Haram of Nigeria. However, these groups differ in other areas.
 845
  For instance, despite 
the prohibition of female participation in the Jihad in the Islamic ideology, Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS have claimed approximately 24,7% of all female suicide attacks.
846
  
 
Firstly, there were uncertainties as to how to interpret the ideologies upon which terroristic 
conflicts are predicated. This is because there was no knowledge of original texts or case 
studies to be relied upon that contained the mandate, rationale and plots of the terrorists. This 
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may be due to the randomness and variations of terrorist mandates and government 
restrictions on terrorist activities on the internet.
847
 The risk of interrogation or detention by 
law enforcement officers restrained the researcher from intensive searches of terrorist 
materials and texts that may be available on the internet. Such searches could trigger the 
attention of intelligence and security officers; to avoid this, the researcher relied on 
information generally derived from text books, news materials and other Islamic 
narratives.
848
  
In addition, authors, commentators and even governments may make analysis based on their 
perspectives of Islamism and jihadi war. Information derived from such analysis may be 
tainted with the author or commentators personal views. Such materials may not even portray 
every single ideological concept that terrorists hold. Furthermore, there is no access to any 
material that divulges information on how or if terrorists consider the impact terrorism has on 
victim states and on terrorists themselves. Such information would have been helpful in 
properly determining and understanding how terrorists reflect on the current terrorism v 
targeted killing conflict under study.  
 
The same can be said about the states (the US and Israel) that are under scrutiny in this thesis 
for using targeted killing. The objectives and mandates that instigate the use of targeted 
killing are either inaccessible or ambiguous.  For example, the US white paper that describes 
the country’s endorsement of targeted killing is not a detailed document in that it does not 
cohesively declare the objectives sought to be achieved from using targeted killing 
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counterterrorism strategy.
849
  Perhaps the country’s initial desire to covertly carry out 
targeting operations in order to avoid legal scrutiny, has made the drafters of the document 
refrain from clarifying the objectives of the strategy and when such objectives should be 
met.
850
 Likewise, Israel’s targeted killing mandate and rationale is contained in only one 
document, the judgment in the Israeli case.
851
 Although the judgment clearly defines and 
states the objectives the country seeks to achieve from targeted killing, it does not link the 
current conflict to its inception. In addition, the case does not clearly determine the objectives 
in terms of what it would take for Israel to negotiate a truce or ceasefire. 
 
It can be easily presumed however, that any country fighting against terrorism seeks the 
optimum outcome of ending terrorism through their adopted countermeasures. It should be 
for this rationale that targeted killing strategy is adopted. Clarifications of the rationale of the 
parties where obtained from textbooks, journals, news materials and articles.
852
 Some of these 
contained first hand information derived from interviews with those with a stake, or privy to 
information about the conflict.
853
 For example, it took expositions in news items to clarify 
that the passage in the Torah/Bible
854
 mandating Israel to repossess Gaza strip (which is also 
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claimed and currently occupied by Palestinians) is indeed the motivation of Israel’s war 
against Palestine, in which the strategy of targeted killing is used as a means.
855
   
 
Ironically, an incoherent text is no barrier to a hermeneutic analyst because the approach is 
apt in prompting a researcher to offer explanations and make logical deductions on such 
texts.
856
 A critical evaluation which includes the improvisation of meanings in texts, making 
the researchers conclusions the crux of reasoning, is characteristic of hermeneutical 
analysis.
857
 
 
Using the hermeneutical approach, the texts of authors debating the terroristic conflict have 
been studied and interpreted in this thesis. The result is that scholars have been characterised 
as either liberalist, realist or pragmatist. Conclusions that either justify or castigate the use of 
targeted killing were made based on how each school perceive that the strategy should be 
addressed. The conclusions show how much the hermeneutic process is subjective to an 
author’s opinion. However, by not relying on hermeneutical analysis to make empirical 
evidence based conclusions, this thesis is able to curb the tendency to abuse of bias. 
Furthermore, the incentive to attribute certain scholars to the different schools of thought are 
not solely based on the researchers own opinion. Instead, the incentive is informed by a wide 
range of research and understanding of the ideologies that predicate certain belief systems.  
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The choice of the hermeneutic method allowed the experiences of the respondents to be 
presented in a direct and evocative manner, encouraging the reader to enter imaginatively into 
the experiences described.
858
 In so doing, the method provided a vehicle for an in-depth 
understanding of the ideological nature of terroristic conflicts. It also allowed for the 
researcher to reflect on changes in the character of warfare. This was accomplished by 
comparing the components of traditional warfare as we know it to the terroristic type that 
dominates 21
st
 century conflicts.
859
 The exploratory nature of the method also allowed the 
uncovering of parties own interpretations of their involvement. Interestingly, it portrays how 
each party to the conflict sees itself as a victim.  Terrorists believe they are victimised 
because their lives had been shaped by western standards.
860
 The states at war with terrorists, 
particularly the US and Israel studied in this thesis, see themselves as victims of constant 
terror.
861
  
 
While keeping the above limitations in mind, the study presented findings that deepened our 
understanding of certain aspects of terroristic conflicts, and suggested directions for 
furthering the knowledge of the law in action regarding targeted killing. The study made 
explicit the disadvantages with applying the LOAC and IHRL to terroristic conflicts, just to 
satisfy the need to legally categorise the conflict and impose sanctions. The study reminds us 
that terroristic conflicts are more complex than current regulatory laws recognise.  
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 6.2.3.3. Game Theory Limitations  
 
Game theory is employed in this thesis to help determine the effectiveness of targeted killing 
in eliminating terrorism. Game theorists would ask the question: is targeted killing the best 
strategic option for eliminating terrorism? However, terroristic conflicts are much more 
unpredictable than the strategic modelling of game theory. Notwithstanding, it was possible 
to model the interaction between terrorists and the states in conflict with them and invoke a 
much more guided approach to decision making. 
 
Some authors in the field of game theory (including Aarseth, Katz, Thaler, Wood and 
Coleman) have laid emphasis on the fact that Game Theory is a method rather than a theory, 
since the approach is empirical, and not limited to any particular theoretical result or 
model.
862
 Thus, they are quick to warn that the method is not without limitations.
 863
  These 
consist of limitations within the method and the novelty of the subject matter of terroristic 
conflicts in general and targeted killing in particular. The limitations encountered followed by 
approaches to surmounting them in this thesis are addressed below in a way that counters the 
assumptions and advantages of game theory. For ease of reference, these are enumerated 
below: 
6.2.2.3.1. Limitation within the Method 
1. Assumption that all players choose intelligent and rational strategies. 
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Game theory is based on rationality, which in traditional economic models is the 
maximization of one’s own payoff.864 Every action, good or bad, can be rationalized in the 
name of self-interest. Therefore, in every situation, one is bound to always act to gain as 
much as possible, regardless of how it affects others. Thus, an intelligent-rational player will 
choose the decision that leads to the best outcome for him or herself, while bearing in mind 
the decisions of the opponent. Interestingly, studies have found that those most likely to 
exercise the economic model of a self-serving, payoff-maximizing agent are kindergarten 
students, but as they grow older, their behaviour begins to favour cooperative strategies.
865
  
However, a constant difficulty with game theory modelling is defining, limiting, isolating or 
accounting for every single factor and variable that influences strategy and outcome. In many 
cases, there is usually a factor that simply cannot be accounted for.
866
  For instance, no 
strategy can predict the actions of a party in the throes of a religious revelation. Thus the 
game theory assumption that players have knowledge about their own and opponent’s pay-
offs is not practical in all cases.  
It has been pointed out that game theory can help only so much if an attempt is made at 
predicting realistic behaviour.
867
 In regard to the study of terrorism, the author of this thesis 
considers that intelligent rational thought may not rule in every strategic decision: Firstly, on 
the terrorists side there are more primitive motivators than best strategic decision to optimize 
outcomes. For example, some terrorist organisations are inclined to kill to satisfy a primal 
appetite for brutality without necessarily considering if it serves their interests in the long run.  
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Secondly, an intelligent decision making process might not operate because the behaviour, 
values and actions of the opponents of terroristic conflicts are not known. This is because 
they do not communicate each other’s decision options. They might not be capable of getting 
their most desired outcome until a series of different interactions have occurred. The 
following hypothetical illustration of ‘dangling a carrot in the face of a proverbial horse’ may 
help illustrate what is usually sought to be achieved from using game theory: 
A reluctant horse would not take its cart driver to a destination. The cart driver cannot make 
the horse do as he/she says without luring the horse out of the stables. What he or she must 
think about is how to lure the horse out of the stable without forcing it out, but instead 
making the horse think it is doing what it wants to do. The cart driver knows that if a carrot is 
dangled in front of the horse whilst stepping backwards and out of the stable, the horse would 
likely follow. The carrot treat is the motivation for stepping out of the stable and possibly 
doing as the rider says. 
 
Game theory is about answering the question ‘what strategy can be applied to make an 
opponent do what I want?’ It helps to know what to anticipate when making a rational 
intelligent decision. This way, it is easier to consider a response when applying game theory 
and pre-determining outcomes in payoffs. Unless parties know the decisions their enemies 
are likely to take and how those enemies would likely respond to their strategic decisions, 
they would be making responsive decisions intuitively as is the case with terroristic conflicts. 
Game theory will be of little advantage where it is difficult to pre-determine the strategy that 
is likely to invoke compliance. On the other hand, it may be anticipated that there are at least 
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three ways of deciding in terroristic conflicts: brutally motivated, intuitive decision and 
intelligent rational decision. Since game theory allows for assessment of iterative interaction 
to determine strategic behaviour, it creates the opportunity to possibly predict some terrorist 
actions. 
2. The assumption that the number of players or competitors is finite.  
This assumption presumes that interactions analyzed by game theory are simple. However, 
some interactions such as that between terrorists and states using targeted killing are complex 
and difficult to streamline.  Elster notes that generally game-theoretic and econometric 
analyses of the intentions of the organizers of suicide attacks are doomed to fail, because the 
organizers may not be as rational as the theory requires, and the theory has very little to say 
about the equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among more than two actors.
868
 A 
comprehensive model would have to take into account divisions within the parties to the 
conflict—government and dissident organizations—as well as foreign supporters of both 
sides.
869
 Indeed, through global media communication, individuals are now being radicalized 
and incited to acts of terror. There are an unknown but large number of independent terrorist 
‘players’, including those formerly part of a known group; all expressing similar mandates 
against the same countries.
870
 Autonomy and unpredictability of terrorist participants are 
increasing, and numbers of players exceed the standard two person game; analysing strategic 
interactions between parties thus becomes more complex and decisions and conclusions less 
certain. Even a researcher would find it difficult to know which interaction to focus on 
considering the proliferation of terrorism. 
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Secondly, even the designing of matrices for a two player interaction can seem unlimited and 
inexhaustible as one scenario prompts the analysis of others. It becomes necessary to 
streamline and focus on a few scenarios that can be used as reference points. This was the 
approach used in this thesis, considering the word count limitation. This is not to suggest that 
other scenarios are discarded as unimportant. The point is that game theory can be used to 
analyse a vast number of issues under one subject matter. This can either be an advantage or 
disadvantage:  
 
6.2.3.3.1 Advantages 
 
The vastness of the game theory approach shows that it can serve as a navigation tool for 
analysing and deriving answers to several issues of strategic decision making. Indeed game 
theory achieves all that it proposed to do, as stated in chapter 4 of this thesis. It prompted the 
analysis of the effectiveness of targeted killing from different standpoints than theoretical 
approaches may have offered. It modelled several strategic options in order to decipher which 
of them offer the best outcome.
871
 Indeed, it broke general questions into smaller units to 
analyse every aspect of the question in detail.  
 
6.2.3.3.2 Disadvantages 
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Firstly, a lot of effort was put into designing the game matrices and then describing its 
application to the scenarios. It may have been easier to simply make the same analysis 
without using game theory.  At the start, the application of game theory to the issues stated in 
chapter five seemed a very complex and difficult process. Several mistakes were, making the 
whole process time consuming. For example, when quantifying outcomes, the researcher had 
to make a constant note to refrain from comparing a party’s outcomes with its opponent in 
order to award numeric values; this is not a game theory approach. Game theory compares 
the outcomes a player’ derives from the various strategic options. The player does this by 
awarding numeric values to each option depending on best outcomes. It was only after much 
practise that the game theory approach seemed less complex to apply. However logically 
simple the approach may seem to economic experts or researchers who have gained 
experience over time, it may be unpopular to legal academics.  
 
Secondly, outcome values are arbitrarily decided by the designer of game theory matrices. 
Thus, it is possible for a researcher to bias both the results and conclusion, by inputting 
personal impression of outcome values. Indeed, in this thesis, extra care was taken to avoid 
influencing the end result outcomes with personal viewpoints. To avoid this, the designer 
needs to know the historical interactions between opponents, in order to know what they 
value. This is one reason why a hermeneutical analysis of ideological perspectives was 
conducted in this thesis. The game theory analysis cannot generate information on its own 
without prior in-depth knowledge of the inclinations and inhibitions of the parties . Each 
opponent was found to have different values for the same decision strategy. It would be 
systematically wrong for the designer to insert his own personal values. It is very important to 
stand in one of the players shoes and give outcome values with that perspective. The same 
rule applies to giving outcome values to decision options for the opponent.  
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6.2.3.4 Limitations as a result of the novelty of terroristic conflict 
 
Game theory application to the terroristic conflict under study was not limited by the 
weakness of the method alone. It was also limited by the novelty of the conflict, between 
states (state actors) and terrorists (non state actors). When reference is made to peace and war 
game theory, which is modelled after Prisoners dilemma, it considers the decision whether to 
make peace or wage war against an enemy. Usually, such peace war game theory analysis is 
done in reference to conflicts between states or organisations with established and defined 
regimen.
872
 It takes into account expected responses by foreign and domestic adversaries, 
supporters etc. These are done in a bid to assist decision making on national and international 
policies. For example, a game-theoretic focus on strategic interaction that assumes that states 
are rational unitary actors shows that war, being costly, is always ex post inefficient.
873
  This 
comes under one of the assumptions of game theory; that each player has a definite course of 
action.
874
 
 
Conflicts involving terrorists have proved more complex than those between states. It has 
shown how terrorists adopt mixed strategies, some of which are not all goal oriented but 
random.
875
 This randomness may be a calculated attempt at remaining unpredictable to their 
opponent. Notwithstanding, terrorists’ course appears to be indefinite and unpredictable.  For 
example, it may be easier to presume under a tit for tat (Peace, War) approach that the US is 
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less likely to wage war if al-Qaeda terrorists make peace (initiate a ceasefire and re-
negotiation of the conflict so as to benefit both parties). Whereas, there are no guarantees that 
terrorists would respond by making peace should the US choose to make peace (that 
considers ceasefire and negotiate terms that benefit both parties).  This means that the war 
against terror is as alien to the LOAC as it is to game theory discussions modelled after the 
peace and war game,. However, this method made the following contributions to research 
practice: It provided an alternative approach to analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing; 
it broadened the scope of readers of targeted killing; it created an awareness of the existence 
of the method of game theory which can serve as a precautionary guide from bad decision 
making involving conflict strategies.  
6.2.4 Overview of outcomes  
The doctrinal, hermeneutical and game theory methods were applied to articulate the 
understanding of the terrorism vs. targeted killing conflict. Limitations were encountered in 
using the methodologies. Whilst some of the limitations were anticipated and easily 
overcome, others were dominant and irresistible. 
The deficit in legal resources for comprehensively determining the legal implications of 
targeted killing counter-terrorism strategy proved that the subject matter is completely novel 
to the legislations enacted to regulate conflicts. By first making a comprehensive study of the 
law in action through text books, journals, articles and other secondary news materials, it 
becomes easier to understand the legal issues, dilemmas and debates over targeted killing. It 
was soon realised that the absence of legal categories that describe the terrorism v targeted 
killing conflict is the major issue causing controversy in legal debates. 
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The hermeneutical approach was relied upon to explore the foundational basis for targeted 
killing and terrorism, including the legal and philosophical perspectives of the ongoing war 
against terror. Although there were limitations of resources that fully described the 
philosophies that instigate terrorism and targeted killings, the hermeneutic approach is suited 
to explore issues under such limitations. Notwithstanding, care was taken that conclusions, 
which are predominantly the views of the researcher, were not coated with bias.   
A major reliance on infinitely repeated games, such as peace war is in the tendency for 
trigger strategies such as ‘tit-for-tat’ to eventually encourage cooperation that facilitates 
ceasefire and negotiation of the conflict; this is typically the ultimate aim in conflict 
situations. This is however not a realistic expectation from the terrorists who mainly get 
satisfaction from the act of killing. However, through the application of the hermeneutic and 
game theory approaches, in that sequence, this thesis is able to achieve better understanding 
of how the parties to the terroristic conflict under study reason and strategically interact with 
one another. Together, both approaches are useful in cautioning unrealistic expectations of 
the extent to which targeted killing is helpful in achieving its anti-terrorism goals. 
 
6.3. Overview of findings   
The first findings related to the actual application of the LOAC and Law Enforcement 
(IHRL) regimes to terroristic conflicts. Overall, it was concluded that, as a result of the 
novelty of the conflict (unusually involving terrorists who are non-state actors; terror and 
counter-terrorism operations done within civilian territories if considered under the LOAC or 
killing without fair trial when considered under IHRL); there were serious discrepancies 
between the legal standards that generally regulate conflicts and the actual practices in the 
war against terror. It was found that the enforcement of the LOAC was generally 
characterised by the US’s unconventional use of drone missiles against terrorist civilians and 
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within civilian territories.  It was also found that the terrorists (of al-Qaeda and Hamas) are 
unperturbed by their actions that consistently contravene all the laws that regulate conflict 
and human actions. Further, it was found that the enforcement of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter which is generally applicable during warfare or peace-time, was 
characterised by the US and Israel’s unconventional use of force in anticipation of 
unforeseeable attacks.  
 
The UN Charter’s Article 51 right to self-defence generally applicable to all humans were 
inadequately implemented by terrorist organisations and the states using targeted killing. 
While the former insist on defending terrorism as an expression of their self-defence rights 
against ideologies and claim that conflict with theirs; the latter claim the same self-defence 
right to use pr-emptive force against terrorists as a preventative measure against future 
terrorist attacks.  Thus, the application of the right to attack in self-defence, through the use 
of targeted killing had not fully met the standard of Article 51, UN Charter. While it is right 
to use force in self-defence, whether in the name of warfare or peacetime, it is important that 
the force is applied only against impending danger. The standard does not legalise the cases 
of targeted killings launched against terrorists unforeseeable threats.  
The research identified key themes and reasons for partial or non-fulfilment of both states’ 
obligations under the charter to wait to see a lethal threat advance before defending against it 
in a similar manner. These were the lack of practicality of such expectations under the 
Charter and the lack of alternatives for preventing future terrorists attacks other than the pre-
emptive use of targeted killing. This theme formed the basis for analysis of the literature in 
Chapter 3 which sought to understand and interpret the discrepancies mentioned above. 
Overall, the opinions in favour of the practicality of targeted killing were weighed against 
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those in favour of the rigid dictates of the conflict regulatory laws that prohibit warfare 
involving civilian participation and proximity. The chapter also compared two different 
interpretations of Article 51 of the UN Charter: the one that insist that the Charter intends that 
a victim must first see a lethal attack advance before defending against it; and the one that 
considers attacks anticipated (by hints from intelligence sources) but not seen, to be valuable 
proof of imminent threat.  
It was found that terrorists attack without warning, thus the first option is impractical. 
Spontaneity, especially in the use of suicide bombings, knives, vehicles and guns against 
unsuspecting victims have formed and will continue to form the main strategy that terrorists 
use when attacking western states.
 876
  Prior to such attacks, terrorists may give hints, through 
mediums such as propaganda videos, of intentions to carry out attacks. They do not usually 
precede their attacks with warning so their intended victims are unprepared to defend against 
the attacks.  However, such hints, which happen to be  the only ‘conducts’ of terrorists that 
are indicative of the imminence of an attack, may not reach the intensity level necessary to be 
qualified as an ‘armed attack,’ deserving of response in self-defence, in the absence of war, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the landmark Caroline case. Practically, 
owing to the spontaneous nature of terrorist attacks, a victim becomes aware that he/she is 
under armed attack, only at the time, or after the occurrence, but not immediately before the 
attack. Because such attacks cannot be easily prevented, terrorist plots will, most certainly, 
continue to thrive.  
It seems that as long as terrorists favour spontaneity as a tactic,
 
any strategy aimed at 
effectively averting attacks must be pre-emptively used. Such concerns drive commentators 
to conclude that a proactive, tit for tat strategy, similar to what obtains within the scope of 
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warfare, is more practicable for combating terrorism.
 877
  It is in consideration of this that the 
US and Israel adopted the pre-emptive counterterrorism strategy of targeted killing, albeit 
illegal under international law.  The practice of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy 
varies slightly from how the LOAC currently directs that lethal force can be applied. For 
example, the targeting process aims at complying with the principle of distinction by 
premeditatedly identifying the real terrorist culprits, in order to target and kill them on a 
future date and as a way of distinguishing them from other innocent civilians.  
 
The above classification was important in demonstrating the limits of earlier works that 
generally attribute targeted killing solely to unwillingness on the part of the governments of 
US and Israel to comply with the rule of law without paying sufficient and necessary 
attention to the significant impediments occasioned by the practical challenges of terrorism. 
The research demonstrated that, even if it were the case that every government combating 
terrorism was willing to optimally comply with the warfare principles, it would mean limiting 
the targeted killing of terrorists to the times where the latter can be found in isolation of other 
civilians. In fact, a strict compliance with the LOAC will mean that the states cannot target 
and kill terrorists at any time because terrorists are still valued as civilians with immunity 
from being targeted under international law. If warfare is not applicable to terroristic conflict, 
then an attempt to strictly comply with Article 51, UN Charter which is applicable during 
peace time, will also mean that unless everyone who walks the streets is aware of an 
impending danger and is armed and ready to defend against it, the attacks against them will 
be successful. Knowing that the states are under obligation to obey this principle of 
distinction, terrorists do everything in their power to thwart the states’ efforts and avoid being 
targeted and killed by constantly remaining within civilian proximity.  
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Terrorists are also aware of their civilian immunity status that protects them from being 
attacked during warfare, so once they finish carrying out attacks they easily revert to 
pretending to be innocent civilians. With deceptions like these, it is difficult for states to 
easily identify terrorists. This is one reason why the targeting process does not offer undue 
advantage to terrorists; it does not award terrorists the same immunity that civilians (non-
combatants) are entitled to under the LOAC. Instead it relies on the intelligence of a kill list 
containing the names of terrorists in order to be alerted about potential terrorist threats. These 
unconventional ways of exercising the rights to use force under the LOAC and human rights 
generally is what causes uproar. Whereas, all that both states intend to do is strike a balance 
between what is lawful and what is expedient. It is important to comply with the doctrines of 
the LOAC, however, to the US and Israel, it is even more important to defend their 
sovereignties from terrorism without limitations from these same laws that permit the use of 
lethal force in self-defence. 
 
 Terrorism is considered, by the US and Israel, to be a serious threat deserving of 
commensurate responses.  Both states find themselves in a position where they have to 
actively defend against terrorism amidst argument over its legality. Even when they cannot 
comply with legality, they seem prepared to contend against it with an approach that seems 
practicable.  To the US and Israel, targeted killing is practicable so they defend targeted 
killing on the basis of practicality. The states are determined not to be bound by legality if it 
causes them to ‘passively’ address terrorism. They even call for an international recognition 
of the approach, considering it to be the best counterterrorism solution to modern day 
terrorism. Contingent upon this appeal was the need to study the effectiveness of targeted 
killing strategy in this thesis. It sought to answer the question: Is targeted killing deserving of 
this type of international recognition? Is there any truth to the states claims that seem to 
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contradict those of human rights activists and special rapporteurs that dismiss targeted killing 
on legal and humanitarian grounds?  
 The thesis temporarily set aside the issue of legality and analysed targeted killing by 
weighing targeted killing, based on past cases, against the optimum goals for which the 
strategy was devised. An empirical method of game theory that originates from the fields of 
Mathematics and Economics was employed to make this analysis. Game theory was applied 
as a tool for studying and making examples of how the US and Al-Qaeda try to do what is in 
their best interest so that it can be possible to determine their optimal strategies.
878
 The Game 
theory assessment prompted the researcher to thoroughly explore facts relating to previous 
interactions between the US and al-Qaeda. This allowed for the observation of specific 
responses to the different cases of targeted killing upon which the numerical values awarded 
in the matrices were based. Without this it would have been difficult to objectively derive the 
real implications of targeted killing strategy and envisage that a prolonged reliance on 
targeted killing may yield in counter-productive outcomes in future. The questions explored 
were whether, so far: 
1. The US targeted killing of al-Qaeda leaders and notorious members has effectively 
eliminated threats from al-Qaeda organisation and its allies? 
2. If yes, to what extent and at what cost? 
3. If no, what other viable alternatives to targeted killings can be explored to give the US 
desired counterterrorism outcome?   
The game theory format called a game theory ‘matrix’ which is a simple mathematical table 
was used to numerically summarise the US and al-Qaeda’s feasible outcomes from using 
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alternative strategies to killing. The table was used to emphasize the weakness and the 
strengths of the alternative strategies whilst weighing them against the US targeted killing 
and terrorist killing. The researcher decided a score margin between 1 – 5, with 5 being the 
maximum and 1 the lowest that was awarded based on the opponents response. This was an 
attempt at measuring the perceived impact targeted killing had on terrorists and the impact 
terrorists killings had on the US. These scores were later measured against other strategies, 
including the parties attacks on each other’s assets, sanctioning of each other’s assets, media 
campaigns against each other and the cliché of peace negotiations. A party is awarded points 
ranging from 4-1, depending on the extent to which it is able or unable to invoke a desired 
response from its opponent. Through further research inspired by game theory, it was found 
that targeted killing so far, has not overpowered al-Qaeda, instead, it seemed to have fuelled 
the conflict between the two entities. It was the seemly old fashioned peace negotiations 
strategy, if mutually decided by all parties to terroristic conflicts that was perceived to be a 
better strategy for achieving an end to terrorism generally. In this way, the parties can make 
compromise standards that balance the rights of the perpetrators and victims of targeted 
killings.  
 
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This research has analysed the effectiveness of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy.  
Although the US and Israel’s use of targeted killing were the main focus of legal, historical 
and ideological inquiry, only the US strategic interaction with al-Qaeda terrorists served as a 
case study for analysing the effectiveness of targeted killing.  The aim of the analysis was to 
evaluate how the practice of targeted killing measured up to the expectations of the US; with 
the purpose of identifying and highlighting the unproductive and sometimes 
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counterproductive implications of using targeted killing and possible paths for reform. The 
adoption of hermeneutical analysis for studying targeted killing is not novel in the literature. 
However, it is the attribution of the liberal cosmopolitan, realists and pragmatic ideologies to 
the parties of the war against terror in general and the debaters of targeted killing in 
particular, in exercise of the hermeneutic approach that is new to the literature. It is believed 
that this method allows for a new and critical perspective of the justification for terrorism and 
targeted killing. Also, the game theory method for examining and evaluating the effectiveness 
of targeted killing was believed to offer an original and fresh approach to the general 
literature on the subject. The adoption of this approach has, aside allowing for new and 
critical perspectives, resulted in a number of findings and suggestions for reconsidering the 
use of targeted killing strategy and improving the strategic interaction between states and 
terrorist organisations. Some of these are reviewed below. 
 
 
 
6.5  Recommendations 
In arguing and justifying the choices of the doctrinal, hermeneutical and game theory 
approaches, one of the points raised was that this approach required the researcher to, after 
making the necessary legal and socio-legal analyses, go further to establish grounds for 
reforms based on those analyses. It was found in the course of this research that such 
proposals and ideas, in addition to being a distinct element of the research, flowed naturally 
during each stage of analysis. It is believed that this research has set a clear path for future 
legislative reforms and highlighted areas for future research on how to improve the study of 
the effectiveness of targeted killing counterterrorism strategy or any other conflict related 
strategy for that matter. 
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One area in need of practical and proactive counterterrorism measures is the LOACs weak 
protective mandate of those defending against terrorism. The protection of civilians is 
understandably lauded. As it turns out, however, terrorists benefit from the protective 
influences of the LOAC more than states.  It was argued that the LOAC could still be made 
effective without departing from the original intention of its drafters but by deciding what 
statuses to award terrorists under international law. If, for political and practical reasons 
terrorists cannot be regarded as state actors under the LOAC or criminals under Law 
enforcement, then international legislators must not shy away from the need to enact a whole 
new set of laws that specifically determines how terrorism can be addressed. Although it 
seems that such laws will be acknowledged only by the states at war with terrorism as 
terrorists generally feel non committal to western laws. This would entail that the legislators 
take the extra step of specially drafting the laws in such a way that it regards states needs to 
adequately combat terrorism. It seems that the states will go ahead to use targeted killings 
whether or not it is illegal, however it was argued in the thesis that states do not deliberately 
contravene international law, they only derogate from it when the laws do not cater for their 
all important counter-terrorism needs.  
 
A number of strategies were also highlighted by which the US, Israel and other western states 
could counter terrorism other than through the use of targeted killings. Some of the important 
strategies that stood out include an attack on terrorist assets and the ceasefire peace 
negotiations. Out of the two options, it was clear from the research that the surest way to 
effectiveness was in the mutual agreement upon a cease fire peace settlement as it is likely to 
produce better counterterrorism outcomes. Although it may seem that, owing to terrorists 
subversive nature, arriving at rational conclusions are unlikely, however, this thesis invites us 
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to note that even terrorists themselves have goals; they want to achieve something from the 
conflict. If they compare the option of ceasefire and peace negotiations with the risk of being 
targeted; especially if targeted killing campaign intensifies against terrorist who are 
unprepared to die for their causes, then terrorists may rightly consider the former option. This 
conclusion was based on the finding that aside from the spiritual obligation to generally 
invoke terror, terrorism is also done in protest against the western governmental system. 
Should the international committee choose to negotiate some terms with terrorists, it remains 
to be seen whether terrorists will be willing to reach a compromise. 
 
On the issue of the ideological backgrounds upon which the war against terror is predicated, 
it was pointed out that the literature is concerned with making attempts at understanding 
terrorists’ ideologies. Granted, terrorism is done as an expression of terrorists ideologies; 
however, it was argued that this is not limited to terrorists alone as all parties are motivated 
by their ideologies when they express themselves during conflicts. The need to understand 
the US, Israel, and other western states motivations for targeted killing and other reactions to 
terrorism cannot be underestimated. From it comes a better understanding of the goals they 
seek to achieve from the strategies they choose. Thus, the literature is balanced and 
progresses further by the thorough assessment of states ideological incentives for using 
targeted killing made in this thesis. It was important to make this assessment because the 
effectiveness of targeted killing was measured against these goals.  
The scarcity in empirical and socio-legal based observations in the literature over the 
effectiveness of targeted killings is observed to be as a result of the fact that many scholars 
have not progressed beyond dismissing targeted killing as illegal or defending the strategy 
under the laws that regulate conflicts. The few that acknowledged the importance of 
evaluating the effectiveness of targeted killings have either confirmed or refuted the claims 
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that it is effective. There is no critical and empirical research based analysis in the literature 
that leads to the proposal of realistic counterterrorism mechanisms against terrorism under 
either the law enforcement regime or the LOAC. Falk’s literature statistically assessed the 
effectiveness of Israel’s targeted killing of Hamas terrorist leaders of Palestine and made 
conclusions that Israel’s strategy has been effective only to the extent of reducing suicide 
bombing fatalities. However, Israel’s targeted killing programme has not been effective in 
eliminating all threats from Hamas.  
This thesis is a progression of Falk’s literature and recommendation in which he suggested 
that future researchers adopt his empirical/statistical evaluative approach to assess targeted 
killing done by other states apart from Israel. His mention that from his research, it was not 
completely clear what makes the targeted killing strategy effective, prompts this research to 
adopt a different empirical approach for assessing the effectiveness of targeted killings. The 
aim was not only to derive answers but also to understand why the answers were generated. 
The game theory alternative approach has proved to be one that stimulates a researcher to 
further investigative and to understand his or her rationale for awarding numerical values in 
outcome against strategic choices. This promotes objectivity when numerically concluding on 
the effectiveness of a chosen strategy. Through this approach, it was made clear that although 
targeted killing may seem effective, it is only because it generates the satisfaction of being 
able to successfully avenge al-Qaeda terrorists’ attacks. However, an assessment of targeted 
killing in relation to the goal for which it is used suggests that targeted killing is nowhere 
near achieving its counterterrorism goals. The game theory approach to evaluating the 
effectiveness of a strategy should be relied upon more by researchers who make reflective 
analysis and study decision making. Like a conventional game, with game theory comes the 
stimulation to explore a subject matter from different angles.  
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6.6.  Implications for Future Research and Development 
The research done indicates that targeted killing is effective in retaliating terrorism and 
showing that the states doing the targeting have the assets needed to avenge terrorism. It is 
established that targeted killing is unsuccessful in mitigating an end to terrorism. Firstly, the 
conclusions drawn and the manner in which the said effectiveness was evaluated as it pertains 
to the US, may also be relevant when evaluating the effectiveness of targeted killing, or any 
other conflict strategy carried out by different states.  Secondly, it has shown how an 
appreciation of the limitations under the LOAC and IHRL are necessary for any future 
reforms. Unfortunately, specific suggestions on the most realistic ways in which terrorists 
should be regarded under international law was not offered. Thirdly, the research has 
demonstrated that ceasefire peace negotiations will be more beneficial to the US than targeted 
killing, however, it does not take into account the unlikelihood of arriving at cease fire peace 
negotiations with al-Qaeda terrorists and what action should be taken if an attempt at such 
negotiations fail.  
Should such negotiation proceed into fruition, then it is expected that the international 
committee of states would generally continue to be faced with difficulties of accepting and 
living with the unconventional terms terrorists will bring to the agreement table. For such 
proposed approach to work, perhaps terrorists should be isolated from the democratic living 
of western states. One possible area for future research would be on how to get terrorists to 
enter into rational peace agreement with states. Whether or not such negotiation can 
potentially succeed or if it does, whether or not terrorists will remain bound to such 
agreement is an issue which was not explored.    
 
Finally, this research has revealed the need for further discussions and research on the 
effectiveness of targeted killing and the proffering of suggestions on ways to combat 
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terrorism. While the US and Israel have at different times achieved cooperation from other 
affluent states in curbing terrorism, it is clear that attention is needed from international 
bodies as a whole. In terms of research; other researches that either disagree or build up on 
researches current literatures will contribute maximally to enriching and improving the 
literature on the effectiveness of targeted killings.  
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